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ABSTRACT
The purpose of this study is to utilize the insights 
provided by the decisions of the Virginia Court of Appeals 
during the years 1776-1830 to gain a fuller tinderstanding 
of the concept of "republicanism" through an analysis of 
its application in courts of law.
It is clear that in the years after the Revolution, 
the Virginia Court of Appeals made a striking statement 
about the nature of that Revolution in Virginia. It 
defined a new constitutional order by elevating the 
Virginia constitution to the plane of higher law, and by 
articulating and implementing the doctrine of popular 
sovereignty. The court made workable such previously 
theoretical constructs as the separation of powers, and 
adapted the English legal heritage to republican dictates 
and the demands of a new society. It was also instrumental 
in applying new republican conceptions to specific areas of 
the law. In so doing, the court displayed a clear 
deference to the policy initiatives of the legislative 
branch.
While applying republican principles, the Virginia 
court added a decidedly conservative gloss, favoring stable 
rules of law and the protection of existing property rights 
at every opportunity, in the process supporting the 
existing political order. At the same time, the Virginia 
Court of Appeals was in the forefront of a localistic 
response to the challenges posed by the establishment of a 
new federal government.
Taken together, these conclusions suggest that 
Virginia retained in large part a conservative, localistic 
strain of republicanism well into the nineteenth century, 
while its judiciary remained essentially incrementalist in 
its policy-making approach.
vi
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION: REPUBLICANISM, THE COURTS, AND
THE REVOLUTIONARY SETTLEMENT
The doctrine of "republicanism" has long been central 
to American life. It served as a theoretical justification 
for the Revolution, imbued the institutions of the new 
nation, and has functioned as the basis for American 
political thought from that day to this. Considering the 
fundamentality of republicanism to the American experience, 
it is remarkable how little the doctrine is actually 
tinder stood. Despite continual efforts to explicate the 
nuances of republican theory, the end result has been more 
to muddle than to enlighten.
Scholars have long been interested in the intellectual 
aspects of early American republicanism; in particular, 
analyzing {and arguing about) what the term encompassed, 
the wellsprings of the doctrine, and its implications for 
the American experience.1 This, too, is a study of 
republicanism in the early American republic. It is not, 
however, a study of republican "ideology” in the usual 
sense of the term. The students of intellectual history 
who have focused their attention upon republicanism have 
performed inestimable service in the effort to better
2
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3understand the conceptual framework that motivated the 
citizens of the new American republic- But for all their 
perceptiveness, they have left unanswered— indeed, unasked—  
the kinds of questions that are immensely useful to a true 
understanding of the early Republic; the kinds of questions 
that reveal the actual workings of republicanism among the 
participants in the republican experiment. While the 
broader, more theoretical studies form an indispensable 
precursor, it is time for the next step: a study of the
application of the lofty principles of republicanism to the 
mundane affairs of everyday life. For it is only through 
an understanding of the day-to-day reality of applied 
republicanism that we can hope to resolve the larger 
theoretical issues posed by the historians of ideology.
This analysis, then, is an effort at illuminating the 
application of republican principles. It will seek to do 
so within a manageably narrow focus, both geographically 
{the state of Virginia}, as well as in terms of the source 
materials utilized (appellate court decisions).
Discerning the precise nature of those "republican 
principles" is part of the task at hand. Indeed, defining 
"republicanism" is no easy matter, and has been a central 
problem since the inception of the republic. In 1803, St. 
George Tucker commented that "the revolution which 
separated the present United States from Great Britain . . . 
produced a corresponding revolution . . .  in the principles 
of our government . . .."2 Most of Tucker's contemporaries
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
4would have agreed that the break with England had been 
accompanied by a revolution in principles, and most would 
have been content to ascribe the label "republican" to the 
new order. But there was considerable disagreement over 
the precise meaning of republicanism. Certainly it implied 
an absence of monarchy and aristocracy.3 Beyond that, 
agreement vanished. Some viewed it essentially as only the 
removal of the British monarchy from the constitutional 
structure, while others viewed it as a blueprint for a 
reordering of society.4 Different conceptualizations of 
republicanism were to continue into the nineteenth century. 
The perceptions of this construct may also have varied by 
region, and even by class.3 All of this goes to suggest 
the difficulty in making any valid generalizations with 
respect to republicanism. Indeed, part of the strength of 
republicanism and the reason for its almost universal 
acceptance was due to the fact that it was such a vague 
concept that it could be, in effect, all things to all 
people.6
The articulation of republican principles could be 
found, in the first instance, in the constitutions and 
statutes of the various colonies which were adopted in the 
years immediately after the break with Great Britain. Such 
statements of republican policy, while important, are still 
an incomplete guide to an understanding of "applied 
republicanism.” While the constitutions and statutes were 
key efforts to apply republican concepts to the pragmatic
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
5task of actual governance, these documents were themselves 
essentially statements of policy which, in turn, had to be 
applied at the level of individual action. Thus, to truly 
reach the essence of republicanism— that is, to perceive 
republicanism in the swirl of day-to-day existence— our 
attention must be directed to the forum where republican 
principles were reduced to the level of pragmatic deci­
sions— that is, to the courts.
In the courts (here, in particular, the Court of 
Appeals of Virginia) could be found the application of 
republican principles at all levels of sophistication, from 
the high theory of constitutional interpretation to such 
pragmatic questions as who would receive the assets of a 
deceased's estate. Judicial decisions, indeed, are 
particularly suited to our task, since they provide such 
clear examples of theoretical principles in practical 
application. As James Willard Hurst once put it, "because 
compared with other modes of social adjustment law yields 
an uncommon amount of formally defined choices and 
decisions, legal sources present to a knowledgeable reader 
a specially reliable means to identify continuities and 
discontinuities or changes of direction in social 
relations."7 Indeed, "a society reveals itself in its law. 
Its points of growth and the interests it values may be 
disclosed even in the decision of a seemingly technical and 
insignificant legal question."8 The nature of 
republicanism in its every-day form, then, is best
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
articulated in the decisions of its courts. Leonard Levy 
has noted that through judicial decisions, ”we may discern 
what [society] thought about the relation of the individual 
to the state and of the states to the nation; about rights, 
duties, and liabilities, about the roles of government; and 
about the character of law itself. We may also learn how 
liberty and order were comparatively valued; which 
interests were deemed important enough to secure in legal 
form; and where the points of social tension, growth, and 
power were.”9 It is in the answers to such questions that 
our insights into the nature of the new order in Virginia 
can be found.
More specifically, the essential issues in this study 
can be simply stated. Four questions arise which are of 
central importance, and each relates in one way or another 
to the nature of the "Revolutionary settlement" in 
Virginia; that is, how Virginia came to grips with the new 
order which was forged in the fires of a republican 
revolution and tempered by several decades of experience in 
implementing the new reality.
The first area of investigation is the substantive 
application of republican ideology at the state level. The 
constitution, statutes, and— especially— the decisions of 
the Court of Appeals provide an opportunity to gain an 
understanding of the substance of the republican revolution 
in Virginia. In the years after the Revolution, the court 
was instrumental in the implementation of theoretical
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
7concepts such as constitutionalism and popular sovereignty. 
At a more prosaic level the court's application of 
republican theory took the guise of adapting the English 
common law to Virginia's republican environment and 
implementing legislative enactments of republican prin­
ciples. After 1787, the Court of Appeals also helped to 
articulate Virginia's response to an important shift in 
the republican universe: the creation of a new federal
government of undetermined scope and powers. In all of 
these areas the court played a principal role in Virginia's 
response to a new republican reality.
A second question involves whether the legislature or 
the court took the leading role in implementing the new 
republican principles (the executive was relatively weak in 
early Virginia). The significance of this stems from its 
implications for such republican notions as representation 
and popular sovereignty. It also serves as a measure of 
the change that occurred between the Revolution and 1830 in 
the approach to the making of policy in a republican state.
A third area of analysis is related to this conception 
of change over time; that is, it looks to the dynamism 
exhibited by the Court of Appeals in its treatment of 
republican issues. The generally-accepted interpretation 
holds that between the Revolution and 1830 there was a 
considerable transformation in both the substance of 
republicanism and in its application. Scholars such as 
Gordon Wood, John M. Murrin, and Rowland Berthoff have
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
8suggested that republican values shifted from a focus on
communalism and hierarchy to the celebration of 
individualism and equality.10 "By 1820," said Wood, 
"Americans had moved into another century, not only in time 
but in thought, in the way they perceived themselves and 
their world. They had experienced a social and cultural 
transformation as great as any in American history. . . . 
This vast transformation, this move from classical
republicanism to romantic democracy in a matter of decades,
was the real American revolution . . .."lx On the 
institutional side, legal historians such as James Willard 
Hurst and Morton Horwitz have argued that courts grew ever 
more activist ("instrumentalist") in the decades after the 
Revolution, and by 1830 the judiciary was pursuing a policy 
agenda in a manner not unlike previous legislative 
activity.12 The objective is to see if Virginia's 
experience fits this pattern.
A fourth, related, aspect of the analysis incorporates 
all of the above issues and seeks to integrate the Virginia 
experience into generally accepted versions of the 
transformation of American politics and society at the turn 
of the nineteenth century. In particular, the focus is 
upon the extent to which Virginia (and the South in 
general) depart from the accepted interpretation. Several 
of the scholars analyzing this period suggest that the 
conclusions regarding the transformation of republicanism 
may not be valid for the South. Harry Scheiber indicates
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
that the South may have been "fundamentally different," 
while Gordon Wood, in his conclusion that the triumph of 
liberalism was overwhelming, adds a disclaimer that this 
was true "at least outside the South."13 Perhaps no one 
has posed the issue more clearly, or more strongly, than 
Scheiber: "Was the South so dominated by the 1slaveocracy'
interests, supported by the region's 'deference-politics' 
tradition and structure, that the ante-bellum South was 
fundamentally different . . . from the rest of the country? 
. . .  We may need a new typology of the ante-bellum 
southern states . . .,"14 One of the tasks before us is 
to test this hypothesis and, if necessary, to begin to 
develop that "new typology” of Southern republicanism.
The resolution of all of these issues provides a key 
to our understanding of the practical application of 
republicanism in Virginia. It is clear that Virginia did 
adopt, through its constitution and supporting statutes, a 
republican solution to the issues facing the Commonwealth 
at the inception of the Revolution. The Court of Appeals 
was intimately involved in this process as well, not only 
in the mere application of the republican principles set 
out in constitution and statute, but also in actively 
defining the substance of republicanism in Virginia. In 
doing so, the Virginia Court of Appeals made a striking 
statement about the nature of the Revolution in Virginia.
In the years after the Revolution, the court defined a new 
constitutional order through the practical implementation
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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of such conceptual matters as constitutional supremacy, 
popular sovereignty, and the separation of powers. It 
adapted the English legal heritage to republican dictates, 
and implemented legislative assertions of republican 
principles. In the process, the court added a conservative 
gloss to those republican principles, favoring stable rules 
of law and the protection of existing property, and by 
implication, at least, supporting the existing social 
order. At the same time, the Virginia court was in the 
forefront of a localistic response to the challenges posed 
by the establishment of the new federal government.
The Virginia Court of Appeals also carved out a unique 
niche for itself in the policy-making process. The court 
adopted a deferential attitude toward the legislative will 
where that will was discernible. In areas where no 
legislative mandate existed, the court followed what might 
be termed an "implementalist" policy that stressed the 
achievement of a reasonable result within the context of 
existing policy approaches. The only real exception to the 
court's reticent approach was in the field of judicial 
review, where the court placed the will of the "people," as 
expressed in the constitution, above all other priorities.
Interestingly, these judicial attitudes and approaches 
remained remarkably consistent throughout the period 
studied. Taken together, these conclusions represent a 
departure from the generally-accepted interpretation of the 
early national period, and mark Virginia as a potentially
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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critical piece of the puzzle that was early America. The 
experience of Virginia, for example, may be a key to our 
understanding of the divergence of Northern and Southern 
interests, attitudes, and approach in the nineteenth 
century.
The bulk of the following analysis will be centered on 
the interpretation of decisions of the Virginia Court of 
Appeals. To place the Court of Appeals in its proper 
institutional context, a brief summary of the genesis and 
structure of the Virginia court system may be helpful.15 
The longstanding system of local ("inferior") county courts 
and corporation courts had been left undisturbed by the 
Revolution. The colonial General Court, however, made up 
of the governor and his councillors, had ceased to exist 
following the collapse of royal government. That court had 
exercised both original and appellate jurisdiction, and 
united the functions of law and equity. The void was 
quickly filled by the Virginia patriots in 1776. The 
Virginia constitution of 1776 had laid the foundation of 
the first state court system by providing for the appoint­
ment of "judges of the Supreme Court of Appeals, and 
General Court, Judges in Chancery, [and] Judges of 
Admiralty . . ..1,16 The details of organization were left 
to the General Assembly, which by a series of enactments
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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between 1776 and 1779 established a Court of Admiralty, a 
High Court of Chancery, a General Court, and a Court of 
Appeals.17
The Court of Admiralty exercised admiralty jurisdic­
tion, and had a bench consisting of three judges. This 
court ceased to exist after 1789 when admiralty jurisdic­
tion was transferred to the federal courts. The new 
General Court succeeded to the common-law jurisdiction of 
the colonial General Court. Its jurisdiction was "general 
over all persons, and in all matters, or things at common 
law" where the debt or claim was ten pounds or more. It 
also possessed jurisdiction in criminal cases. The 
General Court also had appellate jurisdiction over 
judgments at law of the county and corporation courts. The 
bench was composed of five judges. The High Court of 
Chancery took over the equity jurisdiction of the old 
General Court. Like its common-law counterpart (the new 
General Court), it had general jurisdiction "over all 
persons and in all causes in chancery" where the value was 
ten pounds or above, both in original cases and appeals 
from the chancery side of the county courts. The bench 
consisted of three judges, or chancellors.
The first Court of Appeals, the body that most 
concerns us, did not have a separate bench, but was 
composed of all the superior court judges: the three
chancellors, the five judges of the General Court, and the 
three admiralty judges. This appeals court reviewed
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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decrees of the High Court of Chancery, judgments of the 
General Court, and sentences of the Court of Admiralty, 
where the amount was fifty pounds and above or the matter 
involved a freehold or franchise.18
This initial court system lasted only about a decade; 
by 1788 the inefficiencies in the system caused the General 
Assembly to undertake a radical restructuring. In that 
year, the jurisdiction of the General Court'was, for all 
practical purposes, parcelled out to eighteen district 
courts, to be attended by judges of an enlarged General 
Court (which retained only an extremely limited jurisdic­
tion in its own right). The High Court of Chancery was 
reduced to one judge.19
Importantly, the Court of Appeals was now constituted 
as a separate court, with its own bench of five judges.
Its jurisdiction remained essentially the same as before. 
Although there was some further tinkering with the other 
courts,20 for the remainder of the period under study (that 
is, from 1789-1830), the Court of Appeals retained the same 
essential characteristics.21 Its judges represented the 
court of last resort in virtually all cases (except in 
criminal matters). The Virginia Court of Appeals, then, 
represented the final judicial statement on the vast 
majority of substantive and procedural issues that found 
their way to the Virginia court system. As such, its 
decisions are deserving of close study for the light they
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
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may shed on the practical application of republican 
principles in early Virginia.22
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22. This study does not emphasize the individual per­
sonalities of the judges on the Court of Appeals during 
the period studied. It is possible that these personal 
qualities may have had some— perhaps indeterminable— impact 
upon the court's policy decisions. It is unlikely, 
however, that they had a major effect. Fortunately for the 
student of the court, the membership of the tribunal was 
remarkably stable in the early national period. In the 
forty-two years under study, the five-member panel had only 
fifteen different justices on its bench (see Appendix B).
Of these, only a handful appeared to take a leading role in 
shaping the court's decisions. Edmund Pendleton (1788- 
1303), St. George Tucker (1804-1811), and Spencer Roane 
(1794-1822), in particular, loom large (in the final decade 
judicial participation was more dispersed). There were, of 
course, occasional personality clashes among members of the 
judiciary, as elsewhere. The most famous of these existed 
between Edmund Pendleton and George Wythe of the High Court 
of Chancery, and between St. George Tucker and Spencer 
Roane. There is, however, no substantial evidence that the 
substance of the court's decisions was materially affected 
by any of this.
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ESTABLISHING A CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER
The Revolution which began in 1775 marked a watershed 
in the relationship between the American colonies and the 
mother country. The actual fighting which erupted in April 
of that year made irreversible the drift toward disunion, 
and within fifteen months the independence of the American 
colonies was formally proclaimed. But those developments, 
momentous as they were, were not the most revolutionary 
events of 1775-1776. That sobriquet must be reserved for 
the establishment of the several state governments in the 
vacuum left by the collapse of the royal colonial rule.
The mere construction of new governments in the midst of an 
unprecedented revolt against the Crown was bold enough, but 
what made the move truly revolutionary was the nature of 
the governments created. For in responding to the 
practical necessity of establishing some form of government 
over their society, the revolutionaries seized the 
opportunity "to reconsider the nature of their government 
and to formulate explicitly the assumptions on which they 
wished state power . . .  to rest."1
18
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The first step, of course, in Virginia as elsewhere, 
was the formation of the new state government itself. The 
momentous nature of this undertaking was not lost upon the 
Virginians. Like their fellow revolutionaries in the 
other colonies, Virginia patriots recognized that they were 
"the first people whom heaven has favoured with an 
opportunity of deliberating upon and choosing the forms of 
government under which they should live."2 In Virginia, 
the process began in earnest in May of 1776 when the 
Virginia Convention appointed "a committee to prepare a 
declaration of its rights, and such a plan of government as 
will be most likely to maintain peace and order in this 
colony, and secure substantial and equal liberty to the 
people.”3 By June 29, 1776, the Virginia Convention had 
completed its deliberations and produced the calied-for 
"plan of government" in the form of a "Declaration of 
Rights," followed by a "Constitution or Form of Govern­
ment." These documents were at once a fulfillment of 
revolutionary ideals and a blueprint for the practical 
governance of the new Commonwealth.4
While the framers were responsible for constructing 
the new plan of government, the Virginia Court of Appeals, 
in turn, took a leading role in implementing this rather 
amorphous document, and thereby helped to make the 
constitutional frame of government a viable one. Indeed, 
the court made key contributions to Virginia's new 
constitutional order at all levels— institutional,
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theoretical, and practical. Perhaps the court's most 
momentous contribution came at the institutional level, 
where it construed the constitution to be a law superior to 
mere statutory enactments, thereby establishing the 
constitution as the fundamental framework around which a 
republican society would be erected.
The court also helped to define and implement the 
theoretical underpinnings of Virginia's new constitution, 
particularly with respect to the key doctrine of popular 
sovereignty. In the process, the Court of Appeals 
contributed to a fascinating irony in Virginia's approach 
to the new constitutional order. In the midst of adopting 
seemingly radical solutions (such as popular sovereignty) 
to the issues facing Virginians after the break with 
England, the Commonwealth applied those radical solutions 
in a remarkably conservative manner. For example, the 
court, by supporting the constitution's radical approach to 
"sovereignty,” also gave its implicit blessing to that 
document's conservative definition of "popular" (that is, 
who was entitled to participate politically in the new 
order). This was a limited definition, designed to 
maintain the authority of the existing power structure.
The court also played an essential role at another 
level. The constitution represented, by its very nature, a 
generalized statement of the desired structure of govern­
ment, a mere skeletal form which had to be fleshed out to 
become a smoothly functioning system. Here, too, the Court
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of Appeals was instrumental in adding definition to the new 
constitutional order. By defining and implementing such 
novel constitutional doctrines as the separation of powers, 
for example, the court removed republicanism from the realm 
of the abstract and placed it squarely within the reality 
of everyday existence.
Finally, in the process of establishing this new 
constitutional order in Virginia, the Court of Appeals 
carved out a unique and important role for itself in 
Virginia's republican universe as the primary "interpreter" 
of the republican principles and doctrines contained in the 
constitution and declaration of rights.
Virginia’s constitution and declaration of rights 
contained language approaching rhetorical beauty in its 
articulation of such overarching republican principles as 
popular sovereignty, respect for individual rights, and 
support for communal ideals.3 The constitution and 
declaration of rights, however, as august as their language 
was, had no irrefutable claim to any other status than a 
mere legislative statement of the desired nature of a new 
republican commonwealth, subject to legislative amendment 
or rescission at any time. This was due to the fact that 
the Virginia constitution and declaration of rights had 
been enacted as ordinances of the Virginia convention
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(i.e., interim legislature) in the same manner as all other 
enactments of that session. Despite the lack of overt 
differentiation between statute and constitution, however, 
the Court of Appeals almost immediately began to make 
unequivocal statements about the superiority of that 
constitution to mere legislative enactments. This notion 
of constitution as higher law was a conception that became 
central to emerging perceptions of the proper nature of a 
republican state.
This issue first arose in a judicial context in the 
case of Commonwealth v. Caton in 1782. The Court of 
Appeals had been established in 1779, but before this time, 
all that had come before the Court were some petitions 
concerning land titles, which had been continued from term 
to term. Thus it was that when Commonwealth v. Caton came 
on to be heard as its first reel adjudication, public 
interest and attention were high.6 Commonly called "The 
Case of the Prisoners," Commonwealth v. Caton was a high- 
profile prosecution of three leading Tories for treason.
The matter at issue arose in the context of an apparent 
disagreement between the constitution and the statute as to 
the power to pardon. Under the constitution, the governor 
had the power to pardon in most cases, except when "the law 
shall otherwise direct," in which case it was the privilege 
of the House of Delegates to grant the pardon.7 But a 
statute had passed which provided that, in cases of 
treason, the power to pardon passed not to the House, but
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to the House and Senate jointly. In this case the accused 
traitors had been convicted, then pardoned by the House, 
but the Senate had refused to concur in the pardon. The 
prisoners attempted to evade execution by asserting that 
the pardon by the House was sufficient under the constitu­
tion. The General Court adjoined the issue to the Court of 
Appeals due to the "novelty and difficulty" of the case.8
The majority of the Court avoided the constitutional 
issue by finding non-compliance with the statute, but Judge 
George Wythe, in dicta (that is, judicial language not 
binding upon later adjudications), made a ringing statement 
about the role of the constitution, court, and legislature 
in the Virginia scheme. "If the whole legislature . . . 
should attempt to overleap the bounds prescribed to them by 
the people [in the constitution]," proclaimed Wythe, "I, in 
administering the public justice of the country, will meet 
the united powers, at my seat in this tribunal; and 
pointing to the constitution, will say, to them, here is 
the limit of your authority; and hither, shall you go, but 
no further” (emphasis supplied).9 Justice James Mercer 
also had no qualms about the issue, flatly maintaining that 
the act was unconstitutional.10 Although such language did 
not constitute an official holding of the court, the Caton 
case was an early assertion that the document labelled a 
"constitution" was somehow superior to mere legislation.
The Court of Appeals was much more decisive in 1788 
when it next faced a statute of doubtful constitutionality.
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In that year the General Assembly had attempted to resolve 
longstanding problems in Virginia's judicial system b$ 
restructuring it. A law was passed creating new district 
courts throughout the state.11 The justices of the Court 
of Appeals were charged with the duty of sitting on these 
new courts as circuit judges. These judges took this law 
to be an unconstitutional affront to their independence 
through the imposition of burdensome new duties. When the 
court met for its Spring Term, in May, 1788, the judges 
determined to resist this legislative encroachment.
Instead of flatly declaring it unconstitutional, however, 
the court adopted a more conciliatory stance. It addressed 
a Remonstrance to the legislature, stating the grounds of 
their objections.12 In so doing, the Court explicitly 
recognized that "the constitution and the act are in 
opposition and cannot exist together . . .." This 
presented no insuperable difficulties, however, since "the 
former must control the operation of the latter."13 Here, 
then, was an unequivocal assertion of the idea of the 
constitution as superior to statute.
By the nineteenth century, the supremacy of the 
c o n s t i t u t io n  was substantially unquestioned. In 1828, in 
the case of Crenshaw v. Slate River Co., the court treated 
as axiomatic the conception that principles of the 
constitution "limit the powers of the Legislature, and 
prohibit the passing [of] any Law violating those prin­
ciples ." The generally accepted theory of constitutional
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superiority that evolved was probably best summed up by 
Judge John Green in Crenshaw: "The Legislature of the 
State is declared by our Constitution to be a complete 
Legislature, and consequently has all the powers of 
Sovereignty, except so far as they are limited by the 
Constitutions of Virginia and the United States” (emphasis 
supplied).l4
In siim, then, it was the Court of Appeals which first 
articulated this theory of constitutional supremacy in 
Virginia, and best defined its limits. Importantly, the 
conceptualization behind this elevation of constitution 
over statute goes to the heart of notions of republicanism. 
It reflected developing notions of popular sovereignty, 
for, by conceiving of a charter granted by the people that 
governed all branches of government, no single branch could 
become the oppressor of the people.13 In addition, placing 
the wellspring of fundamental individual rights in an 
organic document such as a constitution made them distinct 
and somehow superior to— and protected from— governmental 
intervention.16 This was, then, a radical new conception 
of government, applied in a pragmatic fashion by the Court 
of Appeals.
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The enshrinement of the constitution as higher law was 
a key development, as it opened the way for the implementa­
tion of Virginia's new constitutional order. This 
"constitutional order," however, involved more than the 
mere words of the document itself; it represented also a 
new conceptualization about the essence of a republican 
government which was revolutionary in nature. Here, too, 
the Court of Appeals was instrumental in establishing the 
viability of this new conception in Virginia.
Unquestionably the most important theoretical concept 
underlying the Virginia constitution was the notion of 
popular sovereignty. The assumption that the new repub­
lican government derived its power, in one form or another, 
from the people, has been called the "one truly revolution­
ary concept to stem from the American revolution."17 
Indeed, the whole conception of sovereignty, and Virginia’s 
solution to the dilemma it presented, colored every aspect 
of the Revolutionary settlement in the Commonwealth.
The issue of sovereignty, which can be defined as "the 
supreme power over the whole,”18 was one of immense 
importance to Revolutionary Virginians. Indeed, it has 
been deemed "the most important doctrine of eighteenth- 
century political science," and, in the decade after 
independence, "the most important theoretical question of 
politics . . . the ultimate abstract principle to which 
nearly all arguments were sooner or later reduced."19 The 
signing of the Declaration of Independence did not resolve
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this issue; indeed, it was the declaring of independence 
that created it. The problem of sovereignty arose out of 
the universal assumption that sovereignty had to reside 
somewhere in the state. Prior to the Revolution, this 
assumption produced no difficulties, since the locus of 
power was presumed to reside in the crown, or in the crown- 
in-Parliament. This theoretical issue became pressing, 
however, the moment that the colonies threw off their 
allegiance to George III. If sovereignty had to reside 
somehwere, where did it now reside? The answer was not at 
all obvious. It might reside in the Continental Congress, 
the individual states, the county or town governments— or 
the people.20 This last possibility was the most radical, 
but Virginia opted for just this solution to the conundrum, 
and it did so at the earliest possible moment, in the most 
explicit terms. In framing their constitution in May and 
June of 1776, Virginians erected their new frame of 
government upon an expressly popular foundation. The 
Virginia declaration of rights unequivocally stated that 
"all power is vested in, and consequently derived from, 
the people," and that "government is . . . instituted 
for the common benefit, protection, and security of the 
people . . .."21
This bold assertion that "power is vested in . . . 
the people" was much more radical than it might first 
appear. By granting such authority and legitimacy to the 
people, Virginians were, in the words of Richard Buel,
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"revers[ins] the dominant presumptions of eighteenth- 
century English thought."22 Prior to this time, once 
authority had been vested in the magistrate (via "contract" 
or otherwise) it remained there indefinitely. The 
interests of the populace were subsumed to those of the 
sovereign, and to countenance any other conception was 
virtually unthinkable. "To someone steeped in British 
legal thought," observed Gordon Wood, "this explicit 
retention of legal sovereignty in the people was preposter­
ous . It could only signify a repudiation of the concept 
[of sovereignty] and an eventual breakdown of all govern­
mental order."23 To the traditional British way of 
thinking, then, power in the people meant anarchy. To 
sustain their novel theory of sovereignty, Virginians (and 
Americans in general) thus had to move beyond familiar 
conceptions and to formulate equally revolutionary precepts 
for a new constitutional and political order.24
Virginians, in other words, were forced by the new 
conception of sovereignty to rethink their whole system of 
government.23 As Thomas Jefferson perceived, "the new 
principle of representative democracy has rendered useless 
almost everything written before on the structure of 
government."26 Nonetheless, the solution did not prove to 
be all that difficult. Indeed, Virginia resolved its 
theoretical problem with a stroke of the pen. In a sense, 
the Commonwealth solved the dilemma of popular sovereignty 
in the very stating of the doctrine. By establishing the
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locus of power in the people by means of a written 
constitution, the framers of the Virginia declaration of 
rights both announced the doctrine of popular sovereignty 
and opened up whole new theoretical vistas.
The provisions of the new declaration of rights 
revealed the framers' allegiance to the notion that 
authority must remain in the people. Indeed, as St. George 
Tucker noted, the very "establishment of this constitution 
was an immediate act of sovereignty" by the citizens of the 
Commonwealth.27 The provisions themselves could hardly be 
more clear. In addition to flatly declaring "that all 
power is vested in, and consequently derived from, the 
people,” the framers went on to assert that "the magis­
trates are their trustees and servants, and at all times 
amenable to them." Moreover, continued the framers, 
"government is . . . instituted for the common benefit, 
protection, and security of the people." If the government 
should fail in that objective, "a majority of the community 
hath an indubitable, unalienable, and indefeasible right, 
to reform, alter, or abolish it."28 This, concluded 
Tucker, represented "the principle of democracy.1,29
This bold statement of popular power was revolutionary 
enough, but the framers went one step further in placing 
this language in a document they considered part of the 
constitution of Virginia. In doing so, the Virginians 
went beyond a mere statement about authority residing in 
the people and made a commitment to a radical variation of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
30
popular sovereignty. They thereby implicitly refuted a 
common theory of the locus of such power. The doctrine 
that the Virginians rejected in the framing of their 
constitution had its roots in traditional English govern­
mental theory. British constitutional theory, best 
articulated by Sir William Blackstone, held that the 
sovereign power of society resided in the legislature.30 
Although Blackstone was anything but a believer in popular 
sovereignty, the familiar belief in legislative power was 
adapted by many patriots to emerging conceptions of 
popular sovereignty. According to these lights, sover­
eignty indeed lay in the people— until the people delegated 
that sovereignty to the legislature, which thereafter held 
it unmolested. This, of course, was a variation of the old 
British conception of sovereignty, and was perhaps best 
expressed by Benjamin Rush in 1787. "The people of America 
have mistaken the word sovereignty," said Rush. "It is 
often said that 'the sovereign and all other power is 
seated in the people.' This idea is unhappily expressed.
It should be— 'all power is derived from the people.' They 
possess it only on the days of their elections. After 
this, it is the property of their rulers, nor can they [the 
people] exercise or resume it, unless it is abused."31
This orthodox theory of sovereignty as expressed by 
Rush remained a staple in America until at least 1787. But 
not in Virginia. The 1776 constitution had implicitly 
rejected this notion of legislative sovereignty, and the
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Court of Appeals made explicit the more radical theory that 
the people were truly sovereign over all branches, 
including the legislative, at all times. The doctrine that 
the constitution suggested and the Court clearly enunciated 
was the notion that the constitution was a law superior to 
mere legislative act.32 The importance of this constitu­
tional supremacy for notions of popular sovereignty lay in 
the fact that by enshrining the constitution above statute, 
the court was at the same time placing the people above the 
legislative branch (and implicitly, above all others).33 
Throughout the train of cases asserting constitutional 
supremacy, the Court of Appeals equated the language of the 
constitution with the will of the people. When, in 1788,
the court rebuked the General Assembly's attempt to
establish a new court system, the justices in their
"Remonstrance” to the legislature portrayed the constitu­
tion as a document "which the people in 1776, when the 
former bands of their society were dissolved, established 
as the foundation of . . . government . . .," wherein "the 
people" allocated the functions of government to the 
various branches. Consequently, concluded the court, no 
act of a mere department of government could be permitted 
to contravene this "act of the people"— i.e., the constitu­
tion.34 Similarly, George Wythe, in his ringing dicta in 
Caton v. Commonwealth. depicted the legislature as 
circumscribed by the constitution, or, as Wythe phrased it, 
by "the bounds prescribed to.them by the people."35
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The Court of Appeals, then, established the constitu­
tion as higher law; in so doing, it played a pivotal role 
in the elaboration of a new theory of politics quite 
distinct from any that had been inherited from England.
What was truly important about this line of decisions were 
the resulting implications for notions of republican 
government. For, in asserting the primacy of the constitu­
tion, the Court generated "a revolution in . . . concep­
tions of law, constitutionalism and politics" which worked 
”a transformation . . .  in the people’s traditional 
relationship to government.”36
For instance, the notion of constitution as higher law 
dramatically altered theoretical conceptions of the 
formation of civil government. The traditional view had it 
that government originated in a kind of contract between 
government and the governed, where each party had recipro­
cal duties. This, at least, was the reigning "Whig” view 
in the eighteenth century. But, as Gordon Wood has 
perceived, the belief in the omnipotent power of the 
people over government required a profound shifting of the 
basis for the Whig understanding of politics.37 No longer 
were there equal parties at the inception of government; 
now the people had all the authority, and delegated it at 
their discretion to institutions of government. Fortu­
nately, John Locke— who had contributed so much to the 
contract theory of government— also provided the theoreti­
cal conceptualization for the new world view. "This,"
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noted Wood, "was the idea of the social compact, . . . not 
a governmental contract between magistrates and people, 
rulers and ruled, but an agreement among isolated 
individuals in a state of nature to combine in a society— a 
social compact which by its very character was anterior to 
the formation of government." This, then, was a theory 
that comported with the new notion of popular sovereignty. 
"Only a social agreement among the people," concluded 
Wood, "only such a Lockean contract, seemed to make sense 
of their rapidly developing idea of a constitution as a 
fundamental law designed by the people to be separate from 
and controlling of all the institutions of government."38
The new notions of sovereignty also had an impact far 
beyond the level of mere abstract theory. The most obvious 
change resulting from the shift in conceptions was in the 
locus of sovereignty. Virginians had, in the words of 
John Murrin, "separated sovereignty from government in a 
way that no one had dared try before."39 The American 
Revolution, then, had "introduced into world history the 
practicability of the people organizing themselves into a 
government of their own creation, whereby the people are 
made forever sovereign, and where the limits of government 
are defined in order to preserve that sovereignty."40 
Gone, then, was the Blackstonian notion of legislative 
sovereignty; gone, indeed, the notion that any department 
of government retained the ultimate authority. As St. 
George Tucker portrayed it, in the constitution "the
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legislature . . . [and] the other branches find . . . 
limits, which cannot be transgressed without offending 
against that greater power from whom all authority, among 
us, is derived; to wit, the PEOPLE."41
The idea of an organic, higher law also had more 
subtle implications. In it the Virginians found new 
protections for certain fundamental rights. In England, 
governmental power was virtually boundless. Such limita­
tions as there were, such as notions of contract and, in 
particular, the rights and procedures embodied in the 
common law, were insufficient against the arbitrary acts of 
crown and parliament. The Virginians, by establishing the 
ascendancy of a constitution and declaration of rights 
containing a statement of fundamental rights, placed an 
added and formidable barrier to government usurpations. As 
Tucker put it, "all acts of the legislature [or, indeed, 
the other branches] of this Commonwealth, which violate . . . 
the Bill of Rights, and Constitution of this Commonwealth, 
are not binding upon . . . any Citizen of the Common­
wealth," and, moreoever, such aggrieved citizen "hath an 
undoubted right to redress, by application to the judicial 
Courts of the State . . .."42 This is not to say that such 
rights were inviolate, but they did gain an added measure 
of protection by their inclusion in a written constitution.
Similarly, the new conception of constitution also 
worked a fundamental change in ideas about modification of 
government itself. In the English tradition, although
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there were certain safeguards against governmental abuse 
(such as the common law), in the face of persistent or 
blatant transgressions on the part of the governing 
authority, the only real recourse for those oppressed was 
to revolt.43 In Virginia, under the theory of a constitu­
tion grounded in the ultimate authority of the people, such 
a drastic remedy was not necessary. In Virginia, "the 
People, whenever they see fit may make any alterations in 
the Constitution which they may deem necessary to their 
happiness, and . . . prosperity . . .." Nor were there any 
limitations on the popular power; the people could "put the 
execution of their authority into whatever hands they 
please: and all the powers of the State . . . must obey
them . . .."44 Indeed Virginia's declaration of rights 
specifically provided that, if the government proved 
unsatisfactory, "a majority of the community hath an 
indubitable, unalienable, and indefeasible right, to 
reform, alter, or abolish it . . ,."45 Such constitutional 
language made this innovation manifest; the right of 
modification would have existed had that document remained 
entirely silent on the topic.
In s\im, Virginia adopted a revolutionary solution to 
the problem of sovereignty. The Commonwealth broke with 
English tradition, and at the very inception of the 
Revolution placed sovereignty squarely in the hands of the 
people. To complement this radical departure, Virginians 
were forced to devise equally radical new notions of
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constitutionalism. They achieved this through the 
innovation of a written constitution. With the Court of 
Appeals leading the way, Virginians came to view that 
constitution as representing a higher law; a doctrine with 
immense theoretical and practical repercussions. Viewing 
the people as sovereign and the constitution as organic law 
forced marked changes in the theoretical underpinnings of 
civil government, spurred the revolutionary concept of 
sovereignty as divorced from government, elevated certain 
"fundamental" rights to a hitherto unrealized level of 
status and protection, and, finally, incited a dramatic new 
conception of the people's ability to alter government by 
means ahort of revolution.
These innovations, taken together, were nothing short 
of a revolutionary change in the theory and practice of 
government, and each of these departures could be traced, 
in one way or another, to the new concept of popular 
sovereignty. Due in no small part to the decisions of the 
Court of Appeals, the Commonwealth of Virginia adopted a 
dramatically republican response to the entirely new 
situation confronting the Commonwealth at the outset of the 
Revolution. Given this radical choice, what is arresting 
about the Virginia experience is the conservative way that 
this radical response was applied, yielding a perhaps 
uniquely Virginian amalgam of revolutionary republicanism 
and conservatism.
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For all the genuinely republican aspects of Virginia's 
1776 constitution with its embrace of popular sovereignty, 
the surpassing irony was that the implementation of that 
doctrine was unabashedly conservative, with a focus on the 
importance of— and the protection of— property in the form 
of land and slaves, and the maintenance of the existing 
social and political order.
The constitution crafted by the framers in May and 
June of 1776 was, in the words of J. R. Pole, "far from 
revolutionary."46 Although the rhetoric and theoretical 
implications of the doctrine of popular sovereignty seemed 
to promise a new order, the framers' interpretation of just 
which people were to exercise this sovereignty cast an 
entirely different light upon the subject. The topic was 
addressed in both the declaration of rights and the 
constitution itself. The declaration of rights proclaimed 
that "elections of members to serve as representatives of 
the people, in assembly, ought to be free . . The
framers then added another clause declaring that "all men, 
having sufficient evidence of permanent common interest 
with, and attachment to, the community, have the right of 
suffrage . . . ."47 It was the "evidence of permanent 
common interest" which was the rub, and which formed the 
basis and justification for Virginia's policy toward the 
suffrage. The constitution itself added the necessary 
substantive application of this concept. "The right of 
suffrage in the election of members for both Houses," it
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provided, "shall remain as exercised at present."48 The 
suffrage requirements referred to in the constitution were 
contained in a 1736 statute which, in essence, gave the 
vote to adult white males who owned a "freehold" (an 
interest in land lasting an indeterminate amount of time, 
usually a fee simple or an estate for life) of one hundred 
acres of unimproved land, or twenty-five acres with a 
dwelling attached, or a freehold in a town.49
In imbedding the "freehold suffrage" requirement in 
the constitution, the framers were making a major statement 
about the nature of their political society and how and by 
whom it was to be governed. By granting the vote, in 
effect, only to those holding a permanent interest in land, 
the framers narrowly interpreted what represented "suffi­
cient evidence of permanent common interest with, and 
attachment to, the community." This raised two concerns. 
First, and most obviously, it granted the vote only to the 
landed interests, at the expense of those whose holdings 
were in some form of personal property, or indeed of those 
who had insufficient wealth to meet the suffrage require­
ments. In theory, at least, the policy interests of 
holders of landed and non-landed wealth might not always 
coincide, and the latter, without any input via the ballot 
box, stood to come out on the short end of any such 
dispute. The second concern related to the number of 
people actually disenfranchised by these suffrage require­
ments. There has been some debate over this issue among
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scholars, but in the best and most recent estimation,
Alison Goodyear Freehling has suggested that, even after a 
minor liberalization of the landholding requirements in 
1785, only 40 to 50 percent of the state's adult white 
males were qualified to vote.30 This, of course, chal­
lenged republican notions that "popular sovereignty" should 
require universal white manhood suffrage.
Nor were the suffrage requirements the only anti­
republican aspects of the 1776 constitution. The appor­
tionment of representation in the General Assembly was 
equally suspect. The constitution provided that each 
county should send two representatives to the House of 
Delegates, and that the counties should be allocated into 
twenty-four districts, each to elect one member to the 
Senate.31 While these requirements did not appear unjust 
on their face, the reality was dramatically different. 
Because a number of smaller, less populated counties were 
concentrated in the older, eastern, conservative "Tide­
water” region of Virginia, the allocation of delegates by 
county gave a huge boon to that region. Even at the time 
of the framing of the constitution (and these conditions 
were exacerbated in later years), the Tidewater gentry, 
with one-third of the adult white male population, held the 
reins of power in both the House of Delegates and Senate.32
Similar to the effects of the freehold suffrage, the 
apportioning of representation without regard to population 
had anti-democratic effects. The combination of the two
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trends not only limited participation in government to 
adult white male landholders, it also skewed the influence 
of even that minority in the direction of the owners of the 
large, slave-holding plantations of eastern Virginia. 
Moreover, it must be remembered that in so structuring the 
legislative branch, the framers ipso facto allowed 
slaveholding easterners to control all branches of the 
Commonwealth’s government, including appointments to the 
governorship and the Court of Appeals.53
The really interesting thing about these blatantly 
aristocratic provisions is that at the time of their 
adoption they sparked no real dissent. As J. R. Pole put 
it, "The failure of the legislature of the Revolutionary 
era to break with the freehold basis is matched by another 
failure— that of the unenfranchised class to make any 
effective protest.”54 This very lack of dissent speaks 
volumes about the nature of Virginia society at the 
Revolution. With the exception of some agitation by 
certain religious sects on other issues, there was a 
general acceptance of the political status quo ante as 
represented by the 1776 constitution. "It seems to have 
been commonly accepted," noted Pole, "that the gentry 
exercised their traditional leadership by a right as 
natural as that by which the freeholders participated in 
elections."55 And it was Pole who has given us the best 
explanation of the social, economic, and intellectual 
belief system which upheld elite leadership in the
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Commonwealth. The old system survived the shocks of 
revolution, said Pole, because "it was in a high measure 
representative of the prevailing social order." The landed 
gentry who provided the leadership of the Revolution 
controlled every aspect of local life, dominating the two 
most salient institutions, the county court and the local 
established church. This should not be overly surprising, 
when it is recalled that "great landed property naturally 
induced such power in an agrarian community." Moreover, 
deference to the gentry wa3 a matter of "unchallengad 
social habit," and (with the exception of some of the 
religious sects), the interests of the leadership were seen 
as coinciding with those of the majority.55
The end result of all this was to cement the existing 
elitist orientation of Virginia's political institutions.
It was a political settlement that was to prove extraor­
dinarily longlasting in the Commonwealth. The Court of 
Appeals, of course, did not directly participate in the 
political choices inherent in the suffrage and apportion­
ment policies. Its support was more implicit, in its 
implementation of the constitutional order that dictates 
those results. The Court of Appeals had a much more direct 
role in shaping Virginia's unique radical-conservative 
Revolutionary settlement in other areas of the law, which 
will be discussed shortly.
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While popular sovereignty was the operative theor­
etical construct underlying Virginia’s constitutional 
order, the constitution itself was designed as a practical 
blueprint for the establishment of a workable governmental 
system in the Commonwealth. Here, too, the Court of 
Appeals played an important role in implementing the intent 
of the framers, and in doing so the court made such 
previously theoretical doctrines as the separation of 
powers a reality.
The drafters of the Virginia frame of government 
deemed the concept of a "separation of powers" important 
enough to insert it in both the declaration of rights and 
the constitution itself. Article V of the declaration 
proclaimed that "the legislative and executive powers of 
the state should be separate and distinct from the 
judiciary . . . ," while the Constitution itself provided 
that "the legislative, executive, and judiciary depart­
ments, shall be separate and distinct, so that neither 
exercise the powers properly belonging to the other . . .."s7
The really intriguing aspect of Virginia's separation- 
of-powers concept, however, is that the Commonwealth did 
not practice what it preached. While the Virginia 
constitutional provisions just cited appeared to stand 
four-square behind the separation-of-powers theory, the 
remainder of that document, and the actual practice in 
Virginia, put the lie to any notion of a rigid adherence to
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placed in the legislature, particularly vis-a-vis the 
executive. The Governor was chosen annually by the 
legislature, which also had the power of impeachment. The 
Governor could neither veto legislation nor had he power to 
prorogue or adjourn the legislature. The Governor could 
not act without the advice and consent of his Council (also 
appointed by the legislature), whose proceedings must be 
laid before the Assembly upon demand. Neither could the 
Governor nominate judges; again, this lay within the 
province of the legislature. The ultimate blow to 
executive power came in Article IX. Under this provision 
the Governor "shall not, under any pretence, exercise any 
power or prerogative, by virtue of any law, statute, or 
custom of England." Instead, "he shall . . . exercise the 
executive powers of government according to the laws of the 
Commonwealth."39 According to St. George Tucker, "This 
declaration instantly levelled the barriers of distinction 
between the legislative authority, and that of the 
executive, rendering the former completely paramount to the 
latter . . .."6 0
The source of this emasculation of the executive, even 
in the face of a titular commitment to a separation of 
powers, is not far to seek. Tucker acknowledged that "The 
constitution of this Commonwealth was formed at a time, 
when the spirit of equality was at its utmost height, and 
under circumstances which contrived greatly to augment that
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natural jealousy of executive power, to which all free 
states are prone, and for which, the convention then saw 
the most just and cogent reasons."61 Virginians had had 
more than a taste of executive tyranny under Lord Dunmore, 
and were extraordinarily careful in structuring their new 
government to avoid the possibility of such a despotic 
executive again.62
The "perversion" of the doctrine of the separation of 
powers caused by the restrictions on the executive did not 
mean that this doctrine was a mere sham in Virginia. Once 
the framers got beyond their fear of executive tyranny, the 
doctrine seemed both wise enough and safe enough. Beyond 
the obvious autonomy of the legislature, the judiciary was 
given a considerable degree of independence, with tenure 
"during good behavior" (but judges, too, were subject to 
impeachment). St. George Tucker explained how this 
restriction of the executive, coupled with the independence 
of the judicial and legislative branches, was consistent 
with republican precepts: "[The members of the Virginia
convention] had learned from the history and example of 
their mother country, that limitations of the executive 
authority were nugatory, if that authority be united with 
the legislative, or if the judiciary be subservient tc it 
or united with either.”63 Hence the republican doctrine of
the separation of powers came to be proclaimed in the new
/
commonwealth's frame of government. But merely articulat­
ing a republican ideal is a far cry from implementing it.
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The prospect of the three branches of government remaining 
securely within each’s appointed sphere had its allure, but 
it was foolhardy to believe that there would be no friction 
or conflict between departments, particularly when this 
idea of separation was so untried. And, inevitably, such 
conflicts did arise. It was here that the Virginia Court 
of Appeals established itself as the chief arbiter of such 
conflicts and in the process made meaningful a theoretical 
doctrine that had theretofore never been attempted in 
actual practice.
The early cases addressing the separation of powers 
were the now-familiar ones which treated high constitu­
tional issues. In the first of these, the 1782 case of 
Commonwealth v. Caton, Judge George Wythe defended the 
court's right to determine whether a legislative pardon 
had been valid in terms of " . . - the powers which the 
different branches of government may exercise." According 
to Wythe, the separation of powers reached its full flower 
"when those who hold the purse [the legislature] and the 
sword [the executive], differing as to the powers each may 
exercise, the tribunals who hold neither [the courts] are 
called upon to declare the law impartially between them.
For thus the pretensions of each party are fairly examined, 
their respective powers ascertained, and the boundaries of 
authority peaceably established." By applying the 
separation of powers doctrine in such circumstances, 
concluded Wythe, "tyranny has been sapped, the departments
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kept within their own spheres, the citizens protected, and 
general liberty promoted."64
The Court of Appeals returned to the topic of the 
separation of powers in the next constitutional conflict 
that came before it— the brouhaha over the establishment of 
a district court system in 1788. In their Remonstrance to 
the General Assembly, the justices based their assertion of 
the act's unconstitutionality upon the principle of the 
separation of powers. Pointing to the constitution, the 
court asserted that "In that solemn act, the people 
distribut[ed] the governmental powers into three great 
branches, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in order 
to preserve that equipoise, which they judged necessary to 
secure their liberty, declaring that those powers be kept 
separate and distinct from each other . . .. "6 3 The court 
illustrated the point in colorful language: " . . .  For
vain would be the precautions of the founders of our 
government to secure liberty, if the legislature, though 
restrained from changing the tenure of judicial offices, 
are at liberty to compel a resignation by reducing salaries 
to a copper, or by making it a part of the official duty to 
become hewers of wood, and drawers of water. Or, if, in 
case of a contrary disposition, then can make salaries 
exorbitant; or, by lessening the duties, render offices, 
almost sinecures: the independence of the judiciary is, in
either case, equally annihilated."66 The Remonstrance had 
its intended effect. Governor Randolph immediately called
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a special session of the legislature, and the General 
Assembly rescinded the initial act and replaced it with 
another which maintained the district court system, but set 
up the Court of Appeals as a separate entity with no 
circuit duties.67
The new district court act was much less distateful to 
the Court of Appeals on a practical level, since they were 
no longer obligated to ride circuit. But the constitu­
tional objection remained, because the later act, in 
effect, dissolved the old Court of Appeals and erected a 
new one in its place. The justices, caught between their 
constitutional principles and a recognition of the need for 
a remodelled judicial system, took the only feasible way 
out, and resigned. In doing so, the judges "administered 
another lesson to the Assembly on the subject of the 
independence of the judiciary.”68 The justices asserted 
that, "however painful the repetition," they were constitu­
tional officers, not subject to removal by the Assembly. 
Since it was their "duty to guard against encroachment,” 
they thereupon resigned.69 The establishment of the new 
Court of Appeals, containing many of the former justices, 
then proceeded unimpeded. It is interesting to note that 
there was an echo of this debate as late as 1811, when 
Judge St. George Tucker resigned from the bench in protest 
to a new law which required the Court to sit at least 250 
days in the year.70
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so well established that the court could summarily reject a 
challenge to its application. In that year, a case arose 
involving a Frenchman named Beaumarchais who had sold goods 
to the Commonwealth during the Revolution, and now sought 
to have the accounts adjusted.71 Beaumarchais had first 
sought redress through the General Assembly, where he was 
rebuffed. He then petitioned the courts. The Common­
wealth's defense was that the Court had no jurisdiction, 
because the legislature had already spoken. President 
Judge Pendleton made short work of such an argument. "We 
are as much bound," said Pendleton, "to support the 
legitimate powers of the Judiciary, as [the Judiciary]
. . .  is not to invade what hath been assigned to 
others."7 2 Pendleton reminded the parties that the 
"Constitution creates three branches of government, and 
declares that their powers shall be kept separate and 
distinct, and those of one not exercised by the others."73 
The President Judge went on to reprimand the counsel for 
the Commonwealth. "But this is said, by one gentleman, to 
be an invasion of the State sovereignty and its attributes, 
and by another to be a prostration of the Legislature at 
the feet of the Judiciary: Sounding term3i but which would
have been more properly used, when the Constitution was 
framing, in opposition to the creation of three depart­
ments, than now, as objections to the exercise of the 
powers alloted to each."74
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By the 1828 case of Crenshaw v. Slate River Co.. the 
Court of Appeals could assert the fact of separation 
without need of further elaboration. "The Constitution 
declares," the court stated simply, "that the Legislative 
and Judicial Departments, shall be distinct and separate; 
so that, neither shall exercise the powers properly 
belonging to the other."75
In sum, the conception of a separation of powers among 
the three branches of government thrived in Virginia, in 
large part because the Virginia Court of Appeals was 
assiduous in delineating and responding to threats to the 
balance of the system. In so doing, the court made 
practicable a doctrine that had theretofore existed only in 
republican theory.
The court's key role in assuring the ascendancy of the 
constitution, and in the practical application of the 
constitution’s theory and frame of government, masked a 
development which was more subtle, but every bit as 
important to the institutional development of the new 
commonwealth. In the determination of the handful of key 
adjudications of "high” constitutional law, the Court of 
Appeals carved out a unique role for itself as interpreter 
of the constitution and as an important republican 
institution in its own right.
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The court's prominent role in Virginia's constitu­
tional structure has since become so axiomatic as to make 
it difficult to appreciate the ambiguities in the court's 
status at the inception of the Commonwealth. One of the 
complicating factors was the ambiguous nature of the 
Court's charter. The actual role of the Virginia courts in 
the constitutional structure was left disturbingly vague 
by the Virginia framers. The constitution's only 
mention of specific courts was the directive to the 
legislature to appoint "Judges of the Supreme Court of 
Appeals, and General Court, Judges in Chancery, Judges 
in Admiralty . . .." The result was, that while the 
courts themselves were constitutional in nature, all the 
details of their make-up and jurisdiction were left to 
legislative discretion.76 Indeed, it was not until 1779 
that the General Assembly got around to establishing a 
supreme appellate tribunal.77
The Court of Appeals responded to its ambiguous 
constitutional-legislative nature in a mature and dis­
criminating fashion. It never lost sight of the fact that 
the specifics of its jurisdiction were statutory, and the 
Court did not hesitate to acknowledge this reality. As 
Judge Tucker once put it, "All the powers of this Court are 
statutory; it has no claim whatever from any other source, 
neither custom, prescription, long usage, or precedent, 
have any pretensions here, independent of statutory 
provisions.”7 8 This recognition of the statutory nature of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
51
its jurisdiction was coupled, however, with a dogged 
resistance to any hint that the legislature could undermine 
the court's constitutional right to exist as an independent 
entity.
The court took its stand early, with the first 
constitutional adjudication of Commonwealth v. Caton. 
Although the court's role had been left undefined by the 
constitution, here the court showed no hesitation. In 
asserting jurisdiction to decide the case, Judge George 
Wythe made a stirring statement as to the power of the 
court, couching it in unmistakably republican terms. In 
this case of a dispute between the two houses of the 
legislature, Wythe held that it was the duty of the court 
to step in and protect "the community” from the usurpation 
of a particular branch. Citing the case of an English 
chancellor protecting the rights of an individual against 
the Crown, Wythe intoned that “if it was [the chancellor's] 
duty to protect a solitary individual against the rapacity 
of the sovereign, surely, it is equally mine, to protect 
one branch of the legislature, and, consequently, the whole 
community, against the usurpations of the other."79 
Moreover, it was the particular province of the court to 
make such a determination. As Wythe stated in his 
conclusion, "whenever the proper occasion occurs, I 
shall feel the duty [to step in]; and, fearlessly, 
perform it . . .."80
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The Court of Appeals took an even stronger stance in 
the 1788 crisis over the creation of the district courts.
In their "Remonstrance" to the legislature, the judges 
identified their court "as one of the three pillars on 
which the great fabric of government was erected," and went 
on to lecture the General Assembly on the necessity of 
their judicial independence. "The propriety and necessity 
of the independence of judges is evident in reason and the 
nature of their office; since they are to decide between 
government and the people, as well as between contending 
citizens; and, if they be dependent on either, corrupt 
influence may be apprehended, sacrificing the innocent to 
popular prejudice; and subjecting the poor to oppression 
and persecution by the rich."81 To avoid such unjust 
results, and to fulfill its proper function in Virginia's 
constitutional scheme, the Court of Appeals must have 
complete independence from the legislature and the 
executive.
The court continued to assert and protect its judicial 
province in the nineteenth century. In 1818 the General 
Assembly had chartered a corporation, the Slate River 
Company, and granted it the right to make the Slate 
navigable. The legislature asserted that those individuals 
already having milldams on the stream must comply or face 
having their dams destroyed. The Court of Appeals voided 
this law, maintaining that this determination of the status 
of private rights was an unwarranted interference into a
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sphere particularly appropriate to judicial cognizance.
The court made its position very clear. "The questions, 
whether the rights of the owners of mills, or of the 
public, for the purposes of navigation, are preferred by 
Law generally, or in any particular case," said the court, 
"are emphatically Judicial in their nature, depending on 
the effect and construction of former Laws; and, if upon a 
full and careful consideration, we conscientiously differ 
in opinion in any particular case from the Legislature, we 
are bound by the highest obligations of duty to ourselves 
and our country, to pursue our own judgment."82
The General Assembly incited a similar response when 
it passed a statute which directly overruled a line of 
judicial decisions. While the Court willingly acknowledged 
the legislature's right to make prospective changes in the 
law, it bristled at the intimation that such enactments 
were intended to affect jtsdicial determinations of cases 
which arose prior to the passage of such an act (but coming 
up on appeal after its enactment). In 1819 the legislature 
had directly overturned a long series of decisions by the 
Court of Appeals construing the validity of the conveyance 
of certain "future interests" in property. Nevertheless, 
when, in 1827, the Court next decided a case on this 
subject that had arisen prior to the statute, it maintained 
the old rule. In doing so, Judge Dabney Carr resisted any 
suggestion of legislative dominance. "As to the idea that 
the law of 1819, is an expression of the legislative
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opinion, that the Courts have heretofore decided wrong on 
this subject, and furnishes us with a fair opportunity [in 
this case] to break the toils in which former decisions 
have bound us, I would remark, 1. That it is not the 
province of the Legislature to censure the exposition which 
the Courts give to any law . . . ."83 The same judge was 
even more forceful when a similar situation arose regarding 
the proper procedure for challenging land titles. "It is 
one of a large class of cases, in which the judicial 
decisions point out to the Legislature what they [the 
legislature] consider an evil, and they [the legislature] 
apply the remedy. But," continued Carr, "the remedy always 
looks forward. The Legislature do not mean to say, 'You 
must decide thus and thus, in cases now depending before 
you.' This would be usurpation. This act, then," 
concluded Carr, "while it acknowledged the rule established 
by Noland v. Cromwell to be, at that time, existing law, 
did not intend to affect its operation in past or depending 
cases, but merely to provide for the future . . . ."84
This fierce resistance by the Court of Appeals to 
legislative encroachment can be viewed in terms of sound 
republican principles. Blackstone had noted that in 
England the courts were but creatures of the crown. In all 
courts "the king is . . . represented by his judges, whose 
power is only an emanation of the royal prerogative."8 3 In 
republican Virginia, however, quite the contrary was the 
case. In Virginia, commented St. George Tucker, "the
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judicial power, far from being an emanation from the 
executive, is intended by the American constitutions as a 
counterpoise, or check to its excesses, and those of the 
legislature."86 This had important ramifications for 
liberty, which Tucker was quick to acknowledge. He went on 
to stress that an independent judiciary was as important in 
a republican Virginia as it was in England: "This absolute
independence of the judiciary, both of the executive and 
the legislative departments, which I contend is to be 
found, both in the letter and spirit of our constitutions, 
is not less necessary to the liberty and security of the 
citizen, and his property, in a republican government, than 
in a monarchy. . . . in a republic . . . the violence and 
malignity of party spirit, as well in the legislature, 
as in the executive, requires not less the intervention 
of a calm, temperate, upright, and independent judi­
ciary, to prevent that violence and malignity from 
exerting itself . . . .”87 In sum, the Virginia Court of 
Appeals, in the first decades of the Commonwealth, staked 
out a unique place for itself in the republican firmament, 
and thereby became a ksy institution in the implementation 
of republican ideals.
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By the third decade of the nineteenth century, 
Virginia's new constitutional order was in place. The 
constitution was viewed as a higher law which represented 
the will of the people in a regime founded upon the concept 
of popular sovereignty. The institutions of government had 
by that time achieved a mutually acceptable settlement with 
respect to their respective roles and relations in a 
republican commonwealth. In short, many of the doubts and 
unanswered questions facing the Commonwealth in 1776 were 
non-issues by 1830, having been resolved in the intervening 
decades. In this process of achieving a constitutional 
settlement, the Virginia Court of Appeals played a leading, 
perhaps the leading, role. Through its determinations of 
practical issues which arose in the course of attempting to 
implement the new republican ideals, the court resolved 
high issues of constitutional law which defined Virginia's 
institutions, its theory of government, and the practical 
governance of the Commonwealth. The Court of Appeals was, 
in other words, the prime "interpreter" of Virginia's 
republican principles and polity. The republican system 
which the court helped so much to implement, however, was 
remarkably conservative in its character, a somewhat 
incongruous thread which was to be found woven through the 
entire fabric of Virginia's revolutionary settlement.
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CHAPTER III
THE ENGLISH LEGAL HERITAGE 
IN A REPUBLICAN COMMONWEALTH
The establishment of Virginia's constitution, and its 
implementation by the Virginia Court of Appeals, was a 
first and key step in creating a new republican order. But 
this was only a beginning. One recent scholar has 
commented that "What in the final analysis gave meaning to 
the Americans' conception of a constitution was not its 
fundamentality or its creation by the people, but rather 
its implementation in the ordinary courts of law."1 This 
statement could be expanded to include the proposition that 
the definition of Virginia's entire revolutionary settle­
ment was accomplished in large part by the Virginia 
judiciary. The process of that settlement began with 
Virginia's accommodation with its English heritage; it is 
to this that we first turn.
Virginia's republican constitutional order was in many 
ways a dramatic departure from its colonial past. 
Nevertheless, it was neither possible nor desirable to 
erect a republican commonwealth that represented a complete 
overthrow of Virginia’s English heritage. The difficult 
task for Revolutionary Virginians was not so much what
63
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should be eradicated in the interests of republicanism, but 
rather, what should be retained in the interests of 
freedom, stability, and consistency, and how it should be 
modified to meet the requirements of the Commonwealth's 
republican orientation.
One of the most revealing examples of the subtle and 
complex nature of Virginia's adaptation to republicanism in 
the aftermath of the Revolution lay in the accommodation of 
her English legal heritage to the requirements of the new 
republican order. Virginia society inherited a legal 
system that was at once monarchical, oligarchical, feudal, 
and a bastion of individual liberties and property rights. 
Going about the business of resolving the complexities 
induced thereby provides an object lesson in Virginia’s 
measured response to the challenges posed by the Revolu­
tion.
The Virginia Court of Appeals embraced, on the whole, 
the English legal heritage, despite the violent separation 
from Great Britain. This loyalty to English precedents was 
another illustration of the conservative tenor of the 
Revolution in Virginia. The English common law continued 
to be revered because it was perceived to be a bulwark of 
English— and hence American— liberty. Adherence to English 
precedent also maintained stable rules of law, which in 
turn protected existing property rights. At the same time, 
however, the Court of Appeals was not slavishly devoted to 
the common law, and the court's departures from accepted
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precedent illustrate the nature of Virginia's revolutionary 
settlement.
The instances of judicial deviation from English rules 
of law during the Commonwealth's first decades were 
infrequent but illuminating. One example of the Virginia 
court's departure from English precedents occurred when the 
English rules clearly contravened republican principles.
The Court of Appeals also consistently supported the will 
of the Virginia legislature— as expressed through statute—  
over traditional rules of law. This demonstrated a respect 
for manifest policy choices by Virginians over English 
tradition, and was also an early indication of the court's 
perception of its limited role in the making of policy. 
Another instance where the Court of Appeals refused to 
blindly follow the English rules was when they did not 
comport with local conditions in Virginia. Likewise, the 
court refused to stand on technicality when to do so 
prevented the execution of an individual's obvious intent. 
Finally, the court also stepped in when the common law or 
statute provided no clear guidance. In such cases, the 
Court of Appeals articulated a policy based upon principles 
of "reason."
Largely through the contributions of the Court of 
Appeals, then, the English legal heritage was adapted to 
the Virginia experiment. On the whole, traditional legal 
rules went unchallenged, evidencing a conservative respect 
for stability and property rights. Where the court did
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depart from English legal precedents, it was for the 
purpose of implementing legislative policy, or adapting the 
common law to Virginia's situation. The result was a legal 
system which was tradition-laden, but not tradition-bound; 
a conservative yet pragmatic jurisprudence which was to 
define Virginia's approach to the new order.
Theoretically, at any rate, once the Virginia colony 
slashed its ties with the mother country, the source and 
authority of the British legal system were extinguished.
In this veritable "state of nature,” it was the duty of the 
new sovereign and independent state to fill the vacuum by 
establishing a new legal order.2 One of the first orders 
of business for the Virginia Convention in May 1776 was to 
address the matter of the continued validity in Virginia of 
the British statutes and the English common law— that 
amalgam of rights, duties, and liabilities built up through 
centuries of judicial decisons in the English courts which 
formed the basis for the vast majority of the substantive 
law that governed the rights and obligations of all English 
subjects. The Virginia Convention did not hesitate, and 
immediately embraced the English system. In order "to 
enable the present magistrates and officers to continue the 
administration of justice . . . till the same can be amply 
provided for," the Convention specifically adopted the
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English common law, and all applicable English statutes 
passed before 1607, "until the same shall be altered by the 
legislative power of this colony."3 The end result was, 
as St. George Tucker described it, "That the common law of 
England, and every statute of that kingdom, made for the 
security of the life, liberty, or property of the subject, 
before the settlement of the British colonies, respec­
tively, so far as the same were applicable to the nature of 
their nature and circumstances, respectively, were brought 
over to America . . .."4
The hasty adoption of the essence of the English legal 
system at the very moment the Virginians were engaged in a 
violent revolt against that government is not the con­
tradiction that it would at first appear. In many ways 
the Virginians— taking their cue from the British "Opposi­
tion" writers of the early eighteenth century— believed 
that their revolution was not a revolution at all but 
merely a last, desperate attempt to recover the traditional 
English liberties that had been lost at the hands of a 
"corrupt" English government.3 One of the bulwarks of 
those traditional English liberties was the substance and 
procedure of the English common law. Accordingly, the 
common law was claimed as the "birthright” of American 
citizens.6 The Virginia Court of Appeals was fully aware 
of the libertarian nature of the common law inheritance.- 
As Judge Tucker phrased it, "No man I trust would be more 
jealous than I of the danger of preserving any part of the
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theory of monarchy in our Commonwealth; but the rights of 
individuals, upon whatever theory originally founded, after 
having settled into the known law of the land for six 
centuries, in England, and after being considered in a 
similar light in this country, from its first foundation, 
ought not to be shaken, unless the imperative voice of the 
constitution, or of the legislature, shall compel it to be 
done."7
There was also a more pragmatic reason for adhering to 
the known rules and procedures of the common law which the 
Court frequently articulated. That was the idea that it 
was important that the law remain predictable. Nowhere was 
the rationale for this position more cogently arrayed than 
in the early case of Commonwealth v. Posey, which dealt 
with a 200-year old precedent which had been definitive in 
construing the English statute regarding the benefit of 
clergy. {The "benefit of clergy" was a privilege of 
exemption from execution in a capital crime granted 
originally to clergymen but later expanded to include many 
others.) In Posey, Judge William Fleming gave the 
essential rule; " . . .  precedents, so long acquiesced in, 
cannot be overturned, without more danger than benefit, as 
no point will ever be settled."8 But it was Judge Peter 
Lyons who expressed the underlying rationale: "The
security of men's lives and property require that [the 
earlier cases] should be adhered to; for precedents serve 
to regulate our conduct, and there is more danger to be
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apprehended from uncertainty, than from any exposition, 
because, when the rule is settled, men know how to conform 
to it; but when all is uncertain, they are left in the 
dark, and constantly liable to error . . . . "9 The 
importance of this holding did not go unrecognized. Nearly 
fifty years later (in 1833) Daniel Call, in publishing his 
edition of this case, added a postcript that "No cause 
decided, since the revolution, is more important than this, 
as it fixes, by the opinion of a large majority of the 
judges, distinguished for their patriotism, independence 
and ability, a principle necessary for the tranquillity of 
society, and the safety of the general transactions of 
mankind, namely, that a settled construction of a statute, 
forms a precedent, which should be adhered to as part of 
the law itself; and ought, upon no criticism of words, to 
be departed from. Accordingly, the decisions of the court 
[of appeals], since that period, abound with instances of 
the same kind; but none of them state the ground and reason 
of it, with so much force . . .."10
Call was right about the Court of Appeals1 continued 
respect for the rules of property as established by the 
English cases. The reports teem with similar professions 
of allegiance to the accepted common-law interpretations of 
legal doctrines. In 1827, the Court refused to overrule a 
longstanding interpretation of the effect of language 
creating a "future interest" in property, even though the 
legislature had shown a clear dissatisfaction with the
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judicial reasoning in such cases. The Court, normally 
deferential to legislative wishes, here refused to change 
its position (in a case that arose prior to the enactment 
of the corrective statute). Judge Dabney Carr articulated 
the Court's reasoning. While a statute was prospective, 
and gave everyone notice of the new rule, a judicial 
decision was by its very nature retrospective. "If we say 
that these decisions [that the Court has held to over the 
years] are wrong," asserted Carr, "all the estates which 
have been settled, all the contracts which have been made, 
all the titles which rest on the foundation of their [i.e., 
the former cases'] correctness, are uprooted."11 Nor did 
Carr stop there. If all those decisions were overturned, 
it would be impossible to foresee "the extent of the 
mischief." "But, only open the door," concluded Carr,
"[and] proclaim to the world that all which has heretofore 
been done is wrong; and then we shall see the wild uproar 
and confusion among titles, which will follow. Is it not 
better to prevent this, by holding on in the course we have 
so long run?"12
So strong was the loyalty to precedent that the Court 
was willing to fellow a common-law rule even when the 
rationale underlying that rule had been lost in the mists 
of time. As late as 1829 we find Judge William Cabell 
intoning: "It cannot be admitted, that a law ceases to
exist, merely because the reason which gave rise to its 
adoption has ceased. If this were admitted, we should
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demolish at once, much of the venerable fabrick of the 
common law."13 And Judge John Green, searching in 1830 for 
the reasoning behind the doctrine that all judgments 
"relate back" to the first day of the judicial term, 
finally threw up his hands in despair. "This general 
principle of the common law, like many others, is of such 
remote antiquity, and so long recognized without dispute 
that the reasons and policy are, in great degree, left to 
conjecture.1,14 Even more revealing are the cases where the 
judges toed the common-law line even in the face of their 
own sense of justice. Throughout the first five decades of 
the new republic judges subsumed their own views to the 
interest of upholding precedent.13 Perhaps Spencer Roane 
summed it up best in the case of Claiborne v. Henderson in 
1809. Roane noted that there are "innumerable instances to 
be found in the books, of a reverence for decisions, and 
rules of property which have been established by the 
concurrent decisions of successive Judges, and acted under, 
for a long series of time. They ought to be adhered to as 
the sine qua non of all certainty and stability in the law, 
the private opinion of any single Judge to the contrary 
notwithstanding.M16
Given this reverence for common-law precedent, both in 
terms of its protections of individual liberties and 
because of the fear of disruption from an overturning of 
established rules, it should come as no surprise that the 
Virginia reports abound with professions of allegiance to
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the common law.17 Indeed it is logical that this should 
be so. As one commentator has put it, "English precedents 
had been for two centuries the ways and woof of the 
Virginia system, and it was neither possible nor desirable 
to cast them aside."18
Perhaps the most telling indicator of the continuing role 
of the English common law in Virginia's system came in the 
early 1830s, when Henry St. George Tucker advised practic­
ing attorneys concerning the matter of rent payments when 
the lessor died before the rent payment was due. Under 
English law, the death of the lessor absolved the renter 
from liability to pay rent, unless the lease specifically 
provided otherwise.19 Although common sense dictated that 
this should not be the outcome, Tucker warned lawyers that 
"until . . . some adjudication shall justify us in 
departing in practice from English authority, it will be 
always safest in practice to make reservations of rent in 
conformity with their decisions . . .."2 0
Given the clear commitment in Virginia to English 
precedent, what becomes most interesting and informative 
are the exceptions to this common-law allegiance. It is 
manifest that only a deeply-held belief in some counter­
vailing value or circumstance could induce the Virginia 
Court of Appeals to depart from its respectful attitude 
toward the common law.
Interestingly, one rationale for deviating from the 
common law is expressed specifically in terms of republi-
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canism. In the 1806 case of Baring v. Reeder, Judge Roane 
acknowledged that "I consider myself bound to pare down the 
governmental part of the common-law of England to the 
standard of our free republican constitution . . ..1,21 
St. George Tucker elaborated in his annotation to Black- 
stone ' s Commentaries; " . . . every rule of the common
law, and every statute of England, founded on the nature of 
regal government, in derogation of the natural and 
unalienable rights of mankind; or, inconsistent with the 
nature and principles of democratic governments, were 
absolutely abrogated, repealed, and annulled, by the 
establishment of such a form of government in the states, 
respectively. This is a natural and necessary consequence 
of the revolution, and the correspondent changes in the 
nature of the governments . . ..2 2
A further subtlety was inherent in this perception of 
the common law in light of republican principles. Even 
when the Virginia courts were at the height of their 
"homage-paying'' to the English precedents, there was a 
subtle but very important distinction between reliance upon 
English decisions and their authority. The Revolution, 
argued St. George Tucker, "by separating us from Great 
Britian for ever, put an end to the authority of any future 
decisions or opinions of her judges, and sages of the law, 
in the courts of this Commonwealth; those decisions and 
opinions, I make no doubt, will long continue to be 
respected in Virginia, as the decisions of the wisest and
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most upright foreign judges; but from the moment that 
Virginia became an independent Commonwealth, neither the 
laws, nor the judgments of any other country, or it's 
courts, can claim any authority whatsoever in our courts 
. . .."23 This, in the end, was exactly the point Roane 
was making in Baring v. Reeder: "On such rules of the
common law . . .  as are neither affected by a change in 
the form of government, nor by a variation in the cir­
cumstances of character of the nation, I am free to avail 
myself of the testimony of able Judges and Lawyers of that 
country . . . .  I am not willing that an appeal to my 
pride, as a citizen of independent America, should prevail 
over the best convictions of my understanding . . . .  I 
wish it, however, to be clearly understood that I . . . 
would not receive even them, as binding authority. I would 
receive them merely as affording evidence of the opinions 
of eminent Judges as to the doctrines in question . . .."2 4
A more obvious exception to the preeminence of the 
English common law in the court decisions of Virginia 
occurred when the English precedents were displaced by 
statutory provisions.23 The superiority of enactments of 
the Virginia General Assembly to any common-law doctrine 
was a commonplace. This was made express in the statute 
adopting English common law and statute in May, 1776, when 
it was declared that the English law was to remain "in full 
force, until the same shall be altered by the legislative 
power of this colony."26 The Court of Appeals was
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assiduous in upholding this doctrine of legislative 
supremacy where there was a direct conflict between statute 
and common law. Whittington v. Christian is a typical 
example, That case, decided in 1824, had to do with a 
technical error in an action of ejectment. When the 
defendant sought to have the case dismissed under the 
common-law rule, the Court looked to the more lenient 
provision of the Virginia statute. "It is true," admitted 
Judge Green, "that this construction of the statute and the 
rule of the common law referred to, cannot exist together. 
The consequence is, that the statute abrogates the rule of 
the common law in toto . . . ."27 Similarly, in Templeman 
v. Steptoe. Judge Tucker noted, in 1810, that under the 
1785 statute of descents, it was "too plain to require 
proof, that . . . all former Rules and Canons of 
Inheritance and succession to estates within this Common­
wealth, whether established by Common Law, or by Statute, 
were rescinded, abrogated, and annulled, and that they 
cannot be revived in any manner but by some express 
legislative provision for that purpose."28
Within the parameters of absolute statutory super­
iority in areas of actual conflict, however, there was 
still room for a considerable amount of reliance upon 
common-law principles and remedies. Oftentimes Virginia 
statutes were exact copies of or derivative from English 
predecessors. In such cases, the relevant common-law 
doctrines were often used to inform and illuminate the
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statutory provisions.29 The Court of Appeals was also 
quite careful when a new statutory remedy was enacted that 
deviated from traditional common-law rights. In such 
cases, the Court acknowledged the statute, but took 
especial care that the common-law remedies were also 
available, unless the statute clearly abrogated those 
rights.30 Thus in 1798 when a debtor sought to stave off 
a creditor because he had not complied with the statutory 
requirements on a bond, Judge Pendleton for the Court held 
that it was "immaterial whether the creditor had or had not 
a remedy by motion, under the Act of Assembly, since the 
act having no negative words, the creditor had his election 
to pursue the statutory mode, or his common-law remedy on 
the bond."21 Ten years later Judge Roane commented with 
respect to an alleged fraudulent transfer of slaves that 
"the statutes in question are merely superogatory in 
relation to the common law . . .."32 And in 1825 the 
Court held that the statute regarding proof of a will "is 
only cumulative, and does not deprive any party of remedy 
at common law."33 Similarly, the Court held that "when a 
statute gives a remedy without prescribing a particular 
mode of proceeding, the mode of the common law is to be 
pursued."3 4
Another situation in which the Court of Appeals was 
willing to overcome its predilection for common-law 
precedent was when the local conditions did not favor its 
application.33 As a contemporary commentator noted in
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1821, "The common law of England is, at this day, the law 
of Virginia, except so far as it has altered by statute, or 
so far as its principles are inapplicable to the state of 
the country. It adopts itself to the situation of society, 
being liberalized by the courts according to the cir­
cumstances of the country and the manner and genius of the 
people."36 Judge Roane added that "in applying . . . [the 
common law] we must adapt [it] to the circumstances of the 
case . . . so as to effect a reasonable and substantial 
compliance therewith, rather than a literal one."37
One distinguishing circumstance in the new common­
wealth was the variation in the court structure between 
Virginia and England. Judge Pendleton addressed the issue 
in 1792 in Thornton v. Smith when he held that the 
requirement of asserting a court's jurisdiction in the 
pleadings was not necessary in Virginia. Pendleton argued 
that the English rule "grew out of the local situation of 
the inferior courts in that country, and was grounded upon 
considerations in which ours totally differ from theirs." 
After discussing the confusing mishmash of jurisdictions in 
England and the straightforward statutory scheme in 
Virginia, Pendleton concluded that in this case "the 
[English] precedents cannot bind us."38 A similar 
situation confronted Judge Tucker in the 1809 case of 
Nimmo's exr. v. Commonwealth. The question there was 
whether a decedent1s executor was presumed to know of 
pending judgments which might bind the estate. Tucker
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acknowledged that presumption applied in England. "But," 
he interjected, "it is not every common-law rule, founded 
upon the judicial system of that country, that can be 
deemed, in strictness, applicable to the circumstances and 
situation of this." After noting that there were only four 
courts of record in England, compared to over two hundred 
in Virginia, Tucker concluded: "Can it be supposed, that
under such circumstances . . .  an executor must at his 
peril take notice of all judgments against the testator in 
his lifetime, in what Court, or part of the state soever, 
the same may be entered? I conceive not . . .."3 9 
Similarly, the dispersed nature of Virginia courts forced 
some departures from traditional requirements. Often 
pleading requirements were relaxed. "Considering the 
circumstances in this country," noted the Court, "and the 
dispersed situation of the attorneys and their clients who 
can seldom communicate with each other but at court, 
justice seems to require a relaxation in these rules of 
practice."40
The demands of settling a new country also affected 
the substantive rules of the common law. In England, a 
mere tenant on the land was limited as to his utilization 
of permanent resources of the land such as timber. If he 
were to cut more trees than was reasonably necessary for 
fencing and the like, he was liable to the owner of the 
land for "waste." But in Virginia, where there was a more 
compelling need to tame and make productive the land, the
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rule was different. In Findlay v. Smith, a life tenant was 
permitted, in 1818, to extract unlimited quantities of 
salt, and to use all of the woodland, if necessary, to 
supply fuel for the operation. As Judge William Cabell 
explained, "the law of waste, in its application here, 
varies and accommodates itself to the situation of our new 
and unsettled country."41 Similarly the common-law right 
of a purchaser of the land to the tenant's growing crops 
was questioned in Virginia, "where lands are seldom let out 
upon leases . . .. ”4 2
In sum, the Virginia Court of Appeals did not hesitate 
to change common-law rules and procedures to conform to the 
requirements of Virginia experience.43 On the other hand, 
such deviations were relatively infrequent, and always 
accompanied by an explanation of the circumstances which 
demanded the variance.
Another exception to the tradition of common-law 
preeminence in the Virginia courts was broad in concept but 
rather strictly limited in practice. It arose because 
there were inevitably times when the common-law precedents 
gave no guidance, or provided conflicting rules of law. In 
such cases, by default, the Court had to step in and make a 
policy decision with little guidance from the precedents. 
Such was the case of the interpretation of an insurance 
contract in Bourke v. Granberry, in 1820. There, the 
precedents were diverse and conflicting, forcing Roane to 
finally conclude, "We are to judge for ourselves in this
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deliberation-"44 Judge Coalter faced a similar situation 
in 1829 regarding the admissibility of proof of handwriting 
in a forgery case. "The decisions, so far as I have 
examined them, are not, I think, very consistent with the 
general rules of evidence, or with each other, or with the 
principles by which they profess to be governed; nor, 
indeed, have I as yet been fully able to comprehend those 
principles."4 3 In such cases, the Court had no alternative 
but to strike out on its own without solid guidance from 
the precedents. On the whole, however, the Virginia Court 
of Appeals was very circumspect in availing itself of the 
opportunity to claim a lack of positive direction from 
prior cases, thus justifying the creation of a new policy 
initiative by judicial fiat.46
Despite the tradition of respect for precedent, there 
was at least one particular area where the Court of Appeals 
did evince a resistance to the pattern of adherence to 
common-law rules— in the interpretation of wills. Cases 
involving wills provided much of the grist for the mills of 
justice in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth 
centuries. And in most will cases, the standard deference 
to English precedent was evident. Indeed, one commentator 
has noted that "owing to their great complexity, will 
construction cases came before the appellate court in 
disproportionate numbers. They afforded numerous occasions 
for the bar and bench to display their mastery of the
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obstruse doctrines of property law and the technical rules 
for construing wills that had evolved with ever greater 
refinement in a multitude of cases. Not surprisingly, the 
string of English citations was longest in will cases."4 7
One aspect of will construction, however, provided an 
exception to this rule. This occurred in the cases 
involving the interpretation of the intent of the testator 
(the writer of a will) in the application of the provisions 
of the will. The resistance to common-law rules in such 
cases was partially justified in the familiar terms of a 
lack of clear guidance from the common-law precedents. In 
a 1792 case the Court expressed its willingness to follow 
the traditional rules of will construction— if it could 
find them. "If we could discover those settled rules of 
construction," lamented the Court, "we would pursue them. 
But, after all our researches, we are much inclined to 
affirm . . . 'that cases on wills serve rather to obscure, 
than illuminate questions of this sort."'48 Two years 
later Judge Edmund Pendleton reiterated this argument.
" . . .  In disputes upon wills, . . . which depend . . . 
on the intention of the testator . . . adjudged cases have 
more frequently been produced to disappoint, than to 
illustrate intention." As a result, Pendleton concluded 
that the proper way to decide such cases was not to rely 
upon precedent, but upon "the state and circumstances of 
each case.”49
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
82
But this reliance upon the crutch of a lack of 
"settled rules of construction" was a bit disingenuous.
For in the same case that Pendleton decried a lack of 
established precedent, he went on to reveal the real theory- 
underlying his approach to such cases. "I am free to own," 
admitted Pendleton, "that where a testator’s intention is 
apparent to me, cases must be strong, uniform, and apply 
pointedly before they will prevail to frustrate that 
intention."30 In supporting the perceived intention of 
testators over technical rules of law, the Court of Appeals 
was not so much rejecting precedent as it was acknowledging 
and effectuating the clear aims of common men, unschooled 
in the law. Judge Carr in 1830 stated the reasoning of the 
Court simply and directly. "The enquiry is to the meaning 
of the bequest: it is a pure question of intention. There
are no technical words or forms of expression used in the 
will. It is, evidently, the production of a plain man, 
who, though he understood very well what he meant to say, 
and was able to express himself quite intelligibly, knew 
nothing of legal forms and legal phrases. To ascertain his 
meaning, we must not look to treatises on wills, or to 
adjudged cases, but simply to the words he has used."31 
Carr's statement, although more eloquent, was really 
echoing the same point made by the Court in 1792. In that 
year, the Court in Kennon v. M' Roberts set up a simple 
rule of interpretation: "if the testator use legal
phrazes, his intention should be construed by legal rules.
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If he uses those that are common, his intention, according 
to the common Tinderstanding of the words he uses, shall be 
the rule."32
Perhaps the most illuminating cases where e testator's 
intent clashed with a legal rule came when there was a 
devise {i.e., a testamentary disposition of land) of real 
property to the testator's children. In 1797, for example, 
John Guthrie, an uneducated man, left land to his eldest 
son James. Everything about the will indicated Guthrie's 
intention to leave the land to James absolutely, without 
limitation or restriction. But Guthrie did not devise the 
land to James "and his heirs," and by leaving out those 
three key words, the common-law rule had it that James took 
the land only during his lifetime, and that at his death it 
went not to James' heirs or his own devisees, but to the 
"residuary legatee" of Guthrie's will. The Court of 
Appeals in this case concluded that "if we consult common 
sense and the reason of mankind, we shall be satisfied that 
where a man gives an estate in lands, without limitation or 
restraint, he means to give his whole interest."33 And so 
the Court continued to hold until the problem was remedied 
by a statutory abrogation of the common law.34
Despite examples of the Virginia Court of Appeals 
effecting a testator's intent over technical rules of law, 
there were acknowledged limitations to this policy in both 
theory and practice. Although it was a familiar refrain 
throughout the period, Judge Carr perhaps articulated it
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best in 1825: "In the construction of wills," said Carr,
"the cardinal point, the polar star, is the intention of 
the testator; and this being clear, must be pursued, unless 
it be in violation of some fixed and settled rule"
(emphasis supplied).33 Just exactly what were the "fixed 
and settled" rules which no testator could abridge were 
never clear, and, indeed, seemed to vary. St. George 
Tucker thought them limited to such citadels of common-law 
construction as the rule against perpetuities (which 
forbade making property inalienable beyond a certain 
length of time) or the prohibition against devises in 
mortmain (that is, to religious institutions).36 But in a 
series of cases adjudged between 1791 and 1803, we find the 
Court upholding rules of law against intention in a far 
wider variety of instances. Thus, despite the testator's 
apparent intention, the Court strikes down the intended 
conveyance of after-acquired lands,37 a 999-year lease,38 
a remainder in slaves,39 and a remainder in land.60
The Court's struggles with the rule of law versus the 
intent of the testator is revealing regarding the prevail­
ing attitude toward the common law. On the one hand, we 
see the Court willing to throw over the shackles of ancient 
law to give effect to the obvious desires of the 
individuals. In so doing, the Court was merely acknowledg­
ing a pragmatic reality of the Virginia countryside: 
unschooled men often made wills wherein their intent was 
clear, but whose language did not comport with all the
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legal niceties. The Court chose, where possible, to 
recognize that reality. On the other hand, the Court 
could not— would not— overthrow the familiar rules of 
common-law construction entirely. This was more than mere 
antiquarianism. Again, the Court of Appeals shied before 
the bugbear of unsettling property rights. As Judge Peter 
Lyons phrased the argument in 1803, "It is to no purpose to 
be arguing about the intention . . .; for, mere intention 
cannot prevail against a settled rule of interpretation, 
which has fixed an appropriate sense to particular words; 
because, when the sense is once imposed, they become the 
indicia of the testator's mind, until the contrary is shewn 
by countervailing expressions. . . . It is better that it 
should be sc, too: For, the law ought to be certain; and,
when the rule is once laid down, it should be adhered to: 
Otherwise, what is called liberality, at the bar, will 
degenerate into arbitrary discretion, and all must depend 
upon the will of the Judge."61 Once again we see that 
interesting mix of an abiding respect for the common law, 
leavened by the acknowledgment of the requirements of 
pragmatic reality. And through it all was woven the 
continuing support for fixed and settled rules of property.
Judge Lyons' concern that the law might "degenerate 
into arbitrary discretion, and all must depend upon the 
will of the Judge,"62 provides a key insight into why a 
republican commonwealth like Virginia would unhesitatingly 
accept an antique system of judge-made law derived from an
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essentially monarchical system. For the judicial opinions 
collectively known as the "common law" were not perceived 
as the collective opinions of appointed judges, but as 
reflections of a "higher" entity, and it was the nature of 
this "higher law" to be protective of individual rights and 
property. Indeed, it was only when a court threatened to 
deviate from the accepted notions of the "common law" that 
individual liberties and property rights were endangered.63 
This conception of law had been suggested by Coke, 
propounded by Locke, and elevated to a commonplace by 
Blackstone.64 In Virginia Spencer Roane admitted, in 
1803, "I hold myself bound by well-established precedents, 
and disclaim any power to change the law."63 Such a 
position espoused the familiar doctrine of predictability 
in law, but it also contained an undercurrent of republi­
canism. Thus to Virginians, adhering to the common law was 
more than just a bow to accepted wisdom, more than a means 
to avoid unsettling existing property rights: it was an
affirmative statement of their belief in natural law and 
natural right, which in turn was a fundamental basis of 
traditional English (and hence American) liberties.66
In sum, the Revolution did not mean the overthrow of 
English jurisprudence in Virginia. Rather, "the great body 
of English law . . . remained intact in post-Revolu- 
tionary Virginia. Its rules and principles were the 
predominant authority relied upon in arguing and 
deciding cases . . .."67 This is not to say that,the
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common law was accepted unquestioningly. When the English 
cases did not suit the practical or ideological demands of 
Virginians, the Court did not hesitate to cast them aside. 
Henry St. George Tucker put it succinctly in 1831: "the
common law of England is at this day the law of this 
commonwealth, except so far as it has been altered by 
statute, or so far as its principles are inapplicable to 
the state of the country, or have been abrogated by the 
revolution and the establishment of free institutions."68 
Tucker hit the nail on the head. Through it all, the 
Virginia Court of Appeals incorporated the English common 
law into the emerging jurisprudence of Virginia in a manner 
consistent with republicanism. In the great majority of 
cases, the influence of the English precedents went 
unchallenged. When the English decisions were distin­
guished or overruled, the Court always articulated its 
reasoning for the exception. And, indeed, it is the 
exceptions that prove the rule. The willingness of the 
Virginia Court of Appeals to follow the common law when to 
do so protected individual liberties and predictability in 
social and economic relations, but to depart from English 
precedent when it seemed contrary to republican principles, 
or to the circumstances of the new country, or— especially—  
to the will of the people voiced through statute, proved 
its commitment to a new order. For all this, however, 
there is a strain of conservatism in the attitude of the 
Court of Appeals toward the English heritage.69 With the
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
88
exception of occasional and necessary deviations, the 
commitment was to predictability and stability, which could 
best be achieved by conforming to the safe and familiar 
rules and procedures of the English common law.
Of course, as the decades progressed, an indigenous 
Virginia law also gradually developed (although by 1830 the 
citations to Virginia cases were still outnumbered by those 
to their British counterparts).70 It is an interesting 
study to review how the Virginia Court of Appeals treated 
Virginia precedent. Predictably, as a general rule, the 
ability to cite a Virginia decision as directly on point 
was a boon to any lawyer's argument.71 But there appears 
an interesting dichotomy between the Court's treatment of 
the pre-Revolutionary General Court cases and the respect 
given the postwar decisions of the Court of Appeals. It 
was not uncommon for the Court of Appeals to disregard the 
decisions of the colonial (read "royal”) General Court. At 
one point the Court noted that "it has never been pretended 
that the decisions of the old General Court have been 
considered as conclusive."72 Partially this was because 
technically the old General Court was not a court of last 
resort. It was left unstated— and therefore a matter of 
speculation— whether this disrespect had anything to do 
with that Court's close association with the hated colonial 
governors.7 3
The point about a willingness to overrule General 
Court cases should not be overstated. Consistent with our
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findings regarding the English common law, the stress was 
on continuity rather than change. Perhaps no case better 
displays the limited nature of the Revolution's impact on 
Virginia law than that of Wallace v. Taliaferro. decided in 
1800. That adjudication brought into question the binding 
power of precedents from the old General Court regarding 
property in slaves. Judge Roane was aghast at the very 
thought of questioning that line of cases. "I had supposed 
that no question would have been made of the competency of 
those decisions to fix rules of property in this country 
. . . .  if we reject such rules of property as have been 
fixed by that court and under which our people have 
regulated their property through a long series of time, 
the mischief, which would ensue, is incalculable."74 It 
was Judge Pendleton, however, who directly responded to 
any insinuation that the Revolution had engendered a 
change in the law of property in Virginia. Pendleton 
assumed that such cases had been brought "to discover if 
the Revolution had produced any change in the legal 
sentiment. Fortunately, for the peace of the country, the 
experiment failed, and the point was left at rest." The 
chief justice concluded in a haughty tone: "I imagine some
young gentleman of the bar, not old enough to know the 
practice of the country, nor acquainted with the former 
decisions, advised the suit . . . .1,75 Nowhere can one 
find a better illustration of a Revolution admittedly
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fought for "liberty"— but one in which all the while 
property rights were conservatively protected.
In any event, the Justices appeared even less likely 
to overrule the decisions of their own predecessors on the 
Virginia Court of Appeals. In an early case, Judge 
Pendleton felt he must offer an exaplanation for an 
apparent deviation from a recent adjudication. In Jollife 
v. Hite he admitted that "Uniformity in the decisions of 
this Court, is all important. We have, however, progressed 
but little from the commencement of our existence; and, if 
in any instance, we should recently discover a mistake in a 
former decision, we should surely correct it, and not let 
the error go forth to our citizens, as a governing rule of 
their conduct."7 6 As the decades progressed, the rare 
instance of the Court overruling a previous decision was 
without exception accompanied by such protestations as 
Judge Carr's in 1830: "I believe there are few men, less
disposed than myself, to disturb the decisions of this 
court, made by the enlightened judges who have gone before 
us. Cases, however, do sometimes arise in which our 
respect for their decisions must yield to a more imperious 
duty."77
The discussion thus far has neglected the reception 
greeted pre-Revolutionary English statutes in Virginia.
That story is more straightforward. The same ordinance of 
May, 1776, which accepted the English common law also 
adopted "all statutes or acts of Parliament made in aid of
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the common law prior to . . . [1607].1,78 Here, too, the 
Virginia Convention evinced a willingness to rely heavily 
upon the English legal heritage. But, it is interesting to 
not& the English statutes that were not adopted by the 
Virginia Convention in May, 1776. By the specific language 
of the ordinance, English statutes passed since 1607 were 
not included. This had the disadvantage of eliminating 
salutary English laws passed since that date, but the 
theory was that most such statutes had already been adopted 
by the colonial legislatures— or soon would be by the new 
General Assembly.79 And this proved true enough. The new 
Virginia legislature did copy many prior English statures 
(such as the statute of frauds,80 making certain improve­
ments where necessary81 ). The reception statute of 1776 
also accepted only British statutes "which are of a 
general nature, not local to that kingdom . . ..”82 As 
St. George Tucker phrased it, this meant that some English 
enactments did not transfer because they were considered 
"obsolete, or have been deemed inapplicable to our local 
circumstances and policy.1'83 Finally, and most important­
ly, the acceptance of British statutes was only "until the 
same shall be altered by the legislative power of this 
colony."84 It was here that the most significant activity 
occurred, as the Virginia General Assembly undertook 
between 1776 and 1792 a "revisal" of the laws of Virginia 
which significantly altered both the common law and statute 
law of England as they had been originally adopted in May
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of 1776. The substance of that revisal will be analyzed in 
some depth in the next chapter; here it need only be noted 
that with the completion of the revisal in 1792 the General 
Assembly was evidently satisfied with its comprehensive 
nature, because in that year it moved to repeal the 
ordinance of 1776 adopting the British statutes, and that 
thenceforth, "no such statute or act of parliament shall 
have any force or authority within this commonwealth."83 
In repealing the British legislation, the General Assembly 
sought to come full circle, and exercise, in St. George 
Tucker's phrase, "the undisputed right which every free 
state possesses, of being governed by its own laws."86 In 
doing so, however, the legislature in no way intended that 
its constituents should be deprived of any of the liberties 
which had been enjoyed under British law. To ensure that 
such would be the case, a caveat was inserted in the 1792 
legislation saving "all rights arising under any such 
statute or act . . . and . . . the right and benefit of all 
. . . writs, remedial and judicial . . ,."87
In its application of the English legal heritage to 
Virginia's new order, the Virginia Court of Appeals went a 
long way toward enunciating and defining the nature of 
Virginia's Revolutionary settlement. The first and most 
important attribute of this judicial settlement was the
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traditional and conservative nature of the court's approach 
to change in the legal traditions inherited from England. 
The reliance upon existing rules of law maintained the 
libertarian aspects of the English common law, but also had 
the effect of protecting property rights and thereby 
sustaining the existing social order.
The Court of Appeals, however, was not slavish in its 
devotion to English law. The most important exception to 
the court's usual loyalty to traditional legal rules 
occurred when the Virginia General Assembly overruled 
English statute or common law by statutory enactment. The 
court at all times deferred to the legislature in such 
instances, displaying a respect for the more ''popular" 
branch of republican government and its policy determina­
tions. At the same time, the court continued to support 
traditional rules of law and property unless they were 
directly and unequivocally overruled by the General 
Assembly.
Moreover, the Virginia Court of Appeals displayed a 
distinctly pragmatic vein when it came to the application 
of English precedents. For example, it refused to do so 
when the results did not comport with the realities of 
Virginia’s situation, or when the technical rules of the 
common law yielded an unreasonable result.
In all of this, one fact emerges as particularly 
striking. Throughout the period stretching from the 
Revolution to 1830, the Court of Appeals displayed a
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remarkable consistency in its approach to the salient 
issues which arose. The court displayed a like respect for 
traditional rules of law in the 1790s as in the 1830s. 
Similarly, respect for statutory pronouncements spanned the 
decades under study, and the same continuity can be seen in 
the other topics discussed. Indeed, in all areas, examples 
of judicial attitudes can be drawn as easily from the early 
nineteenth-century reports as from those of the late 
eighteenth century. It is significant that in 1830 the 
Court of Appeals was evincing a judicial approach nearly 
identical to that of forty and fifty years earlier. This 
doctrinal stability in the face of social and economic 
change in the Commonwealth would loom as important as many 
of the court's substantive pronouncements.
A corollary to these conclusions pertains to the 
evolving role of the Court of Appeals. In the decades 
between the Revolution and 1830, the court became a key 
player in the process of defining the nature of Virginia's 
adaptation to its new status as a republican commonwealth 
free from the dictates of English law and policy. Perhaps 
no other institution made a greater contribution to the 
complex task of interweaving the threads of the English 
legal heritage into the fabric of a republican legal 
system.
In sum, by 1830 not only had the Court of Appeals 
played a pivotal role in establishing and defining 
Virginia's new constitutional order, but it had also been
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instrumental in adapting the inherited English legal system 
to a republican commonwealth. Not all Virginia law 
remained static, however. The Revolution also engendered 
significant change in certain areas of law, and the Court 
of Appeals played an equally important role in this aspect 
of the Revolutionary settlement. It is to the legal 
innovations of republican Virginia that we now turn.
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CHAPTER IV
REPUBLICAN PRINCIPLES IN ACTION
Despite all the emphasis upon tradition and stability 
displayed by the Virginia Court of Appeals in its handling 
of the Commonwealth's English legal heritage, there was 
unquestionably a very real transformation in certain areas 
of Virginia law as a result of the Revolution. These 
changes in the law were radical, and comprised the first 
and best articulation of the substance of the republican 
revolution in Virginia. The innovations were initiated by 
the General Assembly, which thereby placed Virginia in the 
forefront of the republican movement. Importantly, 
however, the radicalism of the alterations was tempered by 
a resistance to wholesale change on the part of both the 
legislature and the courts. The Court of Appeals, in 
particular, while supporting the application of republican 
principles whenever possible, nevertheless drew the line 
when the new republican statutes unfairly challenged stable 
and predictable rules of property. In applying the new 
statutory scheme the court was also obliged, on occasion, 
to confront and decide between conflicting republican 
principles. In so doing, the court further defined its 
role in the new Commonwealth. The result was that in the
102
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decades after the Revolution, the Court of Appeals made a 
significant contribution to the substance of Virginia's 
Revolutionary settlement, placing a conservative "gloss" on 
republican principles, while at the same time restricting 
its own role in the making of policy.
One of the most important developments in post- 
Revolutionary Virginia was the series of statutes enacted 
between 1776 and 1792 which clearly reflected the repub­
lican principles of the new Commonwealth. These enact­
ments, together with the judicial application of their 
provisions in practical situations, provide the first 
indicia of the substance of the republican revolution in 
Virginia. While the revisal of the laws was unquestionably 
republican in nature, the overall tone of Virginia's 
legislative revisions was much more restrained than it 
might have been. This analysis will begin with an overview 
of the direction of legislative reform, and then turn to a 
more detailed study of the more republican measures as 
they were enacted by the General Assembly and applied by 
the Court of Appeals. The result illuminates again the 
somewhat peculiar nature of Virginia's experiment in 
republicanism.
While the Virginia legislature passed some important 
legislation on an individual basis (in particular the 
abolition of "estates tail" in 1776),1 most of the 
legislative reform was channeled through a more formal
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revisal of the laws begun in 1776. A review of the 
progress and product of that revisal is illuminating.2
The need for such a modification became apparent 
following the break with Great Britain. There was great 
uncertainty concerning the applicability of English law, 
and a recognition that a revision and recodification of all 
laws in force in the new Commonwealth was sorely needed.3 
The state legislature appointed a committee of revisors—  
Thomas Jefferson, Edmund Pendleton, and George Wythe— to 
effect the needed changes.
The revisors, particularly Jefferson and Wythe, sought 
to execute "an impressive series of reforms . . . which 
established the priorities which the new republic would 
honor."4 Jefferson, in particular, was eager to remake 
the legal structure of the Commonwealth. He hoped to 
remold it both in form and substance so that it would more 
nearly reflect the leading principles of the Revolution.3 
Jefferson's approach sprang from the conviction, as he 
later expressed it, "that our whole code must be reviewed, 
adapted to our republican form of government . . . with a 
single eye to reason, and the good of those for whose 
government it was framed.1'6
But a close analysis of the revisal itself suggests 
that the results were quite different from what Jefferson's 
rhetoric implied. While there were liberal and republican 
aspects of the endeavor, the overall effect of the revisal 
was conservative. Despite Jefferson’s strong words, it is
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clear that from the beginning the revisors decided to limit 
the scope of their undertaking. The language of the 
enabling act had been quite broad, giving the revisors 
"full power and authority to revise, alter, amend, repeal 
or introduce all or any" of the laws of the state.7 But 
they quickly decided on a much more limited endeavor. The 
first question to be settled, according to Jefferson, was 
"whether we should propose to abolish the whole existing 
system of laws, and prepare a new and complete Institute, 
or preserve the general system, and only modify it to the 
present state of things."8 "The committee chose the more 
limited alternative. Thus the revision was based on the 
basic principle of building upon existing laws, rather than 
attempting a new system."9
Furthermore, although Jefferson aimed at a revisal 
along liberal, republican principles, the revisors were not 
in full agreement about how far the new legal code should 
go toward codifying these ideas. Edmund Pendleton, for 
example, acknowledged that Virginia needed a general 
revision of its laws, but he was less willing to make 
radical changes than was Jefferson. For instance,
Jefferson and Pendleton disputed the future of primogeni­
ture. Jefferson wanted it abolished. Pendleton originally 
wanted to retain it, and then, as a compromise, offered to 
follow the Hebrew principle of double portions to the 
eldest son. His reasons were essentially conservative. 
Pendleton knew that the political, economic, and social
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system in Virginia, as in England, was based upon land 
tenure, and he believed that estates must be kept intact if 
the existing systems were to endure. Pendleton's position 
did not carry the day. Nonetheless, this fundamental 
disagreement about succession demonstrates the conflicting 
forces within the committee of revisors.10
When the revisors completed the project in 1779, their 
efforts received only a lukewarm reception in the General 
Assembly. The revisors' report was in the form of 126 
bills. It was introduced near the end of the session, and 
consideration of so formidable a document was postponed by 
the legislature. It appeared that no one in the House of 
Delegates was prepared to fight for acceptance of the 
reforms, and they languished for five more years, until 
James Madison succeeded in directing legislative attention 
to the matter. Certain conservatives at that time opposed 
the proposed code on general principles, but Madison 
succeeded in 1785-86 in winning the enactment of 
approximately half of the bills in the package. While 
Madison eventually had some success, however, the difficul­
ties he encountered in obtaining approval of the sig­
nificant reforms was evidence that few of Virginia's 
leaders were as willing as Jefferson to accept significant 
alteration in the laws.11
Even more revealing are the specific bills which did—  
and did not— gain enactment. By far the greater number of 
proposed bills were of a mundane nature, without any
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ideological connotation. On the other hand, one enactment 
that certainly reflected republican principles was the 
statute of descents enacted in 1785. In addition, by 
Jefferson's own admission, there were only four others 
which were "interesting," and which were broadly 
philosophical in concept. Two of these measures passed the 
Assembly. The first granted citizenship to newcomers to 
Virginia, and thus affirmed the right inherent in all men 
to seek "happiness.1,12 Significantly, this was one of the 
few bills that passed in 1779, in the first flush of 
Revolutionary liberalism. The second bill of significance 
represented the high water mark of liberalism in the 1780s: 
the famous Statute for Religious Freedom of 1786. In this 
measure, written by Jefferson, the assembly extended 
religious liberty to all, without qualification. Moreover, 
the act included a philosophical preamble with an assertion 
of complete intellectual liberty. But the bill did not 
have smooth sailing. When first introduced in 1779, enough 
people regarded it as a "diabolical scheme" to prevent its 
passage. And even in later passing the act, a considerable 
number of legislators rejected the sentiment of the 
preamble, and its language had to be amended and 
restrained.13
Meanwhile, two other "liberal" bills were rejected by 
the General Assembly. In a measure dealing with crime and 
its punishment, Jefferson attempted to make criminal 
sanctions more rational and humane. The bill met intense
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opposition and was rejected, largely because it "mitigated 
penalties in advance of general public opinion."14 A 
final pet measure of Jefferson's was a bill proposing the 
extension of public education. To contemporary Virginians, 
however, Jefferson's education proposal seemed both overly 
comprehensive and revolutionary, and even the limited part 
of the proposal that was enacted was not implemented in the 
state's localities.13
The impression that is gained from all this is that, 
while the forces of change were not absent in post- 
Revolutionary Virginia, they were generally counterbalanced 
by more conservative elements content with the status quo. 
This perspective is reinforced by following the later 
efforts at completing the revision of Virginia law. As 
early as 1783, when the more radical measures of the 
revisors met with strong opposition, the legislature 
recognized the need for more rationality in the laws of 
Virginia and ordered what became known as the Chancellor's 
Revisal. This was merely a non-reformist compilation of 
the laws, rather than a revision.16 Between 1787 and 
1792, attempts to complete the revisal were carried out by 
three successive groups, but the result of their work was 
vastly different from that of the original revisors.17 
The new revisors lacked a strong personality committed to 
reform who could influence the direction the revisal would 
take. Instead, they relied on legislative direction, which 
was decidedly conservative.18 The House of Delegates
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instructed the new revisors that "no new matter should be 
introduced into the system; the object of the act under 
which the said Revisors were appointed, being to compile a 
new and concise edition, and not to form a new code of 
laws."19 This more limited revisal was adopted in 1792.
In sum, despite Jefferson's assertions that the 
revisal of the laws in Virginia marked the dawning of a new 
liberal and republican day with respect to the Old 
Dominion's legal code, there is little evidence that there 
was much more than a lurching, temporary movement in that 
direction, soon overcome by a return to conservatism.20
That the revisal of Virginia's laws during the years 
1776 to 1792 contained many elements of conservatism should 
come as no surprise. As one scholar commented in 1831, "We 
can scarcely presume that any but enthusiasts would adopt a 
jurisprudence entirely foreign to their habits instead of 
the institutions of their fathers."21 And, although there 
were radical ideas abroad in these years, moderation 
prevailed in Virginia.22 In the end, "the laws adopted by 
the state legislature were essentially the same that had 
governed Virginia for generations."2 3
To say that the Virginia revisal of the laws had a 
conservative cast is not to diminish the very real and 
substantial republican advances made by certain pieces of 
legislation passed during those years; such legislation 
effected a fundamental restructuring of certain areas of 
Virginia law, and the republican implications were
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profound. It is to these enactments, and in particular to 
their application by the Virginia Court of Appeals, that we 
now turn.
Thomas Jefferson had identified a handful of bills in 
the proposed revisal of the laws as particularly important 
from a republican point of view. One of these was the act 
granting citizenship to newcomers to Virginia.24 To 
Jefferson, this bill recognized the "natural right which 
all men have of . . . seeking . . . happiness wheresoever 
they may be able . . .."2S Here, then, was a "natural 
right" duly legitimated by the legislative authority. The 
Court of Appeals, in construing a later version of this 
statute, was quick to acknowledge the right, but as quick 
to note the limitations that could be engrafted even upon 
natural rights. In the 1811 case of Murray v. M'Carty, 
Judge William Cabell recognized that "nature has given to 
all men the right of relinquishing the society in which 
birth or accident may have thrown them; and of seeking 
subsistence and happiness elsewhere; and it is believed 
that this right of emigration, or expatriation is one of 
those 'inherent rights, of which when they enter into a 
state of society, they cannot, by any compact, deprive, or 
divest their posterity"' (quoting directly from the 
Virginia declaration of rights).26 But at the same time, 
Cabell took care to add that this right could be regulated 
in the community interest. "But, although municipal laws 
cannot take away or destroy this great right, they may
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regulate the manner, and prescribe the evidence of its 
exercise . . . .”27 in subsequent cases the Court enforced 
these municipal regulations of citizenship by denying the 
vote to a citizen of the Virginia lands ceded to the 
District of Columbia,28 and by demanding that the statutory 
requirements for expatriation be met.29
Of much more importance to republican principles were 
the statutes which sought to cut out, "root and branch," 
those aspects of English law which were most closely linked 
to England’s feudal heritage. Feudalism was the soul of 
English law, and an understanding of its functions is key 
to understanding the provisions and practices which formed 
the bulk of Virginia's legal heritage. After the Norman 
conquest (a rudimentary form may have existed earlier), 
England had joined much of the rest of Europe in employing 
a "feudal" system which was to dominate England for several 
centuries and which still lies at the heart of much of 
English and American jurisprudence. Feudalism, simply put, 
was a political and social system which originated in the 
military needs of the most powerful men in society. To 
secure a loyal following, a "lord" would enter into a 
complex, reciprocal relationship with his "vassal" which, 
at base, depended upon mutual loyalty. In simplified form, 
in return for homage and service from the vassal, the lord 
pledged his protection and provided land to the vassal.
This vassal, in turn, often entered into a similar 
relationship with others, becoming their "lord" and they
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his vassals. The result was a pyramidal structure of 
mutual obligations and landholding, which "grew into a 
complete and intricate complex of rules for the tenure and 
transmission of real estate, and of correlated duties and 
services; while, by tying men to the land and to those 
holding above and below them, it created a close-knit 
hierarchy of persons, and developed an aggregate of social 
and political institutions."30 As early as the end of the 
twelfth century, feudalism in its pure form was at an end 
even in England, but its influence lingered on, 
particularly in English law. Indeed, as late as the 1760s 
Blackstone concluded, "It is impossible to understand, with 
any degree of accuracy, either the civil constitution of 
this kingdom, or the laws which regulate its landed 
property, without some general acquaintance with the nature 
and doctrine of feuds, or the feudal law . . . ."31
The problem for Virginians at the time of the 
Revolution was that feudalism, with its pyramid of 
dependence leading ultimately to the monarch himself, was 
strikingly anti-republican. For a generation steeped in 
the Harringtonian belief in independence based upon the 
free and unrestrained ownership of land, the residual 
restraints on property grounded in the feudal past were 
unacceptable. As a result, St. George Tucker recognized in 
his annotation to Blackstone, "It was expected that every 
trace of that [feudal] system would have been abolished in 
this country when the republic was established."32
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In May, 1779, the General Assembly moved to do just 
that. In what Tucker called a "remarkable passage,” the 
legislature, in order "that the proprietors of lands within 
this Commonwealth may no longer be subject to any servile, 
feudal, or precarious tenure; and to prevent the danger to 
a free State from perpetual revenue,” provided that "the 
reservation of royal . . . quitrents, and all other 
reservations and conditions in the patents or grants of 
land from the crown of England . . . under the former 
government . . . are hereby declared null and void; and 
that all lands . . . shall be held in absolute and 
unconditional property to all intents and purposes 
whatsoever . . ..”33 By the operation of this act, the 
possession of all lands in Virginia became "allodial," that 
is, independent, and held of no superior at all.34
Important as the 1779 statute was as a symbolic 
eradication of the residual feudal "incidents" on land, of 
much more substantive importance were the statutes striking 
at the complex web of law relating to the descent and 
conveyance of property which was firmly rooted in the old 
feudal relationships. These alterations— the abolition of 
entails and primogeniture, the new egalitarian statute of 
descents, the elimination of the right of survivorship, and 
others— represented, in St. George Tucker's words, "a 
desire to conform to the newly adopted principles of 
republican government."33
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The first and perhaps most famous of these statutes 
was the one which abolished entails. An entail (or "fee 
tail" or "estate tail") was a limitation placed upon the 
succession to real property (and, in Virginia, slaves) 
which worked to the benefit of particular heirs, and to the 
exclusion of others. Typically, a testator in his will 
would leave certain property "to A, and the male heirs of
his body." The "heirs of his body" was a formulaic phrase
(there were several others) connoting a fee tail, which
here must descend in the male line. If for any reason
there were no male heirs in a particular generation, the 
fee tail was extinguished and the property either "revert­
ed" back to the original grantor, or, if he had so 
provided, the "remainder" went to a designated remainder­
man. By establishing an estate tail, a grantor could 
guarantee that the family plantation would remain in the 
same family for generations.
The feudal nature of estates tail was acknowledged in 
an early Court of Appeals case. In the 1797 case of Kennon 
v. M 'Roberts. the Court depicted the "spirit of the 
[feudal] system, unfriendly to alienations, or divisions of 
lands . . . .  [This] spirit established the rights of 
primogeniture, and . . . permitted estates in tail . . ,."36 
The reason, explained Judge Pendleton a decade later in 
Bradley v. Mosby. was that it was in the "interests of the 
Barons to keep estates, as much as might be, in one hand 
[or family]."3 7
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
115
The extent of the utilization of estates tail in 
Virginia has been the subject of some debate, but there can 
be no doubt that the elimination of both entails and 
primogeniture in Virginia had— at the least— an immense 
symbolic impact.38 The perception, at least, was that, 
prior to the Revolution, estates tail were "greatly 
favoured in Virginia,"39 and the reason was not far to 
seek. As late as 1830, Judge Carr explained it in Orndoff 
v. Turman by quoting Thomas Jefferson: "In the earlier
times of the colony, when lands were to be obtained for 
little or nothing, some provident individuals obtained 
large grants; and desirous of founding great families for 
themselves, settled them on their descendants in fee tail. 
The transmission of the property, from generation to 
generation, in the same name, raised up a distinct set of 
families, who being privileged by the law in the perpetra­
tion of their wealth, were thus formed into a patrician 
order . . ..1,4 0
By the coming of the Revolution and with it the 
principles of republicanism, the tolerant attitude toward 
entails had greatly changed. No longer was preserving the 
estates of powerful governing families such a priority. 
Jefferson charged that "the whole corps" of these wealthy 
families was devoted to "the interests and will of the 
crown. Instead of an aristocracy of wealth, of more harm 
and danger to society," Jefferson called on the General 
Assembly "to make an opening for the aristocracy of virtue
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and talent, which nature has wisely provided for the 
interests of society, and scattered with equal hand through 
all its conditions." Jefferson concluded that such a move 
was "deemed essential to a well-ordered republic.”41 
Judge Pendleton concurred that notions of republicanism had 
brought about the change in attitude. In the 1797 case of 
Carter v. Tyler, he noted that "The revolution . . . having 
produced a new order of things, this great subject [of 
entails] came before the legislature in October 1776.1,42 
Carr, writing in 1830, filled in the details: "We had
just cut ourselves loose from a monarchy, and established a 
republican form of government. This was the first assembly 
that met under the new constitution, and it became its duty 
to remodel the laws, and adapt them to the genius of our 
infant republic. In this labor, it was natural that the 
laws of entails should attract the earliest attention: a
law, mischievous in its effects upon the general interests 
of society, and peculiarly hostile to the experiment we 
were then making."43
The result of all this was the statute abolishing 
entails passed in that October session of 1776.44 The 
statutory intent, according to Carr, was "to cut up estates 
tail, root and branch,"43 or, as Henry St. George Tucker 
put it in 1831, "our revolutionary ancestors, . . . instead 
of tampering with so noxious a plant, resolved to lay the 
axe to its root by a total abolition."46 When it was
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discovered that the language of the 1776 act contained 
loopholes, these were closed in 1785 and 1792.47
The Court of Appeals of Virginia was assiduous in its 
application of these statutes to conveyances of land and 
slaves. In a long line of cases the Court consistently 
interpreted language in conveyances that had traditionally 
created estates tail to continue to do so (even in 
conveyances drafted long after the statute when presumably 
the grantor knew the law). Such conveyances were by 
operation of the law immediately converted to a fee simple 
(that is, to absolute ownership in the original grantee).48 
The effect of such conversions to a fee simple was to cut 
off the reversion or remainder, thus freeing the property 
from the restrictive aspects of the fee tail.49
The willingness of the Court of Appeals to enforce the 
legislative mandate reflects both its deference to 
legislative initiative and, undoubtedly (as is clear from 
some of the judicial language already quoted) because of a 
sincere belief in the republican principles involved.
Perhaps what is more revealing are the cases where the 
Court did not construe the conveyance to be a fee tail and 
thereby converted to a fee simple. These types of 
decisions fell into two general categories. In the first 
were a few exceptional cases where, despite language which 
normally was deemed to create a fee tail, the Court held 
that an entailed estate was not created. Usually these 
situations arose in "will" cases, where by leaving the
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conveyance untouched the Court in effect upheld a later 
transfer of the property to, say, the testator's grandchil­
dren, a result clearly implementing the testator's 
intention.
The case of Smith v. Chapman50 is a good example. In 
1790, long after the abolition of entails, William Carr 
(the testator) drew a will which, in effect, left property 
to Carr's children for life, then to Carr's children's 
children (Carr's grandchildren). But, if Carr’s children 
had no "issue of their body," the estate would go to Carr's 
wife. As we have seen, under normal circumstances, the 
"issue of the body" language was a formulaic phrase which 
made the conveyance a fee tail. If so, Carr's children 
would take an estate in fee simple by operation of the 
statute, and the provisions for Carr's grandchildren and 
his wife would be obliterated. In this case, the Court 
avoided this result by construing the grant to the 
grandchildren to be a valid "executory devise"— that is, a 
valid future interest in the property. In doing so, the 
Court continued its tradition of supporting a testator's 
intent to provide for his family. A case such as Smith, 
however, was rare, and the Court was usually content to 
convert the fee tail to a fee simple without considering 
the consequences.51
Indeed, the real surprise is that the Smith v. Chapman 
scenario was not played out more often. Almost identical 
fact patterns emerged numerous times both before and after
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Smith, and the Court usually continued to decide that a fee 
tail was created and then converted to a fee simple. St. 
George Tucker may have provided the best explanation. "It 
may seem very hard," admitted Tucker, "that an estate given 
by words which so clearly manifest the donors intention 
towards a particular set of persons, should be defeated by 
a general rule of law. But , . . the legislature [and the 
Court] from the experience of ages being sensible of the 
bad policy of suffering perpetuities in estates to be 
created by any set form of words, probably found it would 
be unsafe to permit any evasion of the act for preventing 
entails to be introduced by any set form of words, or 
device whatsoever.1,3 2
Of more interest is the other category where the Court 
declined to convert an obvious fee tail into a fee simple 
according to the statute. While it is clear that the 
General Assembly intended to totally eliminate fee tails, 
"root and branch," by the statute of October 1776, through 
inartful draftsmanship a loophole had been left. The 1776 
statute eliminated all estates tail except a "tail on a 
tail"— that is, where A left an estate in tail to B, and if 
B had no issue of his body, to C in tail.33 This was a 
technical but very real exception, which clearly did not 
conform to what the legislature had intended. Neverthe­
less, when just such a case (Roy v. Garnett) came before 
the Court of Appeals in 1794, th^; Court felt compelled to 
uphold the fee tail as valid.34 This loophole was quickly
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closed in 1785,33 but the fact that the Court of Appeals 
chose to uphold the fee tail is quite revealing. In one 
sense it confirms the impression that the Court took its 
direction straightforwardly, and literally, from the will 
of the legislature as expressed in statute. It also 
demonstrates, in a broader sense, an example of "conflict­
ing republican principles." It is clear that Roy v.
Garnett dealt with an unintended loophole in a statute 
designed to implement an important tenet of republicanism. 
But the "law" did not so provide in this particular case, 
and the Virginia Court of Appeals deferred to the express 
words of the statute— that is, to the express words of the 
representatives of the people.
In contrast to Roy v. Garnett was the 1830 case of 
Orndoff v. Turman.36 There, an estate tail had been 
created in 1745. In 1769, Turman,37 the tenant in tail, 
conveyed an absolute, fee simple interest (which of course 
he did not have) to Orndoff. In 1816 Turman died. In 
this litigation Orndoff sought to confirm his fee simple 
interest. Orndoff argued that, even though Turman had not 
possessed a fee simple when he made the conveyance in 1769, 
Turman's fee tail had been converted to a fee simple by 
operation of the act of 1776, thus legitimating the 
conveyance. On the other side, the heirs of Turman argued 
that when Turman made the alleged fee simple conveyance in 
1769 his fee tail had thereby been "discontinued," and was 
thus not subject to the 1776 statute until the property
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descended to his heirs at his death in 1816. At that time, 
argued the heirs, the statute operated to convert the fee 
tail into a fee simple in the heirs.
The Court frankly admitted that the statute did not 
address this particular case.38 Under the reasoning of 
Roy v. Garnett, since this was apparently a loophole in the 
statute, it would be logical to assume that the fee tail 
converted into a fee simple, if at all, in 1816. Indeed 
Judge Cabell was candid on this point. "If I felt myself 
bound to give the statute a strict and technical construc­
tion, I confess I could not deny the correctness of this 
position.”39 But here Cabell refused to be confined to 
technicalities, and sought instead to enforce the true 
intent of the legislature. "Can any man read the preamble 
of this statute," asked Cabell, "and believe that this was 
the intention of the legislature? It is a law founded on 
great principles of national policy. It is a highly 
remedial statute, intended to remove great political and 
moral mischief. So far from being restricted to a rigid 
technical construction, according to the letter, I feel 
myself compelled to construe it according to its spirit, 
and thus to bring within the scope of its operation all 
cases that come within the mischief intended to be provided 
against."60 Judge Carr chimed in: "A thing which is
within the intention of the makers of a statute, is as much 
within the statute, as if it were within the letter." And, 
again: "Intention is the governing principle, the essence
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of the law."61 Judge Green inserted a succinct dissent, 
reminding the majority that "the present case does not come 
within the literal terms of that statute."62
Here we have the interesting phenomenon of a Court of 
Appeals in 1794 refusing to expand the intent of the 
statute abolishing entails beyond the precise statutory 
provisions, while in 1830 the Court in a similar case took 
a much more liberal stand.63 One must be careful, however, 
not to make too much of a single instance; for one thing, 
the facts of Orndoff v. Turman do not as clearly demon­
strate that the case was obviously outside the statute.
While the statute abolishing entails is perhaps 
Virginia's most famous Revolutionary strike at the 
aristocratic aspects of the English law, the act which 
undertook to eradicate feudal vestiges in the most 
fundamental fashion was undoubtedly the statute of descents 
passed in 1785.64 Neither the legislature nor the Court 
of Appeals ever harbored any doubts as to the radical 
nature of this act. Judge Tucker acknowledged that by this 
statute "all former Rules and Canons of Inheritance and 
succession to estates within this Commonwealth, whether 
established by Common Law, or by Statute, were rescinded, 
abrogated and annulled."65 Judge Pendleton agreed; "That 
the act of 1785 has totally done away [with] that common 
law [of England], as to the course of descents, has not 
been, nor can be doubted."66
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The full impact of the Virginia statute of descents 
upon the feudal English system can perhaps best be revealed 
by comparing the essential principles of the English course 
of descents with the changes engendered by the Virginia 
statute.67 The feudal system, based as it was on a purely 
personal relationship between lord and vassal, required not 
only absolute loyalty but also someone with the ability to 
fulfill the military and other obligations attendant upon 
the feudal connection. It was chiefly these requirements 
that generated the rules governing the common law of 
descent.
The first of the feudal rules of inheritance was that 
of primogeniture. This held that if the possessor of land 
died intestate,68 his property descended to the eldest 
surviving son. This had the effect both of keeping the 
property intact, and of ensuring that it passed on to the 
person most likely to have the ability to take up the 
deceased father's obligations. The Virginia statute wasted 
little time in abolishing this concept, providing that all 
children took equally.69 In a similar vein, the English 
law of descents maintained that, in Blackstone's words,
"the male issue shall be admitted before the female,"70 
and for many of the same reasons concerning the nature of 
feudal obligations. Again, Virginia struck at the heart of 
this set of assumptions by providing that real property 
should "pass in parcenary [that is, jointly] to his kindred 
male and female."71 By this clause, commented Henry St.
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George Tucker, "the preference of males to females is 
altogether abolished."72
Another concept that loomed large in feudal 
inheritance law was the concept of "blood"; that is, the 
English law of descents emphasized that property must 
remain in the bloodline of the person who had first 
acquired the land. This made perfect sense from a feudal 
perspective, since the top priority was loyalty, and blood 
has always been thicker than water.73 Again, the Virginia 
statute of descents completely stood such thinking on its 
head. Where at common law a property would escheat to the 
crown before descending to someone not of the whole blood, 
in Virginia those of the "half-blood" (one common parent) 
took half portions, bastards could inherit and transmit 
property through the mother, and spouses could inherit in 
the absence of other heirs.74 St. George Tucker gives the 
rationale behind Virginia's liberal approach: "It seems to
have been the opinion of the framers of that act, that if 
he neglected to make any disposition thereof, in his 
lifetime, the law ought to give it to those persons whom he 
would most naturally have preferred if he had made such a 
disposition. *'7 3
A further manifestation of Virginia's emphasis upon 
property passing to the "loved ones" of the deceased can be 
found in the Commonwealth’s amendment to the English 
treatment of "ascending succession." Blackstone noted 
that, in England, "The first rule [of descent] is, that
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inheritances shall lineally descend to the issue of the 
[decedent] . . . but shall never lineally ascend.”76 
Henry St. George Tucker explained: "So that, in England,
if a man dies seised [that is, possessed] of an estate of 
inheritance, leaving no other kindred than his father, his 
land will escheat to the crown rather than pass to the 
father as his heir." Tucker went on to observe: "In
Virginia, this absurd notion is abolished, and the father 
is preferred to all other kindred except descendants."7 7
In sum, it is clear that the Virginia Statute of 
Descents of 1785 represented a radical departure from the 
common law.78 "That important act," said St. George 
Tucker in 1803, "wholly changed the course of descents, 
introducing and establishing principles in direct opposi­
tion to those of the common law, and scarcely agreeing with 
it in any one principle."79 Indeed, wrote Tucker, "the 
common-law rules of inheritance were wholly and entirely 
abolished, and an entire new system of jurisprudence 
substituted for them in Virginia, the grounds and founda­
tions of which, are wholly incompatible with those rules 
and maxims, which were generated by and interwoven with the 
feudal system of which, it appears to have been the policy 
and intention of the framers of our law, to eradicate every 
germ, and obliterate every former trace."80
While the General Assembly took the lead in enacting 
an entirely new system of descents based upon republican 
precepts, it was left to the Virginia courts to apply the
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new arrangement. The Court of Appeals in construing this 
statute acknowledged and applauded its republican inten­
tions. It was clear that the Court attributed the genesis 
of the act to the new republican form of government. Judge 
Carr described the scenario. "Among the first cares of 
this Commonwealth, after the close of the war, was the 
framing of a body of Laws better suited to our actual 
situation, than those which had governed us, as part of a 
Monarchy . . . .  Our Statute of Descents is part of the 
fruit of [these] labors."81 Judge Fleming, although 
writing nearly thirty years earlier, would have agreed.
"The Legislature conceiving, that the rule of descents by 
the common law was not well adapted to the genius of the 
people and the form of our Government, totally changed it, 
by the act of 1785."82 It was Judge Carr who best summed 
it up. "Every body knows," he said, "that these [English] 
Canons of descent are the creatures of the Feudal System, 
and however calculated to support a Government like that of 
England, are in violation of natural affection, and 
repugnant to the free spirit of a republic."83
The Court of Appeals elaborated upon its perception 
of the substance of this proclaimed "free spirit of a 
republic." The abolition of feudal vestiges was certainly 
one important aspect. While Judge Carr had acknowledged 
that the English "Canons of Descent are the creatures of 
the Feudal System,"84 Judge John Coalter was willing to 
elaborate. "The principles of our Revolution . . .," he
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said in 1828 r "required that those Feudal doctrines of 
primogeniture, preference of males over females, that lands 
should not lineally ascend, the rules as to the half-blood, 
and the blood of the first purchaser, &c., should be done 
away, and that the course of descents should conform to the 
new state of things."05 There were also more practical 
aspects to the Virginia policy toward descents. Conforming 
the distribution of property to the "natural objects" of 
the deceased's affection certainly made more sense than 
allowing the land to escheat to the state for want of a 
descendant who fit in the proper common-law category.
Beyond these more obvious justifications for the 1785 
statute, however, the Court of Appeals also was able to 
discern the essential principle underlying much of the 
statutory scheme. It was a principle as novel to real 
property law as it was antithetical to traditional feudal 
notions. In the 1828 case of Davis v. Rowe, Justice Carr 
identified the essential purpose of the statute quite 
lucidly. "The provisions of this Law stand in striking 
contrast with the Canons of Descent of the Common Law," he 
said. "Its great object was equality."86 This is 
confirmed by the statutory provisions. In addition to such 
obviously egalitarian measures such as the abolition of 
primogeniture and the taking of equal portions by males and 
females alike, other sections provided that eligible heirs 
should take equally ("per capita"), and enlarged the 
common-law treatment of "hotchpot" (which allowed an heir
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to share equally even though he had received "advancements" 
from the estate).87
As was the case with the application of the statute 
abolishing estates tail, the adjudications in the Court of 
Appeals that are most illuminating are those where the 
application of the statute was not automatic. In these 
cases are revealed both the limits of court-applied 
republican principles and occasions where equally republi­
can values pulled in opposing directions. It is quite 
interesting to note the cases where the Virginia statute of 
descents of 1785 was not applied. The Court of Appeals 
refused to apply the provisions of the new law to cases 
that arose prior to the enactment of the statute. In 
Shelton v. Shelton, the issue was whether the "surplus" of 
an estate passed to the executors or to the next of kin. 
While admitting that "our new statute of distributions has 
put an end to the dispute as to all cases subsequent to its 
passage" (it thereafter went to the next of kin), in this 
case arising prior to 1785, the Court applied English 
precedents and ordered the surplus to go to the execu­
tors.88 Likewise the Court refused to apply the new 
notions of land descending according to "title" rather than 
by the common-law rule of "seisin" in a case that arose 
before the act.89 Such refusal to apply the statute 
retroactively sprang not so much from any anti-republican 
bias, as from a deeply-rooted respect for stable and 
predictable rules of property.
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A reprise of the interesting problem of the judicial 
treatment of omissions in a statute also appeared under the 
statute of descents. It will be recalled that in our 
discussion of the law of entails the 1794 case of Roy v. 
Garnett refused to deviate from statutory language, even 
though there plainly had been an oversight. In the much 
less clear case of Orndoff v. Turman in 1830, the Court 
appeared more willing to give effect to legislative intent 
over precise statutory language.90 The same type of 
situation arose under the statute of descents in the case 
of Davis v. Rowe in 1828.91 In that case Anthony Gardner 
died intestate (that is, without a will) leaving only 
nieces and nephews as his heirs— one on his brother's side, 
four on his sister's.92 At common law, these nieces and 
nephews would have taken "per stirpes"— that is, they would 
have stood in the shoes of their parents, and taken the 
portion of the estate that would have gone to the parent 
had he or she lived. In this case, Gardner's sister would 
have received half of his estate, and his brother the other 
half. Thus, under the common law, the brother's only child 
would take one-half the estate, while the four children of 
the sister would split the other half (each getting one- 
eighth of the entire estate). The Virginia statute of 
descents, however, had followed a diametrically different 
policy, providing that estates should be distributed per 
capita— that is, in equal shares to those eligible to 
inherit.93 The problem in the Davis case was that,
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although the statute specifically mentioned almost all 
conceivable kin as within the per capita provision 
(children, mother, brothers, sisters, uncles, aunts, etc.), 
it did not mention nieces and nephews. Thus, although the 
spirit of the statute clearly pointed toward an equal 
division of the estate, it was silent as to the specific 
individuals involved in this controversy. The question was 
whether, in the absence of a statutory mandate, the common- 
law rule of per stirpes distribution applied.
The majority in Davis, similar to the previous 
decision in Orndoff, admitted that the case did not come 
within the specific provisions of the statute. Neverthe­
less the Court held that it was clear that the legislature 
intended to completely abrogate the common law, and that 
the spirit of the law equally clearly favored a per capita 
distribution. Judges Green and Cabell in dissent argued 
that, under Virginia law, the common law applied where the 
statute, as here, was silent.94 Here we find the Court 
making a much more definitive statement than can be gleaned 
from Orndoff. Here, although the Justices were divided, 
the Court committed itself to a policy of supporting 
legislative intent in the absence of a specific statutory 
provision. It appears to be a clear departure from the 
earlier technicality of Roy v. Garnett. In so doing it 
supported the republican policy of the statute without 
really doing violence to the equally republican concept of 
deference to the popular (i.e., legislative) will.
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The Davis decision did bring some illumination to the
issue of the Court's perception of its role in the
republican schema. More revealing, however, were a brace
of cases decided in 1800-1801 in which the Court of Appeals
faced squarely a blatantly anti-republican amendment to the
act. The statute of 1785, a product of the Jefferson-
Pendleton-Wythe revisal, was almost flawless in its
drafting. Indeed, as Judge Carr said in the 1828 case of
Davis v. Rowe, "Our Statute of Descents . . . has hitherto
*
been admired as a model of conciseness and perspecuity, and 
so well has it answered its end, that this (I think) is the 
first serious contest, which has arisen in a period of 
forty years, on a provision of the Law, which came from the 
hands of the Revisors."9 3 Not so the amendments added to 
the Statute in 1790.96 In that year additional provisions 
addressed the principles of inheritance to be followed in 
the cases of infants who died intestate. As Henry St. 
George Tucker put it, "These sections, which are stuck like 
wens upon the original act, and deform its fair propor­
tions, have given rise to more litigation within a few 
years than the residue of the act will occasion in a 
century."97
The reason for all the problems was that the inter­
polated provisions were substantively different from the 
original statute, and represented a policy diametrically 
opposed to that act. The new sections provided that if any 
part of the real property in the infant’s estate had
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derived from the father, that property was to go to the 
father or his next of kin, to the exclusion of the mother 
and her kin. Likewise, land derived from the mother was to 
be distributed on the maternal side. This was clearly a 
resurrection of the principle of keeping the property in 
the "blood" of the original possessor.
The first case was that of Brown v. Turberville, which 
came before the Court in 1800.98 The problem in that case 
did not directly involve the 1790 amendments, but arose 
because those amendments were inartfully interpolated into 
the original act. Under section five of the 1785 act, if 
any person (infant or adult) died without children, 
parents, brothers, sisters, or their descendants, the 
estate was divided into two halves ("moieties"), half to be 
distributed on the paternal side (to the grandfather or 
other kindred) and half on the maternal side. As we have 
seen, in 1790 this was amended in the case of infants, and 
the estate went wholly to the parental side from which it 
"derived." The 1790 amendments were designed to apply only 
to infants, while the 1785 approach was retained as to 
adults. Unfortunately, when the 1790 amendments were 
integrated into the statute of descents during the 
recodification of 1792, inartful draftsmanship clouded the 
whole issue. The new amendments were inserted intact (now 
as sections five and six of the recodified act).99 The 
original 1785 section five then became the new section 
seven. In doing so, the draftsman inserted into the 1785
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language a clause designed to acknowledge the new treatment 
of infants' estates. But the inserted language was not 
limited to infants, and a literal reading of the 1785 
provision as amended would have it apply only when an adult 
died without the designated close relatives, and without 
having derived any of his land from either his father or 
mother. Clearly this was not the intent, but that is what 
the statute now said, and, predictably enough, someone soon 
sought to take advantage of it. Hence the case of Brown v. 
Turberville came on before the Court of Appeals.
In Brown. George Waugh, an adult, died intestate, 
unmarried and without issue or other close relation, and 
with land which had derived from George's father. The 
plaintiffs were kindred on George's mother's side, seeking 
a moiety of the estate under the intention of the 1785 act. 
The defendants claimed all the estate as George's father's 
kin under the precise language of the 1792 recodification. 
When the matter came before the Court of Appeals, the Court 
did not duck the issue, but met it directly, unanimously 
supporting the parties claiming under the 1785 intent. The 
eagerness with which they sought to avoid the 1792 language 
can be seen by the fact that the respective judges came tip 
with no fewer than three mutually exclusive theories to 
support their conclusion.
Judge Carrington acknowledged that there had been an 
oversight in the drafting of the 1792 provision, and 
recommended the literal -insertion of the missing language
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into the statute. "This supplement," said Carrington, 
" . . .  according to the rules of expounding statutes, I 
think we have a right to make." He added that "by this 
means, the whole act will be rendered consistent, and all 
cases of intestacy will be provided for,* agreeable to the 
meaning and intention of the Legislature. Which is 
certainly better," concluded Carrington, "than by adhering 
to the literal expression, to disappoint the will of the 
Legislature, and defeat the intention of the Law 
altogether."10«
Judge Fleming was chary of such a drastic remedy. 
Instead, he sought "a plain natural interpretation which 
will effect this important object, without any violence to 
the text." Fleming's solution was to construe the 1785 
statute as still in existence, since "the act of 1792 only
repeals so much of other laws, as comes within its own
purview . . .."101
Judge Lyons would take a broader approach. "It is a 
rule in the construction of statutes," said Lyons, "that 
the intention, when it can be discovered, must be followed 
with reason and discretion, although the interpretation may 
seem contrary to the letter of the statute." He proceeded 
to take "the whole act, and all other acts made on the same 
subject, into one view, moulding them according to the rule 
laid down . . .  to the truest and best use; and rejecting 
what shall appear to be inconsistent and absurd, and
tending to defeat the intention of the Legislature."102 In
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summing up. President Judge Pendleton acknowledged that 
"the Court differ in their reasons," but the result was a 
unanimous decision for the plaintiff and the intent of the 
1785 statute.103
It was not so easy a year later when the case of 
Tomlinson v. Dillard came before the Court.104 In that 
case it was an infant, Benjamin Tomlinson, who died 
intestate, deriving his property from his father, but 
leaving his mother as his closest relative. This set of 
facts brought the case directly within the 1790 amendments. 
The same judges who had reached to uphold the 1785 statute 
in Brown the year before could find no justification for 
doing so here. Judge Fleming admitted: "I have not a
moment's doubt upon this case. The language of the acts of 
Assembly leaves no room for criticism . . . .  For, whatever 
latitude a Court may think proper to indulge, where the 
expressions are ambiguous, they certainly have no right to 
do so, when the words are clear; but, if inconveniences 
follow from a literal construction, they must be redressed 
by the Legislature, and not by the Court; who are not to 
torture the words in order to discover meanings which the 
Legislature never had; but are to pursue the plain import 
of the statute, without regard to consequences."103 
Carrington and Lyons reluctantly agreed. Said Lyons: "The
inclination of my mind would have led me to support [the 
opposite conclusion]; but the words of the act of Assembly 
are too strong to be resisted."106 All these judges
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distinguished (that is, found a difference in) the Brown 
decision. Only Judge Roane found reason to dissent, basing 
his opinion on the fact that in this case personal property 
would be affected (under a statute decreeing that personal 
property should pass in the same manner as real estate),107 
which would lead to some absurd results, clearly beyond the 
legislative intention.108
Although the Court spoke in terms of statutory 
construction, they were fully aware of the ideological 
implications of these disputes over the intestacy law.
Roane detailed again the republican basis for the 1785 
statute. That law "was part of a system commenced with a 
view of conforming our laws to the genius of our govern­
ment, and abolishing the feudal and monarchical principles 
derived to us . . . from the parent government of Bri­
tain."109 Indeed, the "great principle of the [Virginia] 
law was, to lose sight of the stock from whence the land 
descended (or, in feudal language, the blood of the first 
purchaser) . . . and to make that will for [the deceased], 
in case of intestacy, which the natural affections of 
mankind authorise us to infer, he would have made for 
himself . . ,."110 How contrary were the amendments of 
17901 Roane did not pull punches. "Habituated to respect 
the Legislature of our country, I have, nevertheless, no 
hesitation to say that this law of 1790, was anti-republi­
can and aristocratic; founded on false principles; and on a 
total dereliction of the policy of the act of 1785. It was
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anti-republican and aristocratic, because it tended to keep 
up the wealth of families; and so contravene the wise 
policy which annihilated entails in 1776. It was founded 
on false principles, because it forgot that the infant was 
the owner of the property and had respect only to those 
from whom he had derived it, who had parted with the . . . 
interest therein . . . and because it made a disposition 
for the infant, which he never would have made for 
himself . . .
A decade later, despite a parting salvo, even Roane 
admitted defeat. In the nearly identical case of Templeman 
v. Steptoe,112 Roane asserted that "as to the question now 
made upon the act of descents, I believe it will be 
admitted that I have borne my testimony [alluding to 
Tomlinson] against the policy which gave rise to the act of 
1790, restoring, in a measure, the feudal principle of the 
blood of the first purchaser. But," Roane finally 
admitted, "while I shall never be in favour of extending 
that principle in doubtful cases, by construction, I do not 
deny the power of the Legislature to make the innova­
tion."113
It is an appropriate postscript to note that the Court 
of Appeals did not wholly throw its hands up in despair.
Even while denying the mother recovery under the 1790 
amendments in Tomlinson, Judge Pendleton had called for a 
legislative remedy to a problem the Court felt powerless to 
change. On the other hand, said Pendleton, "if the
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Legislature are silent upon the subject, that silence ought 
to be considered as an approbation of the opinion of this 
Court, and the point will be settled.1,11 * The General 
Assembly was not silent, and in that very session passed a 
law to overrule the 17S0 provisions.1*3
The appellate decisions implementing the Virginia 
statute of descents, particularly the Brown and Tomlinson 
decisions, offer an unparalleled opportunity to gauge the 
role the Court of Appeals was to play in implementing the 
"republican revolution." It cannot be questioned that the 
Court favored the republican principles which were 
represented in the 1785 statute of descents. Whenever 
there was the least bit of latitude, either in the facts of 
the case adjudicated, or in the statutory provision, the 
Court, as in Davis v. Rowe116 and Brown v . Turberville11 7 
stretched to the utmost to fulfill the republican prin­
ciples of the statute. However, there were also limits 
beyond which the Court would not go. It would not, for 
example, construe the law to have an ex post facto 
application (Shelton v. Shelton118). Nor would it buck the 
unequivocally-expressed intention of the legislature, as in 
Tomlinson v. Dillard.119 But even there, the Court acted 
in a thorouughly republican fashion. In choosing to defer 
to the policy decisions of the legislative branch, the 
Court of Appeals in reality merely chose to follow the 
republican belief in majority rule rather than the anti- 
feudal republican principle of equality in descents.
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Facing republican principles in conflict, the Court merely 
expressed its perception of their relative merits.
The revisal of the statute of descents, together with 
the abolition of quit rents and entails, did not exhaust 
the feudal doctrines exploded in republican Virginia. Two 
more are worthy of brief review. The first related to the 
feudal favoring of heirs-in-remainder; the other was the 
doctrine of joint tenancy with right of survivorship, 
which, ironically, operated to exclude heirs. Both of 
these doctrines were repudiated in Virginia, in favor of 
more expanded notions of individual intent, the alien­
ability of property, and support for the "natural objects" 
of an individual's affection.
One time-honored common-law rule with its roots in the 
feudal past held that where an estate was conveyed to an 
individual without specifying that it also went to his 
"heirs," that person took only a life estate in the 
property, and at his death it reverted back to the original 
grantor or his heirs. This rule seemed to fly in the face 
of logic. As the Court of Appeals said in Kennon v.
M 1 Roberts, "Common sense would have dictated, that an 
absolute estate should pass by a conveyance unlimited as to 
duration, and containing no provision for its return to the 
grantor . . ..1,12 0 The Court explained the anomaly in 
terms of feudal principles. "When upon the adoption of the 
feudal system in England, an arrangement was made of the 
various tenures by which lands were to be holden . . . The
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spirit of this system," the Court continued, was "unfriend­
ly to alienations, or divisions of lands: and therefore,
the rule that such conveyances passed only an estate for 
life, was established."121 The ultimate objective of this 
particular rule, was to "favor . . . the heir at law, [and] 
narrow as much as possible the operation of all convey­
ances, calculated to disinherit him.1,122
The Court of Appeals of Virginia chafed at this rule, 
particularly in the context of the construction of wills.
"If we consult common sense and the reason of mankind," 
asserted Judge Lyons in Fairclaim v. Guthrie, "we shall be 
satisfied that where a man gives an estate in lands, 
without limitation or restraint, he means to give the whole 
interest . . ..”123 Accordingly, the Court snatched at any 
straw that would enable it to circumvent the common-law 
rule. When a testator had failed to use the words "and his 
heirs," but did use some similar language, such as "to him 
and his assigns,” the Court interpreted such language to be 
tantamount to "and his heirs."124 Soon the Court needed 
only to see the testator's expression of intent to dispose 
of his "estate" in the preamble to his will in order to 
deem it an absolute conveyance.123
But the Court was only willing to go so far. Despite 
the "new cases" which limited the effect of the rule, the 
Court acknowledged that "all [cases] which may come before 
us, arising at a prior period [that is, anterior to the 
statute which later corrected the problem], must be decided
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
141
according to the law of that time [i.e., the common 
law].”126 Nor would the Court go to absurd lengths to find 
language with which to subvert the rule. In Mooberrv v. 
Marve, the Court refused to hold a devise of lands without 
words of perpetuity as a fee simple, where the testator's 
intent did not demand it. "Where a will is systematically 
composed, and the meaning plain, the court will not, for 
the purpose of enlarging estates of devisees . . . 
transpose expressions in other clauses, and obviously 
relating to other subjects.1,127
What the Court of Appeals strove to effect in a 
limited manner by textual interpretation, the legislature 
accomplished in one bold stroke. In 1785, the General 
Assembly enacted a provision whereby "Every estate in lands 
which shall hereafter be granted . . . although . . . words 
heretofore necessary to transfer an estate of inheritance 
be not added, shall be deemed a fee-simple [that is, an 
absolute estate], if a less estate be not limited by 
express words . . .,"128 Thereafter the Court had its 
mandate, and cases arising after the statute presented no 
problem.1 29
Even though heirs were favored in medieval law as a 
means of preventing the alienation of lands to those 
outside the stock of the original holder, there were times 
when a lord wished to circumvent the heir. In earliest 
times, this was simple enough, because the lord granted 
property only for a lifetime anyway. But a traditional
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right evolved of a holder's heir taking the property at the 
holder's death. Sometimes, however, the heir was not the 
lord's first choice to assume the mantle of his vassal.
As Henry St. George Tucker explained, sometimes it was 
preferable to take "the services of a sturdy follower, who 
had attained the thews and sinews of manhood," rather than 
those of a "puling infant."130 One solution was the joint 
tenancy with right of survivorship. In the joint tenancy, 
the lord granted the feud to two men, securing the whole 
estate to the survivor of them (rather than one-half going 
to the deceased tenant's heirs). As Tucker noted, this 
worked well enough in a pure feudal system, but when feuds 
were replaced by "improper" feuds— that is, when the 
estates began to be bought and sold— "the doctrine, though 
continued, was absurd." Tucker provided a simple example: 
"If A and B purchased with equal funds, it would seem very 
unjust, that the survivor should have all," to the 
exclusion of the deceased’s heirs or devisees.131 The 
Virginia legislature, in the midst of smashing other 
seemingly inane feudal vestiges, obliterated this one as 
well, by statute of 1786.132 Again, once the legislature 
acted, the Court of Appeals fell in line.133
In all this exertion to sweep away feudal vestiges, it 
iLs pairv i c u l s * l y  i n v S * t o  o ^ s  j_ rsssnsT^t
that was left untouched. Despite all the legislative and 
judicial activity in striking down feudal land-holding and 
inheritance patterns, in at least one area— the payment of
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interest on back rent due— the Virginia Court of Appeals 
refused to set aside traditional practice.
In a typical feudal relationship, the "payment" for 
the use of land was not in money, but "in kind"— often in 
some form of service to the lord. Under feudal concep­
tions, the idea of paying "interest" on such an obligation 
had no place. If the user of the land did not timely 
supply the lord with the appropriate goods or services, the 
lord's remedy was to secure the payment by the process of 
"distress" (or "distraint"), whereby the lord seized the 
tenant's personal property until the rent was paid.134 
With the use of "improper feuds" and money rents, the 
argument against the payment of interest on rent in arrears 
lost much of its force. Nevertheless, the Virginia Court 
of Appeals consistently refused to deviate from the common- 
law rule disallowing interest in such instances.133
In doing so, the Court unabashedly acknowledged the 
feudal roots of the policy. St. George Tucker in 1809 
noted that "though, in late years, [rent] usually consists 
of money, yet it did formerly, and still may consist in 
other things incapable of any profit, as spurs, capons, 
horses, corn, &c. or in services, or manual operations, as 
in doing suit at the Lord's Court, or ploughing his lands, 
£c. the remedy for all which, if withheld, when it ought to 
be paid, is by distress . . .."136 In the same case 
Spencer Roane argued to no avail in dissent that times had 
changed. "It is said," admitted Roane, "that interest
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ought not to be given, because rents were 'anciently 
payable in spurs, capons &c. which yield no profit.’ It is 
not denied that this was anciently the case," continued 
Roane, "but the true idea of rent is, that it issues out of 
the land demised [rented] . . .." Roane concluded with a 
policy argument. "Even the detaining of spurs, capons, or 
a horse, while such detainer is profitable to the tenant, 
is injurious to the landlord; and this is the true ground 
of giving damages [i.e., interest] . . ,."137 The majority 
of the Court ignored this more modern conception.
Nor was the Court swayed by the fact that interest was 
generally payable in similar situations. In 1827 Judge 
Carr acknowledged, "I have felt the full force of the 
remarks of the counsel for the appellee, shewing . . . that 
with us, interest . . .  in almost all cases . . .  is 
constantly allowed . . .,"138 Judge Green agreed that "the 
spirit of our laws is, to allow interest in almost all 
cases . . .."139 Nevertheless, both judges, and the Court, 
refused to allow interest on rent arrears.
It becomes then a matter of some importance to explain 
why the Court of Appeals was in this instance so hesitant 
to override a policy that was clearly feudal in its 
genesis, and which breached the tide of Virginia legal 
policy. The answer is quite simple. It lay in the Court's 
perception of its role. St. George Tucker made the key 
observation in the case of Newton v. Wilson in 1809. "The 
landlord is neither by the common law, nor by statute.
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entitled tc- interest upon rent-arrear . . . ” (emphasis 
supplied).140 In other words, when the Court had no 
mandate by statute or prior case law to make a policy 
change, it felt that no such change could be made. As late 
as 1827, Carr acknowledged that, by rights, "[interest on] 
rent arrears ought also to be allowed . . . .  I confess, I 
think this the substantial justice of the case; and if it 
were res intecra [that is, a new issue] I should not feel 
much hesitation on the subject." Nevertheless, Carr 
refused to follow his inclinations, because, he explained, 
"every day's experience impressed me more deeply with the 
importance of the maxim stare decisis [i.e., the doctrine 
of adhering to prior cases]."141 Again, John Green agreed. 
"If the question under consideration was a new one,” he 
said, "or if the former decisions of the Court on this 
subject had passed without a deliberate examination of this 
subject, I should have inclined to think that interest 
ought to be allowed. The cases, however, appear to have 
been carefully considered, and fix the rule . . . .  These 
precedents, I think, bind us . . .."14Z In sum, the Court 
of Appeals in these cases took a remarkably restrictive 
view of its own policy-making capabilities, even in the 
face of a clearly archaic feudal rule.
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This rather lengthy analysis of the republican 
principles embodied in the revisal of Virginia's laws 
between 1776 and 1792143 is justified by the fact that 
during this relatively brief span of time, the Virginia 
legislature moved to secure the Revolution, passing more 
laws of an "ideological" orientation during this period 
than in any other. During those same years, and after, the 
Virginia Court of Appeals placed its stamp on the "republi­
can revolution" engendered by the General Assembly through 
its application and interpretation of.those laws. That 
judicial stamp was one of intriguing complexity. The 
Court consistently supported the legislative initiative in 
its rhetoric (except when there was legislative "backslid­
ing" from republican principles, such as the 1790 amend­
ments to the statute of descents). Nevertheless, the high 
court was extremely cautious in its substantive holdings. 
The Court would neither apply the new statutory principles 
retrospectively so as to threaten long-accepted rules of 
property nor (except in limited situations) repudiate 
statutory language, no matter how unsatisfactory. Nor 
would the Court— as in interest on rent-arrears— boldly 
change long-established policy. The resulting conclusions 
about the nature of the Court's contribution have become a 
recurring litanyi support for republican principles within 
a framework of stable property rights and, in particular, a 
deference to legislative policy-making. By the same token, 
judicial support for these republican principles should not
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be underemphasized. Our discussion has centered on the 
exceptions to such support because they are just that: 
exceptions, which help us to delineate the limits of 
judicial support for republican ideals.
Another familiar refrain was the consistency of the 
court's decisions over time. Again we find the Court of 
Appeals’ approach substantially unchanged over the decades 
studied. The only possible exceptions to this were such 
late cases as Orndoff v. Turman (1830) and Davis v. Rowe
(1828), where the court appeared willing to depart from 
strict legislative language to achieve legislative intent. 
Neither case, however, represented an affirmation of any 
dramatic new approach to judicial policy making.
The Orndoff and Davis adjudications offer an oppor­
tunity to address a subtle yet important issue that has 
been central to our entire discussion of the process of 
defining Virginia's Revolutionary settlement: the
respective roles of the legislature and judiciary in the 
new republican system. It is to the further clarification 
of that subject that we now turn.
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admr. v. Drummond's adror., 6 Rand. 182 (1828); Henry St. 
George Tucker, Commentaries, vol. 1, bk. 2, p. 279.
134. See Newton v. Wilson. 3 Hen. & M. 470 (1809); Black's 
Law Dictionary, 5th ed., s.v. "distraint," "distress."
135. See, e.g., Skipwith v. Clinch, 2 Call 253 (1800); 
Cooke v. Wise, 3 Hen. & M. 463 (1809); Newton v. Wilson, 3 
Hen. & M. 470 (1809); Mickie v. Lawrence, 5 Rand. 571 
(1827). The Court intimated in these cases that, in 
extreme cases, interest could be assessed by a jury (but in 
Cooke the Court forced the plaintiff to release the jury's 
award of interest). See a general discussion in Henry St. 
George Tucker, Commentaries. 2:6-7.
136. Newton v. Wilson. 3 Hen. & M. 470, 483-84 (1809).
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137. Id. at 497.
138. Mickie v. Lawrence. 5 Rand. 571, 572-73 (1827).
139. Id. at 576.
140. Newton v. Wilson, 3 Hen. & M. 470, 485 (1809).
141. Mickie v. Lawrence, 5 Rand. 571, 573 (1827).
142. Id. at 
of the Court,
576. For a more in-depth analysis of the 
see Chapter III.
143. There were some other statutes with obvious 
republican genes, such as the law forbidding hunting, 
fishing, or fowling on private lands without permission.
In England this had been a particularly obnoxious stamp of 
the royal prerogative, as well as a method of keeping the 
"lower sorts" in submission. Rev. Code (1803) c. 38 
[passed 1792]? see St. George Tucker, Blackstone's 
Commentaries, 3:395 n. 2, 411-13, 414 n. 3.
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CHAPTER V
POLICYMAKING IN A REPUBLICAN COMMONWEALTH
Our analysis of Virginia's Revolutionary settlement 
began with the Commonwealth's establishment of a new 
constitutional order, and its concomitant commitment to 
popular sovereignty and the separation of powers. We next 
turned to the issue of the accommodation of Virginia's 
English heritage to the demands of the new order. Finally, 
we addressed the substance of republicanism as it was 
applied in Virginia. One issue implicit in all of these 
topics was that of the proper role of the various depart­
ments of government in articulating policy in a republican 
commonwealth. The resolution of that issue was a matter of 
some importance. The determination of the locus of 
policymaking in the new republican order shaped all of the 
matters under analysis: conceptions of sovereignty, the
interrelationship of governmental departments, and the 
substance of applied republican principles.
Of the three branches of government, the role of the 
executive can be safely relegated to a minor role, because 
that branch was dominated by the legislative department.
The major articulators of policy, then, were the legisla­
tive branch and its judicial counterpart. Fortunately, the
157
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role of each (and the nature of their interaction) is 
particularly clearly defined through a study of the case 
law. Statutory enactments are dependent upon judicial 
interpretation for their practical implementation when 
disputes arise under such enactments. This makes such 
adjudications an ideal medium for evaluating the extent 
legislative policy was modified by judicial decision. At 
the same time, the court decisions reveal the extent to 
which the judiciary was willing to set its own policy 
agenda independent of the legislative branch.
In Virginia, the interaction between court and 
legislature was laced with subtleties, but the general 
outline was clear. The Virginia Court of Appeals displayed 
a deep respect for legislative policymaking throughout the 
early decades of the republic. In most cases, the court 
readily subsumed its own policy preferences to that of the 
legislature. Interestingly, this support of legislative 
intent assumed different guises. At times the court upheld 
statutory language strictly; at other times it departed 
from the statute to achieve legislative intent. In either 
case, however, the court exhibited a deferential attitude 
toward the legislative branch. Of course, there were many 
instances when the legislative will appeared unclear, or 
was absent, and in such cases the court was obliged to 
implement policy according to its own best dictates. More 
importantly, there were also times when the Court of 
Appeals resisted legislative initiative. Such instances
\
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outlined the limits of legislative supremacy, and defined 
the Revolutionary settlement.
All of these subtleties make for a fitting epilogue to 
our analysis of Virginia's theoretical and substantive 
response to the demands of a republican order. Both in its 
policy of deferring to the legislative will, and in its 
contrary stance of repudiating legislative enactments which 
contravened the constitution, the Court of Appeals achieved 
nothing less than the implementation of popular sover­
eignty. And, in its restraints on legislative pronounce­
ments , the court confirmed a perhaps uniquely Virginian 
respect for tradition, stability, and the protection of 
interests in property.
The idea of legislative ascendancy was a commonplace 
in post-Revolutionary Virginia. It was in the nuances of 
this doctrine, however, that the shape of Virginia's 
accommodation to the new order became most apparent. In 
those instances where the court deferred to legislative 
initiative, and especially in those instances when it did 
not, we find an example of the application of republicanism 
in all its subtlety.
The most obvious example1 of judicial deference to the 
legislative will came in instances where statutory language 
clearly and unequivocally applied to the facts of the case
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before the court. For example, in. holding in 1797 that 
there could be no appeal from an interlocutory (that is, 
intermediate) decree of the High Court of Chancery, Judge 
Spencer Roane simply said, "The words of the law are so 
explicit, that argument cannot render them clearer."
Justice Paul Carrington added that "although this may be 
inconvenient, the Court cannot alter the law."2 Similarly, 
when in 1824 a lower court of chancery neglected to require 
a party to post a bond before receiving an injunction, the 
Court of Appeals was emphatic. "As to cases coming within 
the provisions of this act, . . . the statute is explicit 
and imperious, and takes from the Chancellor all discretion 
. . . as clearly as words could do . . .."3 In sum, the 
court always looked first to any applicable legislative 
enactment. If that enactment applied, it was determina­
tive. As Edmund Pendleton once succinctly explained the 
court's holding regarding the dismissing of an appeal, "On 
a view of the act of Assembly, it appears that the 
Legislature fully contemplated this subject."4 Therefore, 
there could be no further argument.
Of course, it was not always so obvious that the 
statutory language applied to the case at bar, or if it 
did, that the legislature meant that it should apply to the 
case at bar. In such instances, there were essentially two 
options available to the court: to adhere to the strict
language of the statute, or to grant a more expanded 
application of the legislative provisions. At various
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times the Court of Appeals pursued both options, and it is 
informative to observe the circumstances under which the 
court chose one or the other approach.
At times when the court followed che "strict" 
construction of a statute, it was merely making a reason­
able interpretation of a provision which might be subject 
to more than one application. For example, a 1792 statute 
provided that, if a man died leaving "no child," his wife 
was entitled to one-half of his personal estate; if the 
deceased left children, the wife was to receive only one- 
third of the personal estate.3 In the 1806 case of Bernard 
v. Hipkins, Hipkins had died leaving a wife and grandchil­
dren, but no surviving "child." Counsel for the grandchil­
dren argued that in the statute the term "child" should be 
construed to mean "issue," which, under the accepted legal 
definition, would include grandchildren. The Court of 
Appeals refused to agree, holding that the legislature 
meant "child," and therefore the wife did take a moiety of 
the estate.6
Other cases are more instructive. The court often 
deferred to the strict legislative policy even when that 
policy did not make intuitive sense. For example, a 
statute had been passed which provided that a gift of a 
slave was void when no deed of gift had been recorded, and 
when the donor retained possession. This made perfect 
sense as to creditors of the parties, who may have been 
defrauded thereby, but there was no similar rationale to
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void the gift as between the parties themselves. 
Nevertheless, in the 1828 case of Durham v. Dunkly, the 
court, while acknowledging the lack of logic, held that 
this "was a matter of Legislative discretion." Despite the 
seeming equity on the side of the donee, the court 
concluded that "the Law is not so written; for it declares 
that the Deed shall pass no estate in slaves, unless 
executed and recorded according to Law."7 In a similar 
case respecting the emancipation of slaves, the applicable 
statute, while requiring a recording of the deed of 
emancipation, did not require it to be recorded in the 
county of "current residence." While this, according to 
the court, "might be more desirable, the Court cannot 
prescribe such a rule as it may think expedient, but must 
apply the rule prescribed by the statute, to all cases 
indiscriminately."8
The court also on occasion applied statutory language 
strictly even when the justices were convinced the 
legislature did not intend the result reached in that 
particular case. In the 1794 case of Roy v. Garnett, the 
Court of Appeals refused to "paper over" a loophole in the 
statute abolishing entails. Even though the court was 
convinced that the failure to convert certain "fee tails” 
into "fee simple" estates was a mere legislative oversight, 
it did not feel at liberty to defy the clear statutory 
language.9 The court responded similarly in 1830 when a 
new statutory provision inadvertently changed the practice
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of recognizing deeds executed in the county courts of 
Kentucky. Such deeds had routinely been deemed valid ever 
since a statute of 1792 had expressly made them so. But in 
the recodification of Virginia law in 1819, this particular 
provision had been unintentionally omitted, resulting in 
its effective repeal.10 The Court of Appeals, while 
acknowledging the clear mistake made by the legislative 
branch, nevertheless admitted that "the objection . . . 
cannot be got over."11
Despite the court's consistently deferential attitude 
toward legislative enactments, there were a number of cases 
where the Court of Appeals departed from the standard of 
strict construction, and instead applied the applicable 
statute in a manner which seemed to expand the literal 
meaning of its language. And, indeed, there was the 
occasional instance where the court appeared to positively 
defy legislative strictures. It is important to analyze 
these seeming exceptions carefully, in order to better 
understand the extent of legislative pre-eminence in the 
new republican polity, and to elucidate the role of the 
court in the policy-making process.
Perhaps the easiest cases of this ilk to explain 
involved legislative omissions in provisions that did not 
affect any substantive rule of law. The court would often 
step in and remedy the defect in such instances, justifying 
its action in terms of fulfilling, rather than deviating 
from, legislative intent.- For example, in the 1797 case of
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Gaskins v. Commonwealth, Gaskins, the sheriff of North­
umberland County, had suffered a judgment. He eventually 
filed a writ of supersedeas (an appeal) to the General 
Court, but not until after five years had passed. At the 
time of the filing of his supersedeas, a statute required 
such writs, when involving other courts in the Common­
wealth, to be filed within five years. The statute was 
silent, however, as to any time limitation with respect to 
the General Court. Despite the legislative silence, the 
Court of Appeals applied the limitation anyway. "If . . . 
in grammatical strictness, there be a doubt in this 
particular," said Spencer Roane for the court, "yet, 
certainly a liberal construction of the words would extend 
to this case; for, clearly, the Legislature must have meant 
to include all Courts, and emphatically the General 
Court . . .."12 Similarly, where a statute granted the 
High Court of Chancery power to issue writs of execution 
(that is, methods of enforcing the decree of the court) in 
the same manner as common-law courts, the Court of Appeals 
in 1801 construed this language to grant the High Court of 
Chancery a similar common-law power to assess damages for 
the obstruction of those writs, even though the statute was 
silent as to that particular point.13
The cases that posed the most difficulty, however, 
were those where a strict application of the statute led to 
an unreasonable result or to a clear repudiation of 
legislative intent. An example of a case of this kind was
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the 1825 adjudication of Steptoe v. The Auditor*. The 
statute at issue in that case allowed the Auditor of the 
Commonwealth to bring an action against the Clerk of the 
County Court for the failure to pay over taxes collected.
In such cases, the statute provided for a $600 penalty to 
be assessed against the clerk.14 In this case the clerk, 
after the institution of the suit, had made a proper 
accounting, and the issue was whether the penalty should be 
applied anyway, since the clerk's action had not been 
timely. Counsel for the clerk argued that "it is impos­
sible to suppose that the Legislature meant to subject him 
to the penalty and the sum due also.” But the majority of 
the court took the General Assembly at its word. "To this 
[argument], I answer," said Judge Dabney Carr, ” . . .  
that the law is express . . .  we [the court] are not 
permitted to speculate upon the improbability of the 
Legislature's intending to pass a law so cruel, and 
thence to conclude it is not the Law? it being our business 
dicere et non dare jus ["to express and not to make the 
law"] . . . .  With the hardship of the case, I humbly 
conceive we have nothing to do. We must execute the law.
If it operates harshly, it will be for the power which has 
inflicted the wound, to administer the cure."13
The majority opinion by Carr in Steptoe is perhaps the 
best articulation of the prevailing view of the right of 
the legislature to enact virtually any provision it chose, 
be it wise or unwise, just or unjust. Carr was, then,
\
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making an important statement about the court's perception 
of its own role as well. But there was a dissent in 
Steptoe, and it reflected not a rejection of the essential 
principles set out in the majority opinion, but a belief 
that, somehow, the legislature did not mean what it 
apparently said. John Coalter in dissent openly proclaimed 
his "unwillingness . . .  to charge the Legislature with an 
unreasonable accumulation of fines and punishments for the 
same offence . . .." Coalter concluded that "therefore, 
the law ought not to be so construed, unless such construc­
tion is imperatively forced upon us."16 Taking his cue 
from Coalter, Judge William Cabell looked for a means to 
avoid such an imperative. Looking to the entire "system of 
laws," Cabell found "one principle generally pervading the 
whole; that public officers, receiving money for the 
Commonwealth . . . and unjustly holding it, are coerced to 
pay it, not by arbitrary penalties, but by damages 
graduated according to the amount received, by a certain 
per centage thereon." Cabell then turned to the concept 
of justice. The graduated scale of percentage damages, 
he said, "is a reasonable and just principle. But 
justice revolts at the idea of inflicting an arbitrary 
penalty . . ., without regard to the amount due; of 
inflicting the same penalty, for the non-payment of one 
dollar, and of one thousand." Cabell concluded where 
Coalter had begun; "I cannot believe the Legislature 
intended this injustice."17
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The Steptoe case is instructive. Coalter and Cabell 
were clearly reaching to avoid a result they felt unfair, 
and it is important to note that the dissenters did not 
prevail. But the dissent demonstrates the sort of approach 
the court sometimes took in hard cases. While never 
repudiating the principle of legislative ascendancy, the 
Court of Appeals sometimes labored to bring a case within 
what it thought was the "true" intent of the General 
Assembly.
One more example will suffice. A statute permitted a 
landlord, if he suspected his tenant was about to leave the 
premises, to "attach” (that is, have seized by the court) 
the property of the tenant to secure unpaid future rents.18 
In 1825, in Redford v. Winston, the tenant challenged this 
as unfair, since he was not permitted to make any defense 
at the time, but was left to an action at law against the 
landlord for damages if the attachment turned out to be 
wrongful. Here it was Judge Coalter who showed his respect 
for the legislature. He acknowledged that it "would seem 
to me to be very reasonable, that in the case of wrongful 
attachment, under the act of Assembly in question, the 
defendant should have some means of defending himself."
But Coalter found himself forced to defer to legislative 
wisdom. "But when I consider that this law has been in 
force for near a century, and that it has frequently been 
before the Legislature, as well upon revisals of the law, 
as for amendments thereto, without any provision to this
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
168
effect being made, . . .  I am led to believe that the 
mischief . . . has not been so great, as at first view 
would seem; and that therefore, no remedy in this respect 
has been thought of, or deemed necessary.1,19
This time it was Judge John Green (in the majority in 
the Steptoe decision) who suggested that the court might 
impose some limits on the legislative language. Green 
looked beyond the immediate issue of absconding renters 
which had occupied the General Assembly and perceived a 
perhaps unanticipated threat to the tenant. "To give a 
construction to this statute," warned Green, "which would 
enable the landlord to attach for all rents which might 
thereafter become due, at ever so remote periods, would 
involve such consequences as I am sure the Legislature 
would never have sanctioned, if foreseen." Therefore the 
statutory language, in Green’s view, "cannot receive a 
literal interpretation, without violating the literal 
meaning of many other words in the same clause, and 
involving the consequences before alluded to." Therefore, 
held Green, the landlord could only attach for the rent 
payment next due, and not for other future rental pay­
ments.20 We find here in this qualification of legislative 
language the same essential elements present in the Steptoe 
dissent; 1) an implicit deference to the legislative will, 
in the assumption that the General Assembly had not 
"foreseen" the difficulty articulated by the court; 2) an 
effort to make the new interpretation seem consistent with
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the statute by accepted methods of statutory construction; 
and 3) a willingness, in the end, to refuse to accept a 
literal interpretation of the statutory language.
These cases bring us to the important topic of the 
extent to which the court was willing to circumvent 
legislative policy in the course of resolving the adjudica­
tions that came before it. There can be no doubt that it 
was well accepted that a court could, at certain times, 
vary the terms of a statute with complete propriety. In 
the 1810 case of Dillard v. Tomlinson, St. George Tucker 
was merely quoting Blackstone when he said, "It is another 
fundamental rule in the construction of statutes, that it 
is the business of Judges to know the mischief the statute 
was meant to remedy, and ’so to construe the act as to 
supress the mischief, and advance the remedy.'"21 And, as 
Henry St. George Tucker noted, "Cases are sometimes 
considered as embraced by the equity of a statute . . . .
On this principle, the letter of an act is sometimes 
restrained, and sometimes enlarged."22 The danger, of 
course, was that a court could use an entirely legitimate 
rule of statutory construction as a pretext for undermining 
or deviating from the policy set out by the legislature.
It is therefore important to look more closely at judicial 
deviations from statutory language in Virginia, to see if 
the Court of Appeals remained within "acceptable" bounds of 
judicial initiative.
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The 1803 case of Marks v. Bryant is a good example of 
the court making a reasonable expansion of statutory 
language to secure the underlying legislative intent. A 
Virginia statute provided that a nuncupative (i.e., oral) 
will was valid only "if it be made in the time of the last 
sickness of the deceased at his habitation . . . except 
where the deceased is taken sick [away] from home, and dies 
before he returns to such habitation . . ..”23 Thomas 
Womack met all of the preceding requirements, with the 
exception that he was already feeling ill before he 
travelled to his sister's home (and thus was not "taken 
sick" while away from home). In this case, the court 
allowed Womack's nuncupative will to stand anyway. As 
Judge Tucker explained it, "I conceive it would be adhering 
too closely to the letter of the law, if we were to 
pronounce that no nuncupative will made under such 
circumstances ought to be established. The object of the 
law was to prevent frauds and impositions upon sick 
persons, by enticing them from their friends and relations, 
to the residence of strangers, where advantage might be 
taken of their weakness and infirmity . . . .  [I]t appears 
to me . . . that the case [at bar] is . . . fully within 
the true intent and meaning of the law.''24
An example that was perhaps not so obvious or 
justifiable, and therefore more illuminating, was that of 
purchasers of lands who had notice of a prior, but 
unrecorded, claim to an interest in the property. Two
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cases decided in 1823 are revealing. The basic statutory 
rule was that "all . . . conveyances . . .  of any lands 
. . . shall be void as to all creditors and subsequent 
purchasers, unless they shall be . . . recorded . . .."2 5 
In the case of Robert's widow v. Stanton, however, the 
Court of Appeals, acting as a court of equity,26 refused to 
void a prior claim to land that had never been recorded, 
because the subsequent purchaser had notice of the prior 
claim.27 While this seemed a direct contradiction of 
statutory language, it was not so egregious as might first 
appear. The reasoning for such a holding was articulated 
in the subsequent case of Newman v. Chapman. There, Judge 
John Green stated that "the object of the statute requiring 
mortgages [etc.] to be recorded, and declaring that, if not 
recorded as the statute prescribes, they shall be void as 
to creditors and subsequent purchasers, was to prevent 
. . . the frauds which might otherwise be practised . . . 
on creditors and subsequent purchasers, by concealing it." 
On the other hand, if, as here, "a purchaser has actual 
notice otherwise, he is not only not prejudiced by the 
failure to record it, but is himself guilty of a fraud in 
attempting to avail himself of the letter of the statute, 
to the prejudice of another who has a just claim against 
the property."28 In the end, then, these cases were really 
of a piece with the Marks case involving the nuncupative 
will: each of these decisions was an attempt to secure a
compliance with the perceived intent of the legislation.
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Nevertheless, upon closer inspection, there was a 
difference between the Marks case and the Roberts and 
Newman adjudications, and it was a difference of poten­
tially large import. In both Roberts and Newman the 
plaintiff, when faced with statutory language seemingly 
against his cause, turned to the Court of Chancery, that 
is, to ''equity," to seek redress. It is thus necessary to 
turn to a brief discussion of equity jurisdiction in 
Virginia, and then to assess whether it provided a vehicle 
for the evasion of legislative intent.
"Equity" had grown up alongside the common law in 
England, but was quite distinct from it. It originated 
when individuals would occasionally seek redress from what 
they considered unjust treatment in the king's courts (and 
other places) by petitioning the king's "conscience"; that 
is, by asking the king’s chancellor to intervene and "do 
justice." This the chancellor would often do in his court 
of chancery, cutting through the technicalities of the 
common law to ensure fairness in individual cases. What 
began as a rather arbitrary intervention in the interests 
of fairness eventually became a quite formalized system of 
procedure, which existed alongside the common law but was 
entirely distinct from it. By the seventeenth century, the 
courts of chancery, or "equity," had established a more-or- 
less well-defined jurisdiction. One large area of equity 
jurisdiction stemmed directly from its historical roots: 
stepping in to do justice when that was denied a party at
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common law. Thus a party could resort to equity if the 
common-law form of redress (usually money damages) was 
insufficient. The court of chancery could instead restrain 
an injurious activity through injunction, or mandate the 
"specific performance" of a contract if necessary. The 
equity courts would also intervene to correct injustice 
done at law due to fraud, mistake, or accident. Partly as 
a result of the vagaries of history, equity also assumed 
the primary jurisdiction over certain types of cases, such 
as those involving trusts and mortgages.29 The Roberts and 
Newman cases came within the equitable jurisdiction over 
"fraud." As Judge Coalter put it in Newman, the 
plaintiff's "only remedy was in equity; and there he can 
only prevail on the ground of fraud . . .."3 0
The question that arises is whether the equitable 
mandate to "do justice" was flexible enough to undermine 
statutory dictates. While the nuances of equity jurisdic­
tion in Virginia are quite complex, and well beyond the 
scope of the present enquiry, it can safely be said that 
equity was not used as a vehicle by the courts to undermine 
the legislature. The essential rule was laid out by St. 
George Tucker in 1808 in Commonwealth v. Colquhouns. where 
he said "Neither a Court of Law, nor a Court of Equity can 
carry a statutory remedy further than the statute allows, 
nor supply a casus omissus in any statute."31 The 1797 
case of Anderson v. Anderson is illuminating, because it 
involved the same recording act as the Roberts and Newman
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cases, but without the allegation of fraud. The court 
faced the question directly: "The next question," said
Judge Peter Lyons, "is whether a Court of Equity can supply 
the omission in not recording [the conveyance] . . . 
according to the act of Assembly for regulating convey­
ances?" Or, to ask the question another way, "when a 
statute says expressly, that a conveyance shall not bind 
[subsequent purchasers and creditors], can a Court of 
Equity say that it shall?" Lyons responded to his own 
questions in the negative. "Surely that would be to 
repeal the act," he said, "and therefore equity will not 
interpose in such cases . . .." Lyons went on to 
illustrate the depth of the deference shown to legislative 
enactments, even by courts of equity. "For the power of a 
statute is so great," he continued, "that it has been said, 
that even infants would have been bound by the act of 
limitations [a statute requiring an injured party to bring 
an action within a certain time period, or lose his cause 
of action], if there had been no exception with regard to 
them, contained in the statute itself." Lyons concluded 
with a blunt statement: ” . . .  [A] Court of Equity must
consult the intention of the Legislature as well as Courts 
of Law; and when the Legislature have determined a matter 
. . ., a Court of Equity cannot intermeddle, or relieve 
against the express provisions of the statute."32
As straightforward as Lyons' comments were, it was the 
case of -Innis v. Roane in 1793 that best defined the role
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of a court of equity in relation to the legislative will.
In that case, Roane, as a Revolutionary War veteran, had 
attempted to secure a life-time pension under a 1779 
statute granting such recompense to Revolutionary officers 
who had served until the end of the war. When the courts 
of law determined that he was not eligible under the 
statute, Roane turned to equity. There, Judge Wythe, of 
the High Court of Chancery, ruled that he should receive 
the pension.33 On appeal, the Court of Appeals rebuffed 
Wythe and defined the limits of both courts of law and 
courts of equity. Judge Roane, for the court, noted that 
"It is said that a difference arises from the greater 
powers of a court of equity to dispense with observances 
which the law requires. But there is no foundation in the 
distinction: On the contrary, the construction of statutes
is peculiarly proper for courts of law; and when made, 
those of equity are bound by it; for the latter can no more 
dispense with the requisitions of a statute, unless from 
particular circumstances of fraud, force, or accident 
taking a case out of its operation, than courts of common 
law can: Both being equally bound by the legislative will,
acting within its prescribed limits."34
We have seen, then, that the Court of Appeals did 
sometimes deviate from, or place a "gloss" upon, statutory 
language, but that when it did so, it was in an effort to 
support the perceived legislative intent. Importantly, 
although the rules of statutory construction and the nature
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of equity jurisdiction gave the court some latitude to 
expand the application of a statute, the Court of Appeals 
did not use these as a pretext for usurping the role of the 
legislature in the making of policy.33 The judicial 
application of statutory language was not without its other 
pitfalls, however, which posed a challenge to a court 
apparently dedicated to deference to legislative direction. 
In particular, the court was sometimes faced with situa­
tions where the General Assembly's own language did not 
seem to mesh with its stated objectives. In such cases, 
the Court of Appeals faced the dilemma of enforcing 
statutory language or enforcing legislative "intent.”
One of the better examples was the case of Bernard v. 
Scott's admr., decided in 1825. This action had to do with 
the collection of sheriffs' commissions on forthcoming 
bonds, which were bonds a judgment debtor could post as 
security for his promise to have his goods "forthcoming" on 
the day of the sheriff's sale in execution of the judgment 
against him. Under earlier case law, it had been held that 
a sheriff was not permitted to include his commission in 
the forthcoming bond, and therefore many sheriffs had had 
trouble collecting their due. The General Assembly had 
moved to remedy this problem in 1794, when it provided that 
such commissions could be included in the bond, "but [the 
sheriff] shall not demand or receive such commissions . . . 
unless the same shall be forfeited."36 This last proviso 
was entirely sensible, and intended to prevent the double
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recovery of commissions. As things were supposed to work, 
the sheriff was to receive his commission either when he 
sold the debtor's goods, or, when the debtor failed to 
produce them or otherwise satisfy the claim (and the 
forthcoming bond was thereby forfeited). As often 
happened, however, the statute contained an undetected 
loophole, and, as usual, someone eventually discovered it 
and tried to take advantage of it. It was found that a 
debtor, by paying to the creditor the whole amount of the 
bond, except the sheriff's commission, could technically 
avoid the statutory provision, and avoid paying the 
commission. It was an extremely difficult and technical 
point, perhaps best explained by Judge John Coalter: "But
it is said that [the sheriff] only is entitled, in case the 
bond is forfeited; and that if the debt, interest, and 
costs, including those commissions, are paid, the bond is 
not forfeited; and then the sheriff (not being entitled to 
this commission), must return the money; or that it is not 
necessary to pay it, in order to save the forfeiture." 
Coalter concluded that "This involves us in a kind of 
logical absurdity or dilemma, which we cannot suppose the 
Legislature intended.”3 7
It was Judge Dabney Carr who cut to the heart of the 
matter. "This law was made for the benefit of sheriffs, 
and yet . . . by a literal construction of this law, the 
sheriff loses his commission . . . .  It is not proper, it 
is scarcely decent, to deduce such absurd conclusions from
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difficulty of the situation, but did not let it deter him. 
"There must," he continued, " . . .  be some construction, 
which will avoid this dilemma. What that construction is,
I confess I have not been able exactly to discover. I 
must, therefore, leave it with my bretheren, more 
experienced and abler than I am, to untie this gordian 
knot. For myself, I must cut it, and say, that though I 
cannot pretend to see precisely what the Legislature meant, 
I feel sure they did not mean, in such a case as this, to 
deprive the sheriff of his commission." Carr was careful 
to couch his rather breathtaking exercise in judicial 
statesmanship in terms of legislative intent. "The law of 
1794," he explained, "intended to better [the sheriff's] 
condition; to give him something which he did not before 
possess. The Legislature could not mean (though the words 
seem to import it) that this law should receive a construc­
tion which would defeat its object . . . .  To avoid these 
consequences, I am obliged to decide that the bond is 
forfeited, and the sheriff entitled to his commission.”38 
Other cases of this sort were not so dramatic as the 
Bernard case. Several we have met up with before. It will 
be recalled that in the early (1794) case of Roy v.
Garnett, the Court of Appeals refused to depart from 
statutory language which contained a loophole in the 
statute abolishing entails.39 On the other hand, the case 
of Orndoff v. Turman also dealt with that statute, and the
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court, in 1830, seemed more willing to go with the 
legislative intent over the precise statutory language. 
While the facts of Orndoff were somewhat confusing,40 the 
essential matter at issue was not. It was simply this: 
whether a fact situation not directly addressed by the 1776 
statute could still be deemed within its provisions. In 
Roy v. Garnett, the answer had been in the negative. In 
Orndoff, however, the court was more flexible. Judge 
William Cabell was quick to acknowledge counsel's argument 
that the statute did not literally apply. "If I felt 
myself bound to give the statute a strict and technical 
construction," he said, "I confess I could not deny the 
correctness of this position . . .." But Cabell refused to 
allow himself to be bound by such a narrow vision. "Can 
any man read the preamble of this statute," asked Cabell, 
"and believe that this was the intention of the legisla­
ture? . . . It is a highly remedial statute, intended to 
remove great political and moral mischief (i.e., entails). 
So far from being restricted to a rigid technical construc­
tion, according to the letter (of the law]," continued 
Cabell, "I feel myself compelled to construe it according 
to its spirit, and thus to bring within the scope of its 
operation all cases that come within the mischief intended 
to be provided against."41 Dabney Carr agreed. He stated 
forthrightly that "a thing which is within the intention of 
the makers of a statute, is as much within the statute, as
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if it were within the letter.” Carr summed up: "Intention
is the governing principle, the essence of the law."42
A similar case was that of Davis v. Rowe in 1828.
That case, it may be recalled, dealt with the provision of 
the 1785 statute of descents which called for a per capita
distribution of the assets of an estate. The problem was
that, in including an extensive list of relatives to which 
the provision applied, nieces and nephews were excluded.
The question before the court was whether the statute
should be extended to include nieces and nephews, or 
whether, in the absence of specific statutory language, the 
common-law rule of per stirpes distribution should apply.43 
The majority of the court, as in Orndoff, admitted that the 
case did not come within the specific statutory provisions. 
Nevertheless, it was clear to the majority that the General 
Assembly intended to wholly abrogate the common law, and so 
the per capita approach was extended to the omitted 
relatives.
The Bernard, Orndoff, and Davis cases appeared to 
stand for the proposition that the Court of Appeals was 
willing to ignore legislative language and implement 
legislative intent. But it was not quite so simple as all 
that. In Roy v. Garnett the court had gone precisely the 
other way,44 and even in Orndoff and Davis there had been 
strong dissents. In Orndoff, Judge John Green had 
dissented, harking back to the more restrictive view of Roy 
v. Garnett. Green pointed out that "The present case
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certainly does not come within the literal terms of that 
statute. . .. Nor," he added, "do I think that the case 
comes within the equity of the statutes." That being the 
case, it was clear to Green that the court was bound by 
what the statute said.43 In Davis. William Cabell joined 
Green in dissent. It was clear to the dissenters that in 
Virginia the common law applied where the statute was 
silent. Thus the nieces and nephews in Davis should take 
per stirpes.46 It seems, then, that the Court of Appeals 
struggled with the issue of applying the statute according 
to its spirit rather than following its letter.
Perhaps nothing better indicates the force of the 
conflicting theories, and of the continuing nature of the 
dilemma, than two sets of cases which arose at either end 
of the time period under study. The turn-of-the-century 
adjudications of Brown v. Turberville and Tomlinson v. 
Dillard we have come across before.47 In both those cases 
the provision at issue was a 1790 amendment to the statute 
of descents, designed to apply to infants who died 
intestate. The Brown case of 1800 actually involved an 
adult, but, because the 17S0 amendment had been inartfully 
integrated into the statute in the recodification of 1792, 
the provision appeared to apply to infants and adults 
equally. The court did not hesitate to circumvent the 
statutory language in the light of so obvious a legislative 
mistake. What is interesting, however, is the fact that 
the judges felt compelled to come up with mutually
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exclusive theories to support their conclusion. Paul 
Carrington acknowledged that there had been an oversight in 
the drafting of the 1792 provision, and felt that the court 
was justified in baldly inserting the necessary language 
into the statute so that the true legislative intent would 
be fulfilled. "This supplement," said Carrington, " . . .  
according to the rules of expounding statutes, I think we 
have a right to make." He added that, "by this means, the 
whole act will be rendered consistent, and all cases of 
intestacy will be provided for, agreeable to the meaning 
and intention of the Legislature. Which is certainly 
better," concluded Carrington, "than adhering to the 
literal expression, to disappoint the will of the Legisla­
ture, and defeat the intention of the Law altogether."48 
Judge William Fleming shied away from such a drastic 
remedy. Instead, he sought "a plain natural interpretation 
which will effect this important object, without any 
violence to the text." Fleming's solution was to construe 
the 1785 statute of descents as still in existence, since 
"the act of 1792 only repeals so much of other laws, as 
comes within its own purview . . . ."49 Peter Lyons, for 
his part, would take a broader approach. "It is a rule in 
the construction of statutes," said Lyons, "that the 
intention, when it can be discovered, must be followed with 
reason and discretion, although the interpretation may seem 
contrary to the letter of the statute." In order to 
discover that legislative intention, Lyons proceeded to
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take "the whole act, and all other acts on the same 
subject, into one view, moulding them according to the rule 
laid down . . . and rejecting what shall appear to be 
inconsistent and absurd, and tending to defeat the 
intention of the Legislature."50 In summing up, President 
Judge Edmund Pendleton acknowledged that "the Court differ 
in their reasons," but the result was a unanimous decision 
for the perceived legislative intent over the specific 
legislative language.51
Only one year later, however, the court was unwilling 
to resist the same legislative language when the case 
involved an infant, which was directly within the legisla­
ture's intent when enacting this amendment. In Tomlinson 
v. Dillard, the court did not hesitate to apply the 
statute. Fleming admitted: "I have not a moment's doubt
upon this case. The language of the acts of Assembly 
leaves no room for criticism . . . .  For, whatever latitude 
a Court may think proper to indulge, where the expressions 
are ambiguous, they certainly have no right to do so, when 
the words are clear . . .." Furthermore, said Fleming, "if 
inconvenience follow from a literal construction, they must 
be redressed by the Legislature, and not by the Court; who 
are not to torture the words in order to discover meanings 
which the Legislature never had; but are to pursue the 
plain import of the statute, without regard to conse­
quences."52 Carrington and Lyons reluctantly agreed. Said 
Lyons: "The inclination of my mind would have led me to
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support [the opposite conclusion]; but the words of the act 
of Assembly are too strong to be resisted."33
The Brown and Tomlinson cases are important for our 
understanding of the judicial view of legislative intent.
In a case (Brown) where the wording of a statute did not 
comport with the desired objective of the legislative 
branch, the Court of Appeals was willing to go to almost 
any length to find for the intent over the strict legisla­
tive language. But in another case (Tomlinson) dealing 
with the same statutory provision, the court meekly 
submitted when it seemed within the legislative intent, 
even though, as we have seen,34 the court did not like the 
substantive outcome.
Interestingly, a brace of cases in 1829-1830 reveals a 
Court of Appeals still struggling to achieve the resolution 
of adjudications in a manner best suited to secure 
legislative objectives, even when the statutory language 
itself might not have done so. These cases dealt with a 
statutory provision which changed the impact of levying 
execution upon a judgment debtor’s real estate. Under 
accepted practice, all creditors obtaining judgments 
against a particular debtor could choose one of three 
modes of enforcing (or "executing") that judgment. The 
first method was directed against the "body" of the debtor; 
that is, by a writ of capias ad satisfaciendum (commonly 
called a "ca. sa."), the debtor was imprisoned until he 
satisfied the judgment.33 The second method was against
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the judgment debtor's goods, which were levied upon and 
sold by a writ of fieri facias. The last was against his 
lands, whereby by writ of levari facias or by eleqit the 
profits of the land were channelled to the creditor.36 In 
1819, however, the General Assembly enacted a provision 
stating that the capias ad satisfaciendum should thence­
forward apply, in the case of insolvent debtors, not only 
to the debtor's body, but also to bind his real estate.37 
This provision not only confused the levying of executions 
in general, but also brought into question the issue of 
priority among creditors. The objective of the legislature 
had been rational enough: it had sought by this provision
to end the practice of debtors selling their lands to 
preferred creditors, and then declaring insolvency, thus 
leaving nothing for the more diligent judgment creditor.
The unintended effect, however, was also to undercut the 
rightful claims of other creditors who levied execution 
after the initial ca. sa.
In 1829 the Court of Appeals acknowledged the problems 
created thereby, but refused to remedy the situation by 
judicial fiat. As in Tomlinson. the court, in Jackson v. 
Heiskell, refused to evade clear statutory language. Judge 
Dabney Carr noted that "It was said this construction [of 
the new statutory provision] changes wholly the nature and 
effects of the ca. sa. And this is most true. But," 
continued Carr, "the legislature had the right to do this; 
and its words are so plain, that I am compelled to believe
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it meant to do it. If inconveniences are found to follow," 
he concluded, "the same hand which gave the wound, must 
administer the cure."38 Judge Green, on the other hand, 
doubted "whether this [adverse] consequence was in the 
contemplation or design of the legislature." Nevertheless, 
while he was "sensible of the great harshness, and (in its 
practical application) inconveniences, of this new law," he 
concluded that "those considerations belong to the 
legislature, and not to courts of Justice."39 Cabell 
concurred.
Since the Jackson case was a unanimous decision by the 
three judges (Carr, Green, and Cabell) who heard it, it was 
unusual that its holding would be directly overturned 
barely a year later by the full five-member court. But in 
Foreman v. Loyd that is exactly what happened. Judge Carr 
maintained his prior position. "I have found nothing to 
change," he said, "in the view before taken. The law, 
however harsh, however unwise, is, to my understanding, 
expressed in terms too plain to be changed by construction, 
or judicial action in any form. I must, therefor, adhere 
to my former opinion on the question . . .."60 Green 
likewise remained unswayed, declaring that, "upon recon­
sideration, my opinion remains unchanged."61
It was the two justices who had not heard the case 
before who tipped the balance. John Coalter began his 
opinion by setting out a maxim of statutory construction:
"In construing a remedial statute," he said, "the rule is
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to see how the law stood before, then what was the 
mischief, and, finally, what remedy has been enacted."62 
After completing his analysis along these lines, Coalter 
came to the conclusion that "had the legislature intended 
by that clause [the result that actually ensued], . . .  1 
think it would not only have used more appropriate and 
explicit words, but would have made some provision for the 
subsequent judgment creditor . . .." Coalter therefore 
advocated a narrow construction of the provision to 
eliminate its adverse impact.63 Francis Brooke, the other 
justice hearing the case for the first time, agreed. "In 
construing a statute," he noted, "the first object is so to 
construe it as to make it work a remedy for the mischief 
intended to be prevented. If all its words can be 
satisfied by such a construction, we need not carry them 
farther, however general they may be; expecially, if by so 
doing we are met by inconveniences which we cannot be sure 
were overlooked by the legislature." He therefore 
concurred with Coalter.64
It was Judge Cabell, who had joined with Carr and 
Green in upholding the literal language of the statute in 
the Jackson case, who proved the pivotal figure. Mention­
ing that since the Jackson case he had had the benefit of 
reading the arguments of counsel in the published reports, 
and of conferring with Coalter and Brooke, Cabell candidly 
admitted that "the effect of these advantages has been to 
convince me that I was in error; and I take pleasure in
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acknowledging it." Cabell went on to presume that the 
statute had, "in practice, a harshness of operation, which 
was probably not foreseen, and, therefore, not intended by 
the legislature.” Since the General Assembly did not 
intend what actually resulted, Cabell sought to conform the 
statute to "suppress the mischief" which was the objective 
of the legislature. He therefore adopted the restricted 
construction of the provision first advocated by Coalter: 
"In construing this section so as to overreach only the 
voluntary alienations of the debtor, and to apply the 
proceeds of a sale by the debtor or the sheriff to the 
payment of the different creditors according to the order 
of the respective levies of their executions, we remove all 
the evils which the legislature intended to remove." But, 
if the court were to persist in the Jackson approach of 
"giving [the statute] a more extensive operation," 
concluded Cabell, "we go beyond the mischiefs which the 
legislature designed to remove, and we give rise to new 
ones which it is admitted they did not foresee, and 
therefore could not intend."63
The Jackson and Foreman cases of 1829 and 1830 were a 
fitting epilogue to the series of cases beginning shortly 
after the Revolution and which involved the judicial 
construction of legislative enactments. In that half 
century we have seen the Virginia Court of Appeals follow 
statutory language strictly and liberally, and we have seen 
the court place a judicial gloss on statutory provisions
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and refuse to place the same gloss on identical provisions. 
We have seen the court stretch to interpret statutory 
provisions in a manner that seemed to them reasonable and 
fair, and stoically apply specific legislative language 
against their own policy preferences. In short, virtually 
the entire universe of possible judicial interpretations of 
statutes was displayed at one time or another in the years 
between 1776 and 1830. Closer inspection reveals, however, 
that in the midst of variety there was continuity. In all 
the adjudications cited, be they liberal or strict 
constructionist, the Court of Appeals whs guided by one 
polar star: to give effect to the legislative intent.
Granted, there were times the court did this by a literal 
adherence to statute, and times when the "spirit" of the 
law took precedence over mere language. But even those 
variations in approach were just that: variations in
approach, and not conflicts over underlying principle.
If this were all, the conclusion to be reached would 
be as unquestionable as it would be obvious. But, as usual 
in the world of jurisprudence, it was not quite as simple 
as all that. For there were occasions when the Court of 
Appeals undeniably did refute legislative language, and not 
all of those instances fit comfortably within the rubric of 
a more generalized legislative intent. While the excep­
tions undoubtedly complicate the analysis, they are also 
the best sources for a more sophisticated understanding of 
legislative ascendancy. For, as always, the exceptions
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define the rule, and it is through them that we determine 
the limits placed upon the realm of legislative policy 
making.
The most obvious and perhaps the most important 
instance of judicial limitation of legislative action lay 
in the doctrine of judicial review. The leading cases have 
received ample discussion in earlier sections of this 
study,66 but their implications for the notion of legisla­
tive ascendancy need to be briefly expanded upon. From its 
very inception, the Virginia Court of Appeals boldly 
asserted that the constitution represented a law higher 
than mere statute. The constitution, said the court, was 
"the act of the people."67 When, on occasion, "the 
constitution and the [legislative] act are in opposition 
and cannot exist together, the former must control the 
operation of the latter."68 Moreover, it was to be the 
Court of Appeals which assumed the authority to "decide 
between an act of the people [i.e., the constitution], and 
an act of the legislature . . .."6 9
The sweeping nature of judicial deference to legisla­
tive activity in most other areas makes this exception 
appear all the more stark. It is clear that only a value 
or principle of overriding importance could induce the 
court to defy the legislative branch in its policy 
initiatives. And the principle was, of course, nothing 
less than the sovereignty of the people. Thus, while the 
court was willing to follow the legislative lead in most
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policy decisions, whether the substance of that policy be 
thought wise or unwise, the court would not permit the 
General Assembly to contravene the will of the people at 
large as expressed in the constitution.
While most of the cases involving judicial review 
which have been previously discussed revolved around such 
institutional matters as judicial independence and the 
separation of powers, there was one case in particular that 
proved particularly illuminating with regard to judicial 
willingness to restrict a substantive enactment by the 
General Assembly. In 1819, the legislature had enacted a 
statute intended to secure the navigability of the Slate 
River. Under the act, the Slate River Company was granted 
authority and inducements to complete the task. One of the 
provisions of the law required current owners of milldams 
across the Slate to install locks for the passage of 
traffic through their embankments. Upon their "failure so 
to do . . . the mill-dams are declared to be nuisances, and 
may be abated [torn down]: and the [Slate River Company
is] empowered to clear them away, and to charge the expense 
of doing so to the owners of the mills."7 0
In the 1828 case of Crenshaw v. Slate River Co., 
Crenshaw, the owner of a mill along the Slate, sought 
judicial intervention to protect his property rights. At 
issue, of course, was the right of the legislature to 
interfere with private property rights.71 The Virginia 
court had always been quite favorably disposed toward
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legislative actions taken in behalf of the "public good,"72 
but here it drew the line. The Court of Appeals did not 
for a moment question the right of the legislature to take 
private property for the public good. "It will not be 
denied, I presume," said Justice Carr, "that the Sovereign 
Power (with us the Legislature) may, in their discretion, 
[do such a thing] . . . .  That the eminent domain of the 
Sovereign Power, extends to the taking private property for 
public purposes, I am free to admit." The key issue, 
according to Carr, was not the legislative ability to 
enfringe upon private rights in the interests of the 
public good, but the requirement that the injured 
individual must be satisfied for the damages incurred. 
" . . .  To render the exercise of this power lawful," he 
concluded, "a fair compensation must always be made to the 
individual . . .."7 3
Judge John Green grounded the rationale for this 
decision squarely upon the provisions of the Virginia 
constitution. He first admitted that the "Legislature of 
the State is declared by our Constitution to be a complete 
Legislature, and consequently has all the powers of 
Sovereignty, except so far as they are limited by the 
Constitutions of Virginia and the United States." Green 
went on to cite article I of the declaration of rights, 
which protects, among other things, "the enjoyment of life 
and liberty, and the means of acquiring and possessing 
property . . .." According to Green, "To deprive a citizen
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of any property already legally acquired; without a fair 
compensation, deprives him quoad hoc, of the means of 
possessing property . * Therefore, said the justice,
the statute was unconstitutional and void.74
It is interesting to note the stress Green placed upon 
the protection of private property in a constitutional 
order. One of the primary objectives of government, he 
said, was the protection of private property. As it 
relates to the individual, the governmental protection of 
property is "the only means, so far as the Government is 
concerned, besides the security of the person, of obtaining 
happiness. Liberty itself consists essentially, as well in 
the security of private property, as of the persons of 
individuals; and this security of private property is one 
of the primary objects of Civil Government, which our 
ancestors, in framing our Constitution, intended to secure 
to themselves and their posterity, effectually, and for 
ever."73
While Green based his Crenshaw opinion upon the narrow 
ground of the Virginia constitution, not all the justices 
were so circumspect, and as a result Crenshaw provides an 
inkling that there may have existed another limitation to 
legislative enactments; a kind of "higher law" that might 
best be described as the "law of reason." In Crenshaw, 
Judge Dabney Carr based his conclusion that there must be 
just compensation to the individual upon more than just the 
Virginia declaration of rights. That principle, he said.
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"is laid down by the writers on Natural Law, Civil Law, 
Common Law and the Law of every civilized country." 
Accordingly, Carr concluded that "whether we judge this Law 
by the principles of all Civilized Governments, by the 
Federal Constitution, or that of our own State, it is 
unconstitutional and void."76 Such intimations of some 
extra-constitutional standard superior to legislative acts 
were isolated, but not unheard of. Another instance came 
in the 1809 case of Currie’s admrs. v. Mutual Assurance 
Society. In that adjudication, involving the power of the 
legislature to amend the charter of a corporation, Spencer 
Roane noted that the power of a succeeding legislature to 
alter the enactments of its predecessors "is bounded only 
. . .  by the principles and provisions of the constitution
and bill of rights, and by those great rights and prin­
ciples for the preservation of which all just governments 
are founded."77 These two brief judicial statements are 
joined by Henry St. George Tucker, who wrote in 1831 that 
"if a statute be obviously subversive of the principles of 
common right and reason, it would probably be considered as 
beyond the limits of legislative power . . .."7 8
The possible implications of a theory that allowed the 
courts authority to reject legislative actions on the basis 
of "common right and reason" are immense. Even Tucker was 
quick to add that "this is so delicate an assumption of
power by the judiciary, that it ought not to be exercised
without the greatest caution and moderation."79 And, as we
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have seen, the Virginia Court of Appeals, if it truly 
subscribed to such a theory at all, did not often utilize 
it— certainly not to effect a wholesale departure from 
legislative policy.
A third instance in which the Court of Appeals 
appeared willing to defy apparent legislative policy 
occurred when the statutory language was contrary to 
longstanding practice. The possible importance of actual 
practice to the interpretation of statutory language was 
suggested as early as 1791. In Downman v. Downman's exrs. 
the court addressed the re-opening of office judgments 
[that is, default judgments entered by the court clerk upon 
the non-appearance of the other party]. The district court 
act of 1788 had provided that a defendant could appear and 
plead anytime before the end of the next succeeding term, 
at which time a final judgment would be entered. In 
construing the recently-enacted law, the Court of 
Appeals noted that "these words . . . are the same as were 
used in the old act of 1753, for establishing the General 
Court . . ..” Moreover, the court observed, "the practice 
of that court was very liberal, in allowing a defendant to 
plead . . .." The court therefore permitted the office 
judgment to be re-opened.80
The Downman case merely looked to existing practice as 
a means of defining the application of a new statutory 
provision which echoed a previous enactment. There were 
other cases where a reliance upon usage did not threaten
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legislative ascendancy. Thus in its early years the Court 
of Appeals moved to confirm the continued viability of such 
longstanding practices as the use of a "scroll" instead of 
a "seal” on sealed instruments,81 and the payment of money 
owed to the opposite party's attorney.82 At times, the 
court even cited usage to support a statute, as when a 
question arose as to the legislative intent at the 
enactment of a particular provision.83
There were other occasions, however, where existing 
practice appeared to flatly contradict express statutory 
language, and in such instances the Court of Appeals faced 
the decision of which to affirm: statute or practice. In
fact, the court did both, at various times, and it is 
instructive to briefly review examples of each. The most 
definitive statement in favor of statute over practice came 
from Judge Dabney Carr in 1827. The issue in Coleman v. 
M'Murdo and Prentis was whether a later-appointed 
administrator of an estate could sue his predecessors for 
the mishandling of the estate's assets. In response to 
counsel's argument that this had been longstanding practice 
in Virginia, Carr said that even if the court were willing 
to "admit that such is the practice? yet, when this 
tribunal is called upon to declare the law, I apprehend 
that such practice deserves so much weight only, as to 
insure a close and attentive examination of the foundation 
on which it rests, and a determination not to disturb it, 
unless we are convinced that it is in violation of law."
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Carr went on to say: "But, if we be so convinced, then, I
hold, that however general, however ancient the error, we 
are bound by the highest of all sanctions, to correct it 
with an unshrinking hand; for, to this Court is confided 
the duty of expounding the law in the last resort."84 
Similarly, the court in Baker v. Preston in 1821 firmly 
stated that it "would hold itself at liberty . . .  to 
depart from a usage, which was in conflict with the actual 
expressions of a statute, and perhaps in opposition to 
great principles . . . ."8S
On the other hand, there were also occasions when the 
court was willing to accept common usage even though it 
appeared to belie statutory language. Two important cases 
involved the declaration of rights itself. In 1804, The 
Case of the County L e w  came before the Court of Appeals. 
That adjudication arose under the language of article VI of 
the declaration, which provided that "men . . . cannot be 
taxed or deprived of their property for publick uses 
without their own consent, or that of their representatives 
so elected . . .."86 Under this provision, the Fairfax 
county court had declared the collection of taxes by the 
appointive county court unconstitutional. Edmund Pendle­
ton, for the court, admitted that the practice of assessing 
the county levy appeared to contravene the constitution. 
Nevertheless, he reasoned, the practice was of such 
antiquity, and was so central to the functioning of 
government, that it was impossible to assume .that the 1776
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Convention meant to do away with it. Instead, despite 
appearances, "the convention . . . did not consider 
the article in the bill of rights as extending to the 
case . . .."87 This adjudication, then, was not construed 
to be a case of practice overruling constitutional 
language; rather, it was a case of constitutional language 
implicitly assuming the continuation of existing practice.
In the same year the Court of Appeals stretched this 
line of reasoning a bit further. The case of Turpin v. 
Locket involved the constitutionality of an 1802 statute 
which divested the Episcopal Church of its "glebe" lands. 
The Episcopal Church had been the established church in 
Virginia prior to 1785, and the glebe lands were lands 
granted to the church by the state as a means of support
for its rectors. The 1802 law was challenged on the ground
(among others) that it constituted an unconstitutional 
taking of property. Judges Carrington and Lyons, in 
opposition to the law, cited The Case of the County Levy, 
and stressed that the long practice of upholding the
church's right to the glebes had made it part of the
constitution. The justices maintained that "written 
constitutions are, like other instruments, subject to 
construction; and, when expounded, the exposition, after 
long acquiescence, becomes, as it were, part of the 
instrument; and can, no more, be departed from, than 
that."88 The court evenly split on the issue, and thus the 
statute was upheld. The Lyons and Carrington opinion,
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however, represented a further articulation of the County 
Levy doctrine of practice shaping (if not overruling) 
constitutional language.
An example of the apparent supremacy of practice over 
statutory language involved the implied revocation of 
wills. By Virginia statute, "No devise so made [by valid 
will] . . . shall be revocable, but by the testator's 
destroying . . . the same, . . . or by a subsequent 
will . . . . Nevertheless, continued the statute, a will 
could also be revoked— by statutory implication— if a 
testator died childless, and there was an after-born child 
unprovided for in his will.89 Despite the strong words of 
the statute that "No devise . . . shall be revocable," the 
Court of Appeals did allow for revocations that did not 
come within the compass of the statute. As Judge John 
Green put it in 1827, "notwithstanding the statute, a 
revocation in toto might be implied from facts afterwards 
occurring," giving the example of a legacy which was 
revoked by an advancement of that identical amount during 
the testator’s lifetime.90 In allowing revocations beyond 
the strict letter of the statute, the Court was following a 
similar, longstanding interpretation of an equally strong 
provision in the English statute of wills.91 This of 
course raised the possibility that the court presumed the 
English interpretation of similar language was implicitly 
adopted by the Virginia General Assembly in enacting their
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own provision. Such a view of the matter aligns the court 
with legislative intent rather than against it.
Two other cases are much less ambiguous, and go 
straight to the heart of the matter. In 1800, the Court of 
Appeals directed its attention to a 1727 statute regarding 
a husband's right to his wife's slaves. The statute 
appeared unambiguous. It provided that "where any feme 
sole [unmarried woman] is or shall be possessed of any 
slave or slaves . . . the same shall accrue to, and be 
absolutely vested in the husband of such feme, when she 
shall marry . . .."9 2 The longstanding common-law rule and 
practice, however, held that a husband was not entitled to 
his wife's personal property until he had exercised some 
form of possession over it.93 In Wallace v. Taliaferro. 
Judge Peter Lyons argued that the statutory language meant 
exactly what it said, and that the husband had a right to 
his wife's slaves whether or not he had exercised any 
dominion over them. "No rule is better settled," said 
Lyons, "than that the general intention of the Legislature 
ought to be observed. I conclude, therefore, that the 
makers of the act intended, that the words . . . should be 
understood, according to their full and natural import."94 
Lyons, however, was overruled by the other members of the 
court. In doing so, they looked to the longstanding 
practice. As Paul Carrington put it, "the question 
was considered so well settled and understood, by the 
people, that nobody has ever thought it worth while, to
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stir it . - . ,"93 Pendleton agreed. "I am satisfied [this 
result] will tend to confirm long practice . . . ,"96 
Indeed, Pendleton thought the construction so well settled 
that the legislature must have meant to adopt it as an 
intrinsic part of the statute. "Is not the . . . will of 
the Legislature to be pursued," he asked, "although terms 
may be used which might import a contrary will?" He could 
only surmise that "I imagine some young gentlemen of the 
bar, not old enough to know the practice of the country, 
nor acquainted with the former decisions, advised this 
suit, on reading the clause, and being impressed with the 
force of the strong expressions [contained therein]."97
A similar, albeit more dramatic, case arose in 1829.
In Sailing v. M * Kinney. M ’Kinney, as sheriff of Scott 
County, had "farmed out" his duties to Sailing as deputy 
(that is, Sailing paid a fixed fee to M'Kinney, and was 
thereafter entitled to collect all fees which would 
normally accrue to the sheriff). However, under a statute 
enacted in 1792, it was illegal for "any person . . . [to] 
sell any office . . .  or deputation of any office . . .  or 
receive . . . any money, fee or reward . . . for any office 
. . .  or for the deputation of any office . . . which shall 
in any wise touch or concern the administration of the 
Executive Government, or the administration or execution 
of justice, or the receipt or payment of the public 
revenue . . .." The act contained a proviso "That nothing 
in this act . . . shall be so construed as to prohibit the
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appointment . . .  of any . . . deputy sheriff, who shall be 
employed to assist their principals in the execution of 
their respective offices."98 This case brought directly 
before the Court of Appeals the issue of statutory language 
versus common practice.
The majority of the court held that M ’Kinney's action’"’' 
in "farming" the deputyship was entirely allowable. John 
Green for the majority began by asserting that M'Kinney’s 
conduct came within the proviso of the statute and 
therefore was legal, even by the terms of the act itself. 
Green did not stop there, however, and went on to give a 
second, startling reason for upholding M'Kinney. "If, 
however, these circumstances are not sufficient to justify 
the conclusion, that upon the literal construction of the 
statute the sale of the deputation of the office of 
sheriff, is excepted from its provisions," he began, "still 
the construction is so doubtful, and the practice in 
question has so long prevailed, and is so extensive, and 
the consequences of holding it illegal so extensively 
ruinous, that if there be any case, to which the maxim 
communis error facit jus ["common error makes law," or,
"what was at first illegal is presumed, when repeated many 
times, to have acquired the force of usage; and then it 
would be wrong to depart from it"]99 can apply, this is 
surely one." Green quickly supported his bold utterance by 
adding, "That maxim has been held in England to sanction 
practices even expressly against the statutes . . .."10°
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Justice Carr gave a ringing dissent, which clearly- 
articulated the opposing point of view. "It was also 
contended, that though the sale of the sheriff's office be 
not permitted by law, yet it has been the general idea, 
that it was so, and the universal practice to farm it out; 
and that this common error makes it lawful." Carr rejected 
this idea out of hand. "I cannot assent to this position. 
The sale of the deputation of this office is expressly 
forbidden by the statute, unless the proviso excepts it. I 
have shewn it does not." Assuming, then, that the practice 
contravened the statute, Carr portrayed the resulting 
situation in stark terms. "Here, then, we have the statute 
law prohibiting the sale . . . and we have the law of 
common error, holding the sale . . . good. Which shall we 
follow? We cannot serve two masters. To me, it seems, 
that we can know no law but that derived from the law­
making power? and that, in opposition to such laws, error, 
however common, however hoary, can impose on us no 
obligation."141
In Wallace v. Taliaferro and Sailing v. M 1 Kinney, we 
have instructive examples of the Court of Appeals appar­
ently departing from statutory language to uphold long­
standing practice. Two things, however, should be 
especially noted. First, in both cases the majority sought 
to bring their interpretation within what they perceived as 
the legislative intent. Second, in each case there was a 
spirited dissent. Even more interesting were the reasons
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the court gave for taking the stand it did. In Wallace. a 
case involving property in slaves, Carrington frankly 
admitted: "I am not much disposed to indulge a construc­
tion, which would put all to sea again, and might disturb 
the titles of thousands.” Pendleton agreed. "I am 
satisfied [this result] will tend to confirm long practice; 
and preserve the peace of the country; which would have 
been disturbed, by a contrary judgment."102 In Sailing, 
Judge Green similarly commented that "the consequences of 
holding it [the farming out of deputyships] illegal . . . 
[would be] extensively ruinous . . . ."103 Perhaps the best 
articulation of the underlying basis for such decisions, 
however, came in the 1821 case of Baker v. Preston. There, 
although the court found the usage [admitting copies of 
deeds] compatible with statute, Spencer Roane added that 
the court "would, especially, hesitate to repeal an usage, 
which has been so general and universal, as that its 
reversal would inundate this country with litigation, and 
lay the foundations of innumerable appeals and law 
suits.1,104
In these cases concerning the legitimacy of common 
usage over legislative policy, we find another one of those 
areas where there existed the potential for a considerable 
amount of judicial discretion. Again, however, we find the 
reality much less dynamic. In most instances, practical 
usage comported with statute, and in doubtful cases 
judicial assumptions ran, as before, toward theories of a
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failure in legislative foresight, or to poorly phrased 
statutory language. In those cases where the court did 
indeed appear to be striking out on its own, its reasoning 
reflected a now-familiar set of priorities. In Wallace. 
the court was forthrightly protecting property rights; in 
Sailing, the maintenance of a long-established system where 
venerable county leaders were appointed as sheriff, and 
then turned around and "farmed" out the duties to another 
person.
Undoubtedly the one thing which emerges as most 
striking from a parsing of the Virginia case law in the 
early national period was the consistent nature of judicial 
deference to legislative actions and intent. This 
deference was woven into the very fabric of Virginia law in 
this period, a fact which colored the emerging substantive 
law, and, more, made an important statement about the 
perceived wellsprings of law and the proper role of the 
various political institutions in applying it.
The first and most obvious conclusion that can be 
drawn is that the legislature was considered the proper 
locus for the making of policy in the new commonwealth.103 
Both judicial deference in the face of statutory language 
and intent, and judicial restraint in approaching matters 
allowing potential judicial discretion underscore that
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fact. What is much more important than the mere fact of 
legislative ascendancy in the policy-making sphere, 
however, are the implications this portended for the new 
order.
There were at least two major consequences which 
flowed from the doctrine of legislative ascendancy. The 
first had to do with its implications for republicanism.
As William E. Nelson has perceived, "Shared ideas about the 
sovereignty of the people and the accountability of 
government to the people resulted at an early date in a new 
understanding of the role of the legislature in the legal 
system."106 In other words, the concept of popular 
sovereignty— both in terms of power residing in the people, 
and in terms of government being responsive to the people—  
naturally led to a conception of legislative ascendancy. 
And, indeed, the Virginia Court of Appeals was prominent 
in acknowledging this new reality, recognizing the 
legislators as "the immediate representatives of the 
people, representing as well the justice as the wisdom of 
the nation . . .."107 Nor was Virginia alone in this view. 
According to Gordon Wood, no one doubted in 1776 that "the 
legislature was the most important part of any govern­
ment."108 As one contemporary journal explained it, "It is 
in their legislatures . . . that the members of a common­
wealth are united and combined together into one coherent, 
living body. This is the soul that gives form, life and 
unity to the commonwealth."109 Accordingly, "It became
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clear that the legislature possessed 'full power and 
authority . . .  to make, ordain and establish, all manner 
of . . . laws, statutes, and ordinances . . .  as they shall 
judge to be for the good and welfare of this Common­
wealth. '"no
But as important as the legislature was to the 
realization of popular sovereignty in a republican 
commonwealth, there was another side of the popular 
sovereignty coin. That was the notion of the people as 
superior to the legislature, and here, too, the Virginia 
Court of Appeals played a prominent role. For all of the 
court's deference to the legislature, it also helped to 
define— through judicial review— the limits beyond which 
the legislature could not go.111 Thus, the Virginia 
court's support for legislative ascendancy was a perfectly 
republican stance; somewhat paradoxically, its restriction 
of the legislature— when attributed to constitutional 
mandate— was equally republican. For, in one sense at 
least, the court was as legitimate an oracle of the popular 
will as the legislature. The rationale for such an 
assertion lay in the all-encompassing doctrine of popular 
sovereignty itself. The simple fact was that "the 
representatives of the people [i.e., the legislature] were 
not really the people, but only the servants of the people 
with a limited delegated authority to act on behalf of the 
people."112 In a similar manner, the courts could also be 
seen as servants of the people. Once the people were
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recognized as truly sovereign over all branches of 
government, the judiciary then had as much right to 
participate in the fulfillment of the popular will as any 
other branch.
Besides the implications for popular sovereignty, the 
stances taken by the Court of Appeals in the interpretation 
of statute had a significant impact upon the substance of 
Virginia law. In applying statutory language, the court 
whenever possible continued to support traditional rules of 
law, and, in particular, the rights of property. When a 
statute did not specifically overrule the common law, the 
traditional rule of law remained in place. When a 
legislative enactment appeared to subvert established 
practice, only clear and unequivocal language would cause 
the court to interpret it as intending to overthrow 
existing usage. Moreover, the Court of Appeals was 
forthright in explaining why. By maintaining stable rules 
of law, rights of property remained settled and undis­
turbed .
The decisions of the Court of Appeals vis-a-vis the 
legislature also reflected a distinctive view of the proper 
role of the court in the making of policy. The court 
deferred to legislative will where it existed, and in the 
absence of statute looked with approbation to traditional 
rules of the common law. Such a restrictive view of its 
role as a positive maker of policy was tempered, however, 
by a pragmatic willingness to adapt traditional rules of
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
209
law to meet the needs of the new Commonwealth and the 
requirements of common sense.
Finally, in our analysis of the decisions of the 
Virginia Court of Appeals over a period spanning five 
decades, there was— again— remarkably little sense of 
change. A random sampling of cases from the 1820s would 
produce evidence of a judicial attitude toward policymaking 
not dramatically different from a similar sampling in the 
1790s. This surprising stability in judicial approach 
helps to explain the enduring nature of the substantive 
treatment of law over the same period.
Virginia, then, in the first half-century after the 
Revolution, gradually fashioned its own peculiar accommoda­
tion with the forces unleashed by the Revolution. In the 
course of that settlement, however, the "rules of the game" 
changed, in the form of the establishment in 1787 of an 
entirely new governmental entity of unknown powers. 
Virginia's response to this political innovation forms the 
final topic of analysis.
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enactments are legion; at most, only the most salient 
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2. Grymes v. Pendleton. 1 Call 54, 55 (1797).
3. Lomax v. Picot, 2 Rand. 247, 265 (1824).
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12 Hening 146.
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9. Roy v. Garnett, 2 Wash. 9 (1794). See detailed 
discussion, supra pp.
10. R.C. (1803) c. 90, § 5, p. 157.
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Oct. 1788 c. 67, § 86; 12 Hening 753. The General Assembly 
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212 (1809).
13. Skipwith v. Clinch, 3 Call 86 (1801); see Oct. 1787 c. 
9, § 2; 12 Hening 465.
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c. 185, § 17, pp. 44-45.
15. Steptoe v. The Auditor, 3 Rand. 221, 225-26 (1825).
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
211
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18. 1 R.C. (1819) c. 113, § 9.
19. Redford v. Winston. 3 Rand. 148, 158 (1825).
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1) general words in a clause thereof may be restrained by 
particular words in another clause, subsequent thereto?
2) a statute relating to several subjects may be read 
distributively (independently) in relation to each; 3) a 
construction which tends to absurdities is not to be 
admitted; 4) a statute is to be so construed, that no 
clause, sentence, or word shall be void, superfluous, or
insignificant; 5) no statute is to be so construed as to be
inconvenient; and that consequences may be resorted to 
where the meaning of a statute is doubtful; 6) all statutes
in pari materia (upon the same subject matter) are to be
taken together as one system, and, in case of doubt, to be 
construed consistently; 7) all statutes are to be expounded 
with reference to the nature of the subject matter therein. 
Id. at 201-11. See also Bernard v. Scott's admr.. 3 Rand. 
522 (1825) .
22. Henry St. George Tucker, Commentaries, vol. 1, bk. 1, 
p. 15; see Kerr v. Dixon, 2 Call 379, 381-82 (1800).
23. R.C. (1803) c. 92, § 5, p. 161.
24. Marks v. Bryant, 4 Hen. & M. 91, 97-98 (1809). See
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Commentaries, 2: 154, 156.
25. R.C. (1803) c. 90, § 4, p. 157.
26. See further discussion, infra.
27. Robert's widow v. Stanton. 2 Munf. 129 (1810).
28. Newman v. Chapman, 2 Rand. 93, 100 (1823). It should
be noted that the General Assembly acted to confirm this 
interpretation of the law in the revisal of 1819. See
1 R.C. (1819) c. 99, § 12, p. 364.
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History, 2nd ed. (London; Butterworths, 1979), pp. 38-46; 
Stanley N. Katz, "The Politics of Law in Colonial America; 
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statutory scale of depreciation, contracts in "current" 
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CHAPTER VI
A REPUBLICAN COMMONWEALTH 
IN A FEDERAL REPUBLIC
While Virginians were in the midst of defining the 
nature of their republican revolution, they were confronted 
with a complicating factor: the creation of a wholly new
governmental entity of undetermined scope and powers, which 
was expected to co-exist and interact with the long- 
established state institutions. The Commonwealth of 
Virginia, and in particular its Court of Appeals, was thus 
forced to confront novel problems concerning the organiza­
tion of powers in the years after 1787 that raised new 
questions concerning the proper application of republican 
principles.1
It was universally admitted that the new federal 
Constitution had established a unique frame of government, 
structuring governmental power in a way no one had ever 
before attempted. The idea of two governments sharing the 
sovereign powers of governance posed immense problems of 
both a theoretical and a practical nature. The theoretical 
difficulties with the conception of a shared sovereignty 
were dispelled by the triumph of the notion of popular 
sovereignty, where "the people are avowedly the fountain of
217
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all power," who then delegated aspects of that sovereignty 
to the state and federal governments, respectively.2 The 
practical aspects of the new order remained to be worked 
out in the first decades of the new system's existence.
The all-important practical issue in the implementa­
tion of the new federal system was the proper allocation of 
power between the state and federal jurisdictions. Few 
questioned that each had a legitimate sphere of authority? 
the problem lay in defining the extent of those spheres.
It was a matter of immense importance, because at stake (or 
so many believed) was nothing less than the future of 
republican liberty itself.3
To a great degree, this battle was waged in the 
courts. It was there that the proper form— and forum— of 
republicanism was hashed out, in a series of critical court 
decisions on matters arising under the new scheme. In 
Virginia, the Court of Appeals made a signal contribution 
to the ongoing debate over the nature of federalism. Faced 
with a new federal government of unknown powers, the 
Virginia court became a citadel of restrictive construction 
of federal powers, in the belief that republican rights and 
liberties were best protected at the state level.
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In a series of adjudications in the early nineteenth 
century, the Virginia Court of Appeals articulated a vision 
of the proper balance between federal and state jurisdic­
tions that was to serve as one of the key bases for an 
alternative (albeit minority) view of the federal relation 
which was to be of surpassing importance.
One of the most difficult aspects of the new system to 
conceptualize was the new theory of two governments 
operating concurrently in the same time and space. It was 
the Court of Appeals, in two early-nineteenth-century 
decisions, which best explained how this complexity might 
work in practice. The issue in the 1811 case of Murray v.
M'Cartv was whether, under the Constitution, the Virginia 
legislature retained the power to declare when an 
individual lost his Virginia citizenship under the 
Commonwealth’s "expatriation” law. The Court acknowledged 
that "the situation of America, in this particular, is new, 
and may produce new and delicate questions." Nevertheless, 
Justice William Cabell was able to perceive an important 
subtlety. "We have sovereignties moving within sovereign­
ties," he said, and, as a result, "allegiance to a 
particular state is one thing, and that to the United 
States is another; that a renunciation of the former 
allegiance does not draw after it a renunciation of the 
latter . . .."4 A few years later (in 1815) Cabell 
completed his thought within the context of the case of 
Hunter v. Martin, where the Court defended the right of
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state courts to refuse to comply with directives from the 
federal courts. In Hunter. Cabell stressed the necessity 
of balancing the two spheres. "The free exercise, by the 
states, of the powers reserved to them, is as much 
sanctioned and guarded by the constitution of the United 
States, as is the free exercise, by the federal government, 
of the powers delegated to that government. If either be 
impaired," continued Cabell, "the system is deranged. The 
two governments, therefore, possessing, each, its portion 
of the divided sovereignty, although embracing the same 
territory, and operating on the same persons and frequently 
on the same subjects, are nevertheless separate from, and 
independent of each other."3
One important lesson to be drawn from Cabell's 
perceptions is that, however much the Virginia Court was 
willing to defend the Commonwealth’s interests in the 
federal system, it did accept the fact that it was a 
federal structure, and there was a place for the national 
government. This is consonant with the more sophisticated 
interpretations of republican thought. While most 
Virginians were undoubtedly proponents of the maintenance 
of state integrity, to portray them as solely advocates of 
local rights is, in Lance Banning's words, "a traditional 
interpretation which creates more problems than it 
solves."6 The Court of Appeals, for one, was willing to 
acknowledge this sphere of federal sovereignty. Accord­
ingly, the Court of Appeals had no trouble in acknowledging
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that the United States Constitution applied to Virginia.
The Virginia Court, for instance, noted in 1828 that the 
General Assembly was supreme, "except so far as they are 
limited by the Constitutions of Virginia and the United 
States."7 An example of the unquestioned acceptance of the 
provisions of the federal Constitution was the disposition 
of the Virginia Court of Admiralty. Article three of the 
Constitution had vested exclusive admiralty jurisdiction in 
the federal courts. The Commonwealth unhesitatingly 
thereupon abolished the state-level court, a move that was 
acknowledged and approved by the Court of Appeals.8 
Likewise the Court had no objection to enforcing federal 
statutes which clearly came within the ambit of the 
Constitution. In the 1809 case of Brown v. Crippin and 
Wise, Brown was a citizen of Pennsylvania who sought to 
have the case removed from the Virginia state courts to the 
federal circuit court under the diversity of citizenship 
clause of the Constitution and the federal statute 
implementing that provision. The Court of Appeals was 
firm. "The removal of the cause in such a case," said 
Judge Tucker, "is a matter of right which ought not to be 
refused to any defendant, who makes out his case; and 
complies with the terms of the law."9
Granting that there was no serious questioning of the 
right of the national government to operate within its 
proper sphere, what becomes most instructive are the 
perceived limits of that sphere which the Virginia Court
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attempted to apply. The case of Williams v. Price provides 
a fascinating example of the Court of Appeals evading the 
application of a federal statute. What makes this case so 
illuminating is that it dealt with precisely the same 
statutory provision as the case of Brown v. Crippin and 
Wise just discussed, and was decided only eight years later 
in 1817.10 It will be recalled that in the Brown case the 
Court rigorously upheld the right of a Pennsylvania 
defendant under the Constitution and the federal Judiciary 
Act of 1789,11 to have his case removed from the Virginia 
state court into the federal court. In Williams, James 
Price of Virginia brought a contract action against Joseph 
Williams of Virginia and Cumberland Williams of Baltimore. 
During the suit the Maryland defendant filed a motion to 
remove the cause into the federal Circuit Court. The 
motion was overruled and the Court of Appeals affirmed.
This departure from a clear recent precedent was justified 
in terms of the interests of Virginia citizens. As Judge 
Spencer Roane explained, the statute "does not embrace 
cases, like the present, in which [Virginia] citizen 
defendants have, also, essential interests in the cause, 
which may be affected by a removal into the Federal 
Court."12 The Court specifically distinguished the Brown 
case where there were no Virginia defendants. Moreover, 
the Court of Appeals specifically left open the issue of 
the constitutionality of the federal act. Roane explained 
that the issue was not raised in the Brown case, and that
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here in Williams the matter could properly be resolved 
through mere statutory construction.13
If the Virginia Court of Appeals did not automatically 
bow to federal statute, neither did it unquestioningly 
apply federal treaty provisions, especially to transactions 
occurring prior to the treaty. Indeed, the Treaty of Paris 
of 1783 which ended the Revolution received a somewhat 
ambiguous treatment by the court. The provision of the 
treaty which occasioned the most litigation was that which 
ensured to British citizens the right to pursue their 
claims against American citizens. In only one instance did 
the Court of Appeals uphold th£ federal treaty in such 
litigation, and it clearly did so with distate. During the 
Revolution, Virginia had enacted a statute allowing debtors 
of British creditors to pay the amount owed into the state 
loan office and receive in return a certificate in 
discharge of the debt. In 1796 the United States Supreme 
Court had ruled this law invalid under the treaty of peace. 
In the 1806 case of Commonwealth v. Walker, Virginia 
Attorney General Philip Norborne Nicholas had argued that 
the decision of the federal court was invalid. "I will not 
question the motives of the Federal Court," said Nicholas, 
"but [I] have no hesitation in saying their decision was 
wrong. Virginia, being a sovereign state had a right to 
pass the law in question, and a mere treaty, after the 
passage of the law, could not annul it.” In justifying his 
position Nicholas acknowledged that "treaties are declared
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by the Federal Constitution to be the supreme law of the 
land." Nevertheless, concluded Nicholas, "they cannot have 
a retrospective operation, so as to annu l  the acts of 
sovereign states . . .."14 Judge Roane, for the Court, 
disliked the result, but was forced to disagree. The way 
Roane saw it, in the 1777 statute the Commonwealth of 
Virginia had made a covenant with its citizens to treat 
these debts as discharged. But since then things had 
changed. " . . .  The sovereignty of Virginia, as then 
existing," said Roane, "has passed into other hands; first, 
into those of the government of the confederation, and, 
lastly, into the hands of the present government of the 
United States." Moreover, added Roane, "all the citizens 
of this Commonwealth were parties, and assenting to that 
change . . .." Thus the issue now lay in the hands of the 
federal government, and Walker must seek redress, if at 
all, in the national forum.13
The Walker case, however, stands in stark contrast to 
other cases decided by the same Court before, during, and 
after the term of the Walker decision. In the case of Read 
v. Read in 1804, a British citizen sought to claim Virginia 
lands by inheritance in 1786. The Court of Appeals held 
that under the common law, and under Virginia statutes of 
1779 and 1784, the plaintiffs were aliens and could not 
inherit.16 In 1806, in the very same term as the Walker 
decision, Robert Bristow, Jr., a British citizen, sought to 
recover lands in Virginia that had escheated to the
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Commonwealth in 1779, after all the formalities of an 
inquest of office. The court held that neither the Treaty 
of Paris of 1783 nor the Jay Treaty of 1794 applied, and 
refused Bristow's claim.. Said St. George Tucker: "The
confiscation was final, and the property absolutely vested 
in the Commonwealth long before the treaty of peace, . . . 
or the constitution of the United States, or the treaty of 
1794, came into operation.”17 And in 1810, one rationale 
for denying the claims of Englishman Denny Martin Fairfax 
to lands in Virginia was that the title to the property in 
question had been determined by the Virginia legislature 
prior to the treaty of 1783.18
Given the spirit of independence demonstrated by the 
Court of Appeals in the face of federal statute and treaty, 
it should come as no surprise that the Court displayed even 
more passion when the federal courts sought to intrude upon 
the Virginia judiciary's perceived sphere of influence.
For federal statutes and treaties, if they be constitu­
tional, were undeniably the law of the land. Not so clear 
was the effect of the pronouncements of the federal 
judiciary. It was in addressing this issue that the 
Virginia Court of Appeals best articulated the Virginia 
credo of state autonomy within the federal system.
There was never a time when the Virginia Court of 
Appeals did not feel free to ignore a federal adjudication 
if it felt called upon to do so. In the 1797 case of 
M'Call v. Turner, President Judge Edmund Pendleton frankly
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acknowledged that Chief Justice Jay had instructed a jury 
that interest on British debts should be assessed for the 
period of the Revolutionary War. Pendleton, however, 
disagreed, and commented rather blithely that "I have no 
doubt, but he gave that opinion with the like sincerity, as 
I have delivered mine to the contrary; and mankind, if they 
think it worth while, will judge between us."19 In 1804, 
St. George Tucker, in dissent, presented his view of the 
applicability of federal decisions. In Dunlop v. Harris, 
an action on a promissory note, Tucker stated "The case of 
Mandeviile v. Jameson, in the supreme court of the United 
States, is, I confess, expressly against the opinion which 
I have delivered on this general question . . Tucker,
while disagreeing, had no thought of undercutting the 
Supreme Court as an institution. He owned that "I owe too 
much respect to the opinions of those [members of the 
Supreme Court] who decided that question, to controvert 
their decisions any where, but in this place." Neverthe­
less, Judge Tucker had no qualms about his right and duty 
to ignore the Supreme Court in this Virginia adjudication. 
"Here [in the Court of Appeals]," he said, "I must decide 
according to my own conviction, founded upon obligatory 
precedents, or such as I conceive to be obligatory on me." 
And in this case, at any rate, the federal decision did not 
have that import. "Had the question between the parties in 
that suit had any relation to the constitution or laws of 
the United States," Tucker went on, "I should have regarded
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the decision as obligatory upon me as precedent." In this 
action, however, such was not the case. The judge 
concluded that the Virginia dispute "having no relation to 
either [the Constitution or federal law], or any other 
[subject] in which the judgment of this court may be liable 
to revision by the supreme court of the United States, I do 
not regard it as a precedent."20 In 1827 the Court 
maintained the same stance. M * Clung v. Hughes involved the 
jurisdiction of a court of equity to hear cases involving 
conflicting claims to land. The Supreme Court had had an 
opportunity to apply the Virginia statute in an earlier 
case, and had come down against the train of Virginia 
decisions on the issue. In M'Clung, Judge William Green 
was "struck with the observation, that the Court of Appeals 
in Virginia, and the Supreme Court of the United States, 
seem to have come to opposite conclusions . . .." But 
this circumstance presented no real difficulty for Green 
and the Court. "I cannot assent," Green said simply,
"to the principles on which [the federal case] was 
decided . . .."21
Much more galling was the prospect of the federal 
judiciary actually intervening in the affairs of the 
Virginia courts. In the 1809 case of Brown v. Crippin and 
Wise, one of the issues was whether the defendant, in 
seeking removal of the case from the lower state court to 
the federal court, should have petitioned for a mandamus 
(an order from a superior court commanding obedience) from
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the federal court or the state superior court. Counsel for 
the defendant argued that "It never was contemplated that a 
Federal Court should issue process, commanding a State 
Court to do any act.”22 Judge Tucker agreed. " . . .  Of 
this I have no doubt," asserted Tucker, "that neither the 
Constitution of the United States, nor any act of Congress, 
does, or can (so long as the [Tenth Amendment] remains in 
force) deprive the superior Courts of this .Commonwealth of 
that control over the proceedings of the inferior Courts, 
which the laws of this country [i.e., Virginia] give to 
them."23 An even more dramatic instance of resistance to 
the federal judiciary appeared in connection with the 
Virginia law of 1802 confiscating glebe (church-owned) 
lands. In the case of Turpin v. Locket in 1804, this 
statute had been upheld by the Virginia Court of Appeals as 
constitutional.24 On appeal to the Supreme Court of the 
United States, this determination had been reversed.23 
But the Supreme Court did not have the last word, for in 
1840 the Virginia statute came up for consideration again, 
and the Virginia Court of Appeals, totally ignoring the 
Supreme Court decision, again upheld the constitutionality 
of the local enactment.26
All this served as mere background to one of the most 
important statements on federalism in .-the Commonwealth's 
history: the case of Hunter v. Martin.27 In that
decision, the Virginia Court of Appeals articulated at some 
length a theory of anti-centrism which was both an
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outgrowth of the state's political and intellectual 
heritage and a bold statement in its own right. The 
decision was all the more remarkable in that it appeared at 
a time (1815) when the reins of the national government had 
been safely in the hands of fellow Virginians for a 
considerable number of years, and therefore the general 
attitude toward the federal government and its policies was 
more benevolent than either before or later. Hunter v. 
Martin thus deserves no little attention.
Hunter v. Martin had its origination in the earlier 
litigation of Hunter v. Fairfax;s devisee.28 The Fairfax 
case had been one of great complexity concerning the right 
of the heir of Lord Fairfax to assert his title to lands 
once held of Lord Fairfax in Virginia's Northern Neck. 
Fortunately, the complexities of the earlier case need not 
detain us here.29 The important point for our purposes is 
that the Virginia Court of Appeals held for Virginia 
citizen Hunter, a determination which was carried to the 
United States Supreme Court by a writ of error, and 
re-vfers'ed. In reversing the Virginia Court's decision, the 
Supreme Court issued a mandate to the Virginia tribunal to 
enter judgment for the appellant, Philip Martin.30 It was 
this federal mandate that spurred the Virginia court's ire 
in Hunter v. Martin.
Thus, despite the complexities of the underlying 
litigation, the issue in Hunter v. Martin was as simple as 
it was important: "whether the Supreme Court was to be the
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ultimate arbiter of the Constitution, or whether the state 
courts were to have equal jurisdiction in constitutional 
matters."31 The importance of the matter did not go 
unrecognized at the time. Judge William Fleming 
acknowledged that "This cause has been justly regarded as 
one of the first importance, as it involves in it a great 
national and constitutional question of extreme delicacy.” 
Accordingly, noted Fleming, the cause "has therefore been 
elaborately argued with great ability, by some of the most 
distinguished characters of this bar; and has also received 
from the court, the greatest attention and the most mature 
deliberation."3 2
In addressing the issue itself, the members of the 
Court found themselves on common ground. Indeed, given 
the enormity of the matter at issue, Judge Fleming 
concluded that "It is fortunate and satisfactory to find, 
that the opinion of the court is unanimous on the important 
occasion . . .. "3 3 The substantive holding of the Virginia 
court was probably best expressed by Spencer Roane, who 
contended that neither Article III of the Constitution nor 
the Judiciary Act of 1789 gave the Supreme Court jurisdic­
tion in this case. Article III granted appellate jurisdic­
tion to the federal courts, but, according to Roane, since 
the entire Article dealt exclusively with the federal 
courts and not the state courts, the Article did not extend 
to a case such as this (and thus the Judiciary Act, which
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merely implemented the Constitutional structure, was 
similarly flawed).34
The fact that the case arguably arose under the Treaty 
of Paris of 1783 did not deter the Court. The "supremacy 
clause” of the Constitution of course made federal treaties 
"the supreme law of the land." And the twenty-fifth 
section of the Judiciary Act provided that "a final 
judgment in any suit in the highest court . . .  of a state 
. . . where there is drawn in question the validity of a 
treaty, or statute of . . . the United States, and the 
decision is against their validity, may be re-examined and 
reversed or affirmed in the Supreme Court . . . ."33 While 
none of the Virginia justices questioned the legitimacy of 
the Supremacy Clause, they vehemently denied the assumption 
inherent in the Judiciary Act that this meant that federal 
courts necessarily had the final say in determining the 
validity of federal statutes and treaties. Nowhere could 
the Virginia Court find in the Constitution the granting to 
the federal judiciary of exclusive appellate jurisdiction 
in such matters. The state courts had equal authority in 
cases properly before the state courts, and in such cases 
the decision of the highest state court was final.36
In modern days, with the logic of Hunter v. Martin 
safely buried, it is easy to minimize the originality and 
analytical sense of the Virginia Court's argument. But the 
Virginia justices did more than just articulate an 
alternative approach to judicial review; in the process
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they constructed a reasoned theory of state power within 
the federal structure.
The Court in Hunter began by adding much-needed 
sophistication to the conception of intersecting sovereign­
ties first delineated by the Court in Murray v. M 'Carty in 
1811.37 It will be recalled that in this aspect Judge 
William Cabell was the prime spokesman. In Hunter, Cabell 
acknowledged that in the federal system there were "two 
governments . . . possessing, each, its portion of the 
divided sovereignty, . . . embracing the same territory, 
and operating on the same persons and frequently on the 
same subjects." Despite the obvious opportunity for 
confusion, Cabell maintained that in reality this need not 
be the case. All that was required, thought Cabell, was 
the proper respect for the state's portion of the divided 
sovereignty. "The two governments," he asserted, "are 
. . . separate from, and independent of each other."38 
Moreover, said the judge, "The constitution of the United 
States contemplates the independence of both governments," 
and, importantly, "regards the residuary sovereignty of the 
states, as not less inviolable, than the delegated 
sovereignty of the United States." Here Cabell was getting 
to the essence of his argument, which would serve as the 
foundation for elaboration by other justices. "To give the 
general government or any of its departments, a direct and 
controlling operation upon the state departments, as such," 
concluded Cabell, "would be to change at once, the whole
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character of our system. The independence of the state 
authorities would be extinguished, and a superiority, 
unknown to the constitution, would be created, which would, 
sooner or later terminate in an entire consolidation of the 
states into one complete national sovereignty.”39
Beyond asserting that there was an inviolable sphere 
of state sovereignty, the Court went on to articulate a 
rationale for that affirmation. Again it was William 
Cabell who made the most significant contribution. "The 
Courts of the United States,” he said, "derive their power 
from, and owe responsibility to the people, of the United 
States; whereas the State Courts derive their power from, 
and owe responsibility to their respective states. They 
emanate from different sources, and have no common or 
connecting head.”40 If this be true, then the Court's 
conclusion was irresistible. Cabell again; "The Courts of 
the United States, therefore, belonging to one sovereignty, 
cannot be appellate Courts in relation to the State Courts, 
which belong to a different sovereignty— and, of course, 
their commands and instructions impose no obligation.”41
Not only did the states have their own sphere with its 
own philosophical justification, but they were bound to 
defend their jurisdiction against any transgression. For 
this the Court found its authority in the Virginia 
Resolutions of 1799. Those resolutions had been a 
legislative protest against the federally-enacted Alien and 
Sedition Acts. Drafted by James Madison and enacted by the
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General Assembly, the resolutions had stated that when the 
federal government overstepped the bounds of its delegated 
authority, the states were compelled to oppose that 
usurpation.4 2
Citing the Resolutions, Judge Francis Brooke noted 
that "The state authorities . . . [are] the guardians of 
the people’s and their own rights,” which includes "the 
right to resist infractions of the Federal government, or 
any department thereof . . .. "4 3 Spencer Roane put it in 
stronger terms yet. He, too, quoted from the Virginia 
Resolutions in asserting "that in case of a deliberate, 
palpable, and dangerous exercise of powers [by the federal 
government] . . . the state . . . [legislatures] have the 
right and are in duty bound, to arrest the progress of the 
evil."44 Here Roane departed from the Resolutions and made 
an even more radical assertion. In addition to the 
required legislative opposition to federal encroachment, 
Roane added that "the Courts of the States are also 
authorized to check the evil when it occurs, in the 
exercise of their ordinary jurisdiction."45
The Court left no loose ends untied. Lest their 
successors entertain doubts as to how to proceed in similar 
cases that might arise, the Court spelled out the 
appropriate approach to take when such a case came up in 
the exercise of their "ordinary jurisdiction." " . . .  In 
a controversy respecting the constitutionality of a state 
law," wrote Roane, "it must be shown to be unconstitu­
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tional, [while] a law of the General Government must be 
proved to be constitutional; which can only be by shewing, 
that the power to pass it has been granted.'*46 In setting 
up this standard, the Court was requiring different burdens 
of proof (in effect the state laws were presumed constitu­
tional, while federal law was presumed unconstitutional).
The underlying issue in Hunter, (in the opinion of 
the Virginia court at any rate) was the question of which 
of the two jurisdictions was the most dangerous to liberty. 
In response to counsel’s warning that the decision would 
lead to anarchy, Judge Roane responded by summing up the 
"Virginia theory" of federalism. " . . .  There is a 
Charybdis to be avoided," proclaimed Roane, "as well as a 
Scylla; that a centripetal, as well as a centrifugal 
principle, exists in the government; and that no calamity 
would be more to be deplored by the American people, than a 
vortex in the general government, which should ingulph and 
sweep away every vestige of the state constitutions."47
The anti-centrist stance of the Virginia Court of 
Appeals in 1815 was "conservative" in the true sense of the 
term.48 While the Court acknowledged and accepted the 
federal government as part of the new constitutional 
order, the Court's view of the federal relationship between 
the two jurisdictions was distinctly backward-looking. It 
evoked the Articles of Confederation, which clearly rested 
upon the authority of the states, as well as the Virginia 
Resolutions. If, as the Court of Appeals assumed, the
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locus of power rested in the states, then "it was only 
logical . . . that the states should also possess the power 
to declare a federal law unconstitutional."49 Thus we have 
the spectacle, in 1815, of the high Virginia Court 
expressly adopting both the language and rationale of the 
Virginia Resolutions. And, although the federal Supreme 
Court refused to accept the Virginia argument,30 the 
Virginia court never retracted the radical tract which was 
Hunter v. Martin.
The Virginia's court's interpretation of federalism 
was to have important implications. In supporting the 
power of the state, the Court of Appeals was also—  
implicitly— articulating a theory about the nature of the 
social order in the new federal republic. In this theory 
the state was all-important. By jealously repelling 
federal intrusions, be they by statute, treaty, or 
adjudication, the Virginia Court of Appeals was attempting 
to secure "the continued survival of [the] states as 
independent centers of social policy," as well as the chief 
defenders of liberty and property.31 It was the belief in 
this fundamental objective, undiluted by the passage of 
decades, that would color Virginia perceptions of develop­
ments in the ultimate constitutional crisis at mid­
century .3 2
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CHAPTER VII
EPILOGUE: THE OLD ORDER AND THE NEW
Between 1776 and 1830 Virginia gradually worked out 
the details of its "Revolutionary settlement." That 
settlement included the implementation of a new constitu­
tional order, the accommodation of British traditions to 
Virginia's practical and ideological requirements, and the 
practical application of republican principles. At the 
same time, the Commonwealth was obliged to come to terms 
with a new federal government of unknown powers, with 
potentially critical implications for concepts of liberty 
and republicanism.
In all of these achievements the Virginia Court of 
Appeals played a vital role. In the process of adjudicat­
ing the issues presented before it— ranging from matters of 
high constitutional law to affairs of seeming insig­
nificance— the court placed its own unmistakable imprint on 
each of the major areas of concern. For example, the court 
established the constitution as the framework around which 
the new order would be fashioned through the elevation-of 
the constitution and declaration of rights to the status of 
a higher, organic law. Moreover, the Virginia high court 
helped to implement that order through its perceptiveness
241
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in delineating and responding to threats to the balance of 
the new system. The accommodation of British legal 
traditions to the demands of a new society oriented toward 
republican principles was chiefly the work of the Court of 
Appeals as well. The court adopted common-law principles 
and precedents in a judicious and pragmatic manner—  
respecting the traditions of the common law, with their 
stable rules of property, yet willing to pragmatically 
alter the law ->n the interests of necessity or sound 
reason. The substance of the new republican principles 
adopted by Virginians was articulated by the General 
Assembly, but the Court of Appeals played a key role in 
interpreting and applying the legislative initiatives.
While supporting legislative intent whenever possible, the 
court continued to display a respect for stability in the 
law. Finally, through its localist response to the 
challenges of a new federal system, the Court of Appeals 
placed Virginia at the forefront of a restrictive theory of 
federal power that was to prove a viable alternative view 
of the proper nature of the federal relation.
Two developments of particular interest emerge from 
the contributions of the Court of Appeals to Virginia’s 
Revolutionary settlement. One was the unique role the 
court carved out for itself as an articulator and inter­
preter of policy in a republican polity. That role 
abounded in subtlety and complexity, but represented a 
consistent approach to the proper role of the judiciary.
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First and foremost, the court upheld the doctrine of 
popular sovereignty which served as the polar star of the 
new order. In mundane matters this meant a deference to 
legislative initiative, in the recognition that the 
legislature was the "most popular" branch, and the best 
articulator of the wishes of the people. In constitutional 
matters, however, the legislature had to bow to the 
constitution as the supreme expression of popular will. In
such instances, the Court of Appeals adopted a contrary 
approach and struck down legislative initiatives. In 
matters not directly dictated by constitution or statute, 
the court displayed a sophisticated approach to the 
articulation of policy. When— as was usually the case— the 
matter under adjudication came within the ambit of the 
traditional rules of the common law, the court in most 
cases deferred to precedent. However, the court was not 
slavish in its devotion to the traditional rules of law.
It did not hesitate to depart from longstanding practice 
when the realities of Virginia's situation did not comport 
with the old rules, or when the traditional law no longer 
appeared to make sense. The result was a traditional yet 
pragmatic approach to law which substantially shaped the 
new Commonwealth's legal system.
The second significant aspect of the Virginia court's 
contribution to the Revolutionary settlement was more 
substantive, and therefore more important. The Virginia 
Court of Appeals did much more than just implement
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constitutional language; much more than merely apply 
legislative directives. The court also applied a substan­
tive coloration to the nature of Virginia law, which 
became an integral part of the Revolutionary settlement 
itself. While the high court consistently supported 
republican principles and policies, it did so in a manner 
that can only be described as conservative. That is, the 
Court of Appeals routinely applied both common law and 
statute in such a way as to maintain existing rights of 
property and stability in the rules of law. This conserva­
tive "gloss,” applied to even the most radical responses to 
the issues posed by the Revolution, became the distinguish­
ing feature of Virginia's Revolutionary settlement.
The implications of this Revolutionary settlement are 
worthy of brief comment. The commitment to stability and 
property evinced by the Court of Appeals in its adjudica­
tions must be viewed in conjunction with another phenomenon 
emerging from the judicial decisions of the period. It has 
been a recurring theme of this analysis that throughout the 
half-century under study the substantive decisions of the 
Virginia Court of Appeals remained essentially consistent, 
and did not reflect a sense of evolution or change. The 
enduring stability of Virginia law and its commitment to 
conservative principles meshes nicely with the oligarchic 
institutional structure mandated by the constitution of 
1776. That document, it will be recalled, adopted the 
republican doctrine of popular sovereignty, but applied it
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in a conservative manner through its approach toward 
representation and apportionment. In effect, the constitu­
tion of 1776 granted control of the institutions of 
government to an eastern, conservative, slave-holding 
elite. This, of course, included the power to appoint the 
members of the Court of Appeals. It should come as no 
surprise, then, that Virginia's Revolutionary settlement 
favored the same values which were held dear by that ruling 
bloc.
The adoption of this oligarchic system in 1776 
generated no outpouring of resistance. This was because at 
the time of the Revolution the interests of the landholding 
elite were seen as essentially consistent wl'ch those of the 
rest of society, and because there was an "unchallenged 
social habit" of deference to the leadership that made up 
the elite.1
Importantly, this tradition of deference to the 
eastern elite did not long survive the Revolution, and the 
"old order," which remained ensconced in power as a result 
of the 1776 constitution, came under increasing challenge. 
The threat to the political sway of the eastern, conserva­
tive bloc reached its apex in the constitutional convention 
of 1829-1830. The resolution of that dispute— in the form 
of the constitution of 1830— forms a perfect capstone to 
our study of the nature of Virginia's Revolutionary 
settlement. At the terminus of the period under study, the 
Virginia elite succeeded in beating back the challenge of
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the forces of Virginia's new order, and thereby enshrined 
its peculiar perception of law and politics in the 
institutional structure of Virginia for another generation. 
It was not until the eve of the Civil War that Virginia 
finally succumbed to the demographic, economic, social, and 
political forces engendered by the developments of the 
nineteenth century, and adapted its constitution to the new 
reality. By that time, Virginia and the rest of the South 
were embroiled in a sectional controversy, and the belated 
move toward accommodation with the new order in Virginia 
was swallowed up in the swirl of events.
The proceedings of the constitutional convention of 
1829-1830 are worthy of no little attention. The debates 
of that convention evidenced the co-existence of two 
strains of republican thought, based upon identical 
underlying principles, but yielding widely divergent 
applications of those fundamental concepts. On the one 
hand, the ruling conservative elite espoused the doctrines 
of equality and popular sovereignty, but used those terms 
as they had been defined at the time of the Revolution: 
"equality” meant equality for only a few, and "popular 
sovereignty" presumed a suffrage limited to those with a 
"stake in society"— that is, those who owned land. 
Moreover, the elite maintained that the government of the
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Commonwealth was properly in their hands. By 1829 even the 
conservatives could not justify this assertion based on a 
conception of a homogeneous society of which they were the 
natural leaders; instead, they based their claim to power 
on the pragmatic assumption that only by holding the reins 
of power could they protect their peculiar form of 
property— that is, their interest in slaves.
The reformers, on the other hand, began from precisely 
the same republican premises: popular sovereignty and
equality. In their argument, however, these terms had an 
expansive new definition which embraced all adult white 
males, regardless of wealth, or type of property owned, or 
place of residence. Moreover, the reformers argued, the 
institutions of Virginia's government should be restruc­
tured to reflect the new demographic reality of the 
westward shift of population in the state.
In the end, the debates represented a classic 
confrontation between a minority, representing and 
articulating the principles of the "old order" in Virginia, 
and a majority, which represented a new reality in Virginia 
and a concomitant new variation of republicanism which 
comported with that new reality.
The tension between the diverging interpretations of 
republicanism had its source in the evolution of Virginia 
society after 1776. Changes in both the nature and 
distribution of the Commonwealth's population after 1776 
doomed the halcyon days of unchallenged rule by the eastern
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elite. Two basic demographic trends fueled the new 
dissatisfaction. The first was western population growth. 
While the adult white population of th^ Valley of Virginia 
and the transmontane region increased rapidly, the number 
of counties (and hence the number of delegates and 
senators) did not keep up.2 The result was the increasing 
demand for legislative apportionment based on population. 
Indeed, it was "natural that in the Valley and across the 
Alleghenies, the new men of local substance should want a 
redistribution of members that would give them weight in 
the Assembly proportionate to their numbers."3 The second 
demographic trend was the changing nature of Virginia's 
population. Virginia cities saw the growth of a non- 
freeholding class of merchants and artisans, while the 
entire Commonwealth experienced a rise in the number of 
tenants who lived on the land without actually owning it.4 
Under the existing suffrage laws these men were denied the 
right to vote, and they began to demand reform of the 
franchise. In sum, "the old, unreformed system of 
representation was working a grievous injustice upon a 
widespread and capably led minority [indeed, quite possibly 
a majority] who were no longer content to be subordinate to 
a government in which they had no voice."3
Perhaps more important was the fact that by the 
nineteenth century Virginia society had developed to the 
extent that any claim to its homogeneity— the implicit 
basis of the eighteenth-century deferential society— was
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ludicrous. Indeed, diversity was the norm rather than the 
exception. Even the reality of the eastern portion of 
Virginia— the Tidewater and Piedmont sections which served 
as the locus of power of the conservative elite— did not 
comport with traditional views of a homogeneous society. 
True, much of the agricultural land in this section was 
controlled by slaveholding planters, but this region was 
also the home to several emerging urban centers. In these 
rising cities lived industrialists, artisans, mechanics, 
tradesmen, and merchants. Many of these men owned no 
slaves, and their wealth was in the form of personal 
property rather than in landed estates. Moreover, the 
interests of many of these urban residents opposed those of 
the rural elite, favoring such pro-business policies as 
internal improvements and protective tariffs. As Alison 
Goodyear Freehling has noted, "Far from being monolithic 
and harmonious, white Tidewater and Piedmont Virginia was 
in 1830 a complex, discordant society characterized by 
sometimes similar, sometimes dissimilar interests between 
urban and rural elite, and by more deep-rooted class rifts 
between democratic white artisans and aristocratic white 
planters."6
Similarly, the Valley of Virginia was also charac­
terized by diversity. In the Valley lived a curious 
mixture. There were a large number of settlers of German 
and Scotch-Irish descent, who tended to be non-slaveowning 
small farmers of little wealth, but with strongly held
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.
250
egalitarian beliefs. On the other hand, the Valley had 
also become home to a significant population of slavehold­
ing planters, with attitudes and interests closely akin to 
their eastern brethren. The Valley of Virginia, then, 
represented a kind of amalgam of small, independent 
farmers and slaveholding planters.7
It was the transmontaine west, however (much of it now 
in West Virginia), which most clearly proved that Virginia 
was no longer a homogeneous society based upon agriculture 
and slaves, and deferential to the Tidewater gentry. This 
area was peopled by Germans and Scotch-Irish, many of whom 
migrated to the area from the North. They exemplified the 
independent, egalitarian, small farmer. In addition, the 
major urban center in the area, Wheeling, relied upon 
neither slaves for its labor supply nor plantation 
agriculture for its raw materials. Even its markets tended 
to be in the North and West. There was little about 
transmontaine society to link it to the conservative 
eastern bloc. As Freehling observed, this portion of 
Virginia society was one "whose lifestyle and values were 
more akin to nonslaveholding northern and western states 
than to the slaveholding Tidewater and Piedmont."8
It was Freehling who best summarized the varied nature 
of Virginia in 1830. "Virginia at the close of the first 
three decades of the nineteenth century was a complex, 
heterogeneous society, a region of extremes in both lands 
and peoples. Her vast territory . . . encompassed . , .
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rural plantations and urban factories, aristocratic 
slaveholders and democratic nonslaveholders. . . . Perhaps 
more than any other state, Virginia mirrored polarities 
within the nation as a whole."9 It was this underlying 
reality that served as the basis for the developments of 
1829-1830, a reality that made the results of the conven­
tion all the more remarkable.
Demands for a constitutional convention to reform the 
1776 document had been voiced almost from its adoption, but 
it did not become a matter of public urgency until the 
nineteenth century. In the first decades of the new 
century, protest against the outdated constitution reached 
a crescendo. The conservative-dominated legislature 
succeeded in rebuffing these calls for reform for a 
considerable period, but in 1828 the General Assembly 
finally succumbed to popular demand, and agreed to a 
referendum on the convention question. Despite the 
undemocratic nature of the referendum {only those eligible 
to vote under existing law could participate), the measure 
passed, and the stage was set for the formal consideration 
of possible amendments to the constitution of 1776.10
Both the terms of the debate and the substantive 
results of the 1829-1830 Virginia constitutional convention 
are highly important for our understanding of the nature of 
the republican ideal as it was applied in Virginia; for the 
policy outcome of that convention and the theories 
underlying it set Virginia apart from the generally-
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accepted pattern of nineteenth-century political and 
intellectual development.
The convention debates centered around the two key 
issues of the suffrage and legislative apportionment. On 
the suffrage issue, reformers argued that such notions as 
"popular sovereignty” and "equality” demanded that all 
adult white males should vote. To continue to link the 
right to vote with the ownership of real property was 
nothing less than "aristocracy." The conservatives replied 
that their version of the suffrage was equally as repub­
lican as the reformers. Since the inception of the 
republic, they argued, the right to vote had been tied to 
the ownership of property. Importantly, the conservatives 
could buttress their argument by pointing to the actual 
provisions of the 1776 declaration of rights and constitu­
tion.
On the matter of legislative apportionment, the 
reformers advocated a "white basis”; that is, legislative 
seats should be allocated on the basis of the entire white 
population of Virginia. Again they cited the rhetoric of 
popular sovereignty and equality to support their cause.
The conservatives countered with an apportionment plan 
founded on a "mixed basis,” where legislative representa­
tion would reflect not only the white population, but also 
the slave population. This of course would favor the large 
slaveowners of eastern Virginia. The conservatives 
supported this plan by again appealing to the sanctity of
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property. They asserted that, unless their dominant 
position in the legislature were maintained, their 
ownership of property in slaves would be trampled by a non- 
slaveholding majority which would inevitably tax their 
peculiar species of property out of existence.11
After considerable debate and much political maneuver­
ing, the issues of legislative apportionment and freehold 
suffrage finally came to a vote. The result reflected a 
certain amount of compromise by both sides, but the 
ultimate effect of the determinations of the 1829-1830 
constitutional convention was a clear victory for the 
conservative interests, and solidified their hold on the 
institutions of state government for another three decades.
In the apportionment battle, legislative districts 
were indeed permitted to be based upon the white population 
alone. But the new districts were to be based on 1820 
population figures, with no provision for future reappor­
tionment. This had the effect of assuring a permanent 
conservative majority in both houses of the legislature.12 
The suffrage issue also reflected a compromise which 
nevertheless inured to the benefit of conservatives. The 
final formula for qualifying for the franchise was quite 
complex. It did extend the vote to certain carefully- 
delineated nonfreeholders (who were tax-paying heads of 
families), but even with the expanded franchise, still 
fully 30 percent of all adult white males in Virginia were 
denied the right to participate in the government of the
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Commonwealth.13 In addition, the convention expressly 
rejected the reform demand for the popular election of 
Virginia's executive and judiciary. As always, this 
privilege remained with the conservative-dominated General 
Assembly.14
The reason for the conservative victory in 1830 was 
not far to seek: in structuring the elections of delegates
to the convention, the conservative state legislature in 
effect "stacked the deck" against any meaningful reform.
The convention elections were held under existing suffrage 
requirements, which of course disqualified all nonfree­
holders from voting. Moreover, the delegates were 
apportioned according to existing senate districts, which 
in turn reflected the 1810 census. The end result was to 
place the convention safely in the hands of conservatives. 
As Alison G. Freehling has noted, "the struggle to 
democratize Virginia's government seemed doomed to defeat 
even before the convention began."15
It took another thirty years for the forces of 
democracy in Virginia to muster enough enthusiasm and 
support to once again assault the citadel of Virginia's 
conservative constitutional structure. By 1850, however, 
the demographics of the Commonwealth had overwhelmed the 
eastern conservatives, and in 1850-1851 another constitu­
tional convention framed a document that reflected more 
democratic mores. While the senate retained its tradi­
tional flavor, reapportionment in the house was placed upon
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a democratic basis, and universal white manhood suffrage 
became the rule. At this time also came the popular 
election of the governor and judiciary.16
The debates in the 1829-1830 constitutional convention 
and its eventual outcome provide an opportunity to observe 
a matter of immense importance to our understanding of 
republicanism in Virginia: the shifting nature of
republican thought in response to changes in the surround­
ing society. Virginia, in what has become a recognizable 
pattern, responded in a uniquely conservative manner to the 
key issues posed by the constitutional debate.
Perhaps the most obvious issue raised by the debates 
was one that was also the most fundamental: Just what was
the meaning of this term "popular sovereignty" which 
slipped so glibly from everyone's tongue: or, to put it 
another way, just what was meant by "democracy"? To begin, 
it is clear that the notion of popular sovereignty held by 
the framers of the 1776 constitution was not the same 
notion that was advocated by the reformers in the 1829-1830 
convention. It is relatively certain that those men who 
framed Virginia's original constitution intended sover­
eignty to be exercised by just those people to whom they 
had granted the suffrage; that is, by those with the 
necessary "stake" in society, which of course meant a
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landed interest. This position appeared rather limiting 
and self-serving in retrospect, but at the time it raised 
no great outcry. Moreover, it is no doubt equally true 
that the framers felt no overpowering sense of hypocrisy. 
For one thing, this theory comported with accepted belief. 
For another, it properly reflected an agrarian society with 
a built-in deference to the landed gentry. Perhaps most 
important, however, was the fact that placing power in the 
people had a different import than it was to have in the 
nineteenth century. As Joyce Appleby has perceived, 
"Democratic values were invoked not to enlarge the people's 
power in government but rather to justify the abandonment 
of the authority traditionally exercised over them."17 In 
other words, the broad democratic rhetoric found in 
documents such as the Virginia declaration of rights was 
intended not so much to justify democracy as it was to 
justify an unprecedented republican revolution.
All this began to change as the eighteenth century 
gave way to the nineteenth. In those decades changes in 
the social, economic, and political sphere came to undercut 
virtually all of the rationalizations for the eighteenth- 
century approach. In the new century many non-landed 
individuals were quite qualified to exercise the franchise. 
Moreoever, even if one continued to adhere to the "stake in 
society" theory of the suffrage, new, non-landed forms of 
wealth made the older requirement of real property 
ownership archaic. 'In addition to the social and economic
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changes, there was a new political theory in the air; 
indeed, one that had been implemented by most other states 
by 1830. There was now a belief that all (adult white 
male) people should have a say in government.
With all this seeming inevitability behind the 
reformers' position, it is startling to find a constitu­
tional convention at the end of the third decade of the 
nineteenth century bucking the democratic tide so success­
fully. The reason Virginia conservatives were able to 
suceed may be explained by nothing more than their skills 
at political infighting. The important thing, however, is 
not how they succeeded, but what it meant for Virginia 
society and Virginia republicanism. One striking result of 
the restrictive suffrage requirements that emitted from the 
Virginia convention was the apparent adherence to something 
akin to the eighteenth-century view of popular sovereignty. 
On a more practical level, placing the institutions of 
government in the hands of conservative, eastern slave­
holders portended policy choices in the future which would 
be consonant with their interests.18 All in all, it seems 
that, while many of the other states of the union were 
progressing toward a more democratic order, the leadership 
of Virginia consciously chose an eighteenth-century version 
of popular sovereignty and republicanism. The Commonwealth 
continued to march in place (or, if anything, took a 
backward step) in the face of a changing political and 
social world.
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The Virginia constitution of 1830 was consistent in 
many ways with the Revolutionary settlement that was worked 
out by the Court of Appeals (among others) in the preceding 
decades. It gave voice to republican values, yet applied 
them in a manner that was unequivocally conservative. As 
J. R. Pole has noted, "The new social order was held at bay 
for more than a generation.1,19
The long-term implications of Virginia’s peculiar 
approach to Revolutionary republicanism are beyond the 
scope of this study. Perhaps the most suggestive pos­
sibility has been articulated by James M. McPherson, in 
his recent, acclaimed treatment of the Civil War. The 
Confederate States of America, McPherson contends, 
represented a reassertion of the ideals and traditions of 
the American Revolution. "The South’s concept of repub­
licanism had not changed in three quarters of a century," 
he notes, "the North's had. With complete sincerity, the 
South fought to preserve its version of the republic of the 
founding fathers— a government of limited powers that 
protected the rights of property and whose constituency 
comprised an independent gentry and yeomanry of the white 
race undisturbed by large cities, heartless factories, 
restless free workers, and class conflict. The accession 
to power of the Republican party,” McPherson continues, 
"with its ideology of competitive, egalitarian, free-labor 
capitalism, was a signal to the South that the northern 
majority had turned irrevocably toward this frightening,
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revolutionary future. Therefore," he concludes, "secession 
was a pre-emptive counterrevolution to prevent the Black 
Republican revolution from engulfing the South."20
Regardless of whether McPherson’s particular vision is 
correct or not, an understanding of Virginia's peculiar 
form of republicanism will inevitably lead to a better 
appreciation of the complex forces which were at large in 
America in the early nineteenth century.
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NOTES TO CHAPTER V I I
1. Pole, "Representation and Authority in Virginia," 16- 
17, 23, 28, 29. See generally Charles S. Sydnor, American 
Revolutionaries in the Making.
2. Beeman, The Old Dominion, pp. 43, 44; Pole, "Represen­
tation and Authority in Virginia," 34-35; Alison Goodyear 
Freehling, Drift toward Dissolution; The Virginia Slavery 
Debate of 1831-1832 (Baton Rouge; Louisiana State 
University Press, 1987), p. 35.
3. Pole, "Representation and Authority in Virginia," 35. 
See generally Charles H. Ambler, Sectionalism in Virginia, 
1776-1861 (Chicago, 1910). Alison G. Freehling, however, 
notes that Ambler is simplistic in his east-west dichotomy 
on this issue. Freehling, Drift toward Dissolution, p. 39.
4. Pole, "Representation and Authority in Virginia," 35; 
Freehling, Drift toward Dissolution, p. 35.
5. Pole, "Representation and Authority in Virginia," 32- 
33.
6. Freehling, Drift toward Dissolution, pp. 22-24.
7. Ibid., pp. 30-33.
8. Ibid., pp. 25-27.
9. Ibid., p. 34.
10. Freehling, Drift toward Dissolution, pp. 37-38, 40-45; 
Pole, "Representation and Authority in Virginia," 33-37.
11. See generally Proceedings and Debates of the Virginia 
State Convention of 1829-30 (Richmond, 1830). See 
Freehling, Drift toward Dissolution, pp. 39-75; Pole, 
"Representation and Authority in Virginia," 34-42.
12. Freehling, Drift toward Dissolution, pp. 68, 70; Pole, 
"Representation and Authority in Virginia," 46.
13. Freehling, Drift toward Dissolution, p. 76.
14. Ibid., p. 77.
15. Ibid., p. 48.
16. Ibid., pp. 239-40; Pole, "Representation and Authority 
in Virginia," 47.
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17. Appleby, "Republicanism in Old and New Contexts," 25.
18. Just a year later the Virginia House of Delegates
engaged in a portentious debate over the future of slavery 
in Virginia. It can only be a matter of speculation how 
this debate might have turned out had the assembly been 
composed of more non-slaveholding westerners. See 
generally Freehling, Drift toward Dissolution.
19. Pole, "Representation and Authority in Virginia," 28.
20. James M. McPherson, Battle Cry of Freedom: The Civil
War Era (New York: Oxford University Press).
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APPENDIX A 
SHORT TITLES
Call Daniel Call, Reports of Cases Argued and
Adjudged in the Court of Appeals of Virginia 
(6 vols.; Richmond, 1801-33).
Cranch William Cranch, Reports of Cases Argued and
Adjudged in the Supreme Court of the United 
States, 1801-1815 (9 vols.; New York and 
Washington, 1804-17).
Gilmer Francis W. Gilmer, Reports of Cases Decided
in the Court of Appeals of Virginia 
(Richmond, 1822).
Hening William Waller Hening, ed. The Statutes at
Large; Being a Collection of All the Laws of 
Virginia . . . (13 vols.; 1819-23; Char­
lottesville, 1969 reprint).
Hen. & M. William W. Hening and William Munford, Reports
of Cases Argued and Determined in the Supreme 
Court of Appeals of Virginia . . . (4 vols-; 
Philadelphia, 1808-11).
Leigh Benjamin Watkins Leigh, Reports of Cases
Argued and Determined in the Court of 
Appeals, and in the General Court of 
Virginia (Richmond, 1830-31).
Munf. William Munford, Reports of Cases Argued and
Determined in the Supreme Court of Appeals 
of Virginia (6 vols.; New York, Philadel­
phia, Fredericksburg, Richmond, 1812-21).
Rand. Peyton Randolph, Reports of Cases Argued and
Determined in the Court of Appeals of 
Virginia (6 vols.; Richmond, 1823-30).
Va. Cas. William Brockenbrough, A Collection of Cases
Decided by the General Court of Virginia (2 
vols.; Philadelphia and Richmond, 1815-26).
Wash. Busnrod Washington, Reports of Cases Argued
and Determined in the Court of Appeals of 
Virginia (2 vols.; Richmond, 1798-99).
Wheat. Henry Wehaton, Reports of Cases Argued and
Adjudged in the Supreme Court, 1816-1827 (12 
vols.; Philadelphia, 1816-27).
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APPENDIX B
MEMBERS OF VIRGINIA COURT OF APPEALS, 1788-1830
John Blair 1788-1789
Edmund Pendleton 1788-1803
Paul Carrington 1788-1807
Peter Lyons 1788-1809
William Fleming 1788-1824
James Mercer 1789-1793 •
Henry Tazewell 1793-1794
Spencer Roane 1794-1822
St. George Tucker 1804-1811
James Pleasants January 1811- 
March 1811
William H. Cabell 1811-1830
Francis T. Brooke 1811-1830
John Coalter 1811-1830
John W. Green 1822-1830
Dabney Carr 1824-1830
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